

Incumbency in the Chilean Parliament: Continuities and Change

Patricio Navia
Pdn200@is7.nyu.edu
Department of Politics
& Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies
New York University
53 Washington Square South 4W
New York, NY 10012

Number of words: 11037 (including tables and notes)

March 2, 2000

I draw on existing theories on incumbency and incumbency advantage and explore their applicability to the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. I find that the re-election rates of incumbents have been historically high, but I also report an upward trend in the 20th century. I suggest that consolidation of incumbency advantage was taking place before the 1973 democratic breakdown and consolidated after 1989. I also report on the incumbency advantage among candidates for the Chamber of Deputies between 1965-1973 and during the post 1989 period. I advance a statistical model to explain what led incumbents to seek re-election in 1997 and why most incumbents were successful when seeking re-election. The model uses socio-demographic variables from each of the country 60 electoral districts. Incumbents tend to seek re-election at higher rates in poorer districts. The best predictor of incumbency defeat in 1997 was the occurrence of an incumbent defeat in 1993. I then discuss the effect high incumbency advantage has on accountability and responsiveness in Chile.

“Prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Hyatt Regency Miami, March 16-18, 2000”

Incumbency in the Chilean Parliament: Continuities and Change¹

According to Przeworski's minimalist definition, democracy is a system where parties lose elections (1991: 10). Following Dahl (1971), Przeworski has suggested that political turnovers resulting from electoral defeats are central to the democratic process. Uncertainty is a key component of electoral politics. Challengers and incumbents participate in elections precisely because they believe they have a chance of winning the election.

Erikson's (1971) identified the advantage incumbent politicians have over challengers when facing an election in the United States. Subsequently, many scholars have studied the electoral advantage of incumbents in the United States Congress (Gelman and King 1990, King and Gelman 1991). Alesina and Rosenthal summarize those findings by suggesting that "distributive concerns, coupled with the seniority system in Congress, provide voters with strong incentives to re-elect incumbents" (1995: 137). It has been well established that incumbents have an overwhelming advantage over challengers in United States congressional elections (Gelman and King 1990, King and Gelman 1990, Fiorina 1989).

As Alesina and Rosenthal claim, "incumbents, in part through the use of the pre-requisites of office, have strong informational advantages over challengers. As a consequence, *incumbency advantage* is a major determinant of congressional elections" (1995: 137). Popkin sees the incumbency advantage as an information shortcut for voters, and as the by-product of a positive externalities enjoyed by office holders. Popkin suggests that incumbents "can claim credit for such things as keeping the nation out of nuclear war and preserving the basic structure of government" (1995: 33). Those positive externalities favor the incumbent when competing for re-election. In the American political scene, being an incumbent provides a clear advantage over challengers. As Grofman recalls, "incumbents, in fact, rarely lose" (1995: 180).

Ferejohn, when discussing the moral hazard and adverse selection models to explain campaign promises, suggests that voters can use elections to punish incumbents and throw them out of office. In a sense, retrospective voters will penalize incumbents who perform badly. However, in his conclusion, going beyond the predictive power of the models and after analyzing the empirical evidence, Ferejohn asks: "why do incumbents keep getting re-elected?" (1995: 123)

The existence of high re-election rates for incumbents in the U.S. Congress runs contrary to the powerful intuition suggested by Przeworski. If democracies are systems where parties lose elections but at the same time incumbent politicians are hard to defeat, then the higher the incumbency advantage the less likely parties are going to lose elections. Of course, in a perfect world, elected politicians will always adopt the policies preferred by the electorate, accountability exists and all incumbents are re-elected. Yet, there is evidence that the observed high incumbency re-election rates are not entirely the result of satisfaction among the electorate the performance of their representatives. Thus, one may ask how has the increase in incumbency re-election rates affect accountability and democratic control over elected politicians? The tension arising from the need for alternation of power between different political parties and the hurdles posed to alternation by the incumbency advantage poses a formidable challenge to democratic theory. However, is this a problem that only exists in the United States? Is it just

¹ I am thankful to the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University for providing financial assistance to conduct field research in Chile. Adam Przeworski, Mark P. Jones and Jorge Buendía provided valuable comments, but all mistakes are my responsibility. Sergio Bitar, Yamil Haddad, Alvaro Elizalde, Rossana Pérez, Carlos Almonte and Francisco Javier Diaz in Chile helped me with this research in different ways.

limited to countries that use single member districts? And if not, can we learn anything by studying the phenomenon in a different country with different electoral arrangements?

Chile is a country with several features that make a comparative analysis useful for our understanding of the incumbency advantage under different electoral systems. In addition, it can also help us develop insights on the effect of incumbency advantage on accountability and responsiveness. Contrary to the U.S. where the electoral system in use is the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), or single member district system, Chile had an Open-List Proportional Representation arrangement during the 20th century. Moreover, while the U.S. maintained the same electoral arrangement throughout the century, Chile modified the magnitude (number of representatives per district) and composition of its electoral districts over time. Yet, Chile kept an Open-List PR system, only district size and the district magnitude changed.

Like their counterparts in the U. S., members of the Chilean parliament can seek re-election when their terms expire (Jones 1995b, 1997). Unlike term-limits restrictions in place in Mexico (Buendía 1998) and Costa Rica (Carey, 1997: 206) legislators in Chile do not face term limits or re-election restrictions. The 1833 Constitution (effective until 1925), the 1925 Constitution (effective until 1973) and the 1980 Constitution, effective today, allow for re-election of members of parliament. Members of the Chamber of Deputies have made use of such provision and have sought re-election at high rates. Between 1965 and 1973 (3 parliamentary elections), an average of 68% of the incumbent deputies sought re-election. In 1993, 73% of incumbent deputies sought re-election and 70% did in 1997. Re-election rates for incumbents have also been considerably high. Between 1965 and 1973, 64% of incumbent deputies seeking re-election kept their seats; 80% did in 1993 and in 1997, the percentage of successful incumbents reached an all-time high of 86%. These figures are higher than Argentina's exceptionally low re-election rates (Jones 1997: 276, 1995a) and even higher than in Colombia, where re-election rates have been reported as high (Archer and Shugart 1997: 138-139). As a partial result of the high re-election rates, the membership of the Chamber of Deputies in Chile has enjoyed a great deal of continuity. During the 20th century, there were 24 parliamentary elections. On the average, 39% of the Chamber of Deputies was composed of incumbents, but there is evidence that the trend has accentuated overtime as shown in figure 1.

Here I look at the phenomenon before 1973 and after the restoration of democracy in 1989 and find that a large number of deputies seek re-election when their four-year terms expire. Despite a profound change in the nature of proportional representation adopted in 1988, the rate of incumbent deputies seeking re-election is strikingly similar to that existing before 1973. I also report an increase in incumbent re-election rates after 1989, compared to the three elections held between 1965 and 1973. However, I suggest that re-election rates were already on the rise before 1973. Thus, the upward trend should not be attributed solely to the effects of the new electoral arrangements. The period studied here includes all parliamentary elections in the 20th century, but limited data available only allows to study incumbency re-election rates only for the 1965, 1969, 1973, 1993 and 1997 elections.

From 1900 to 1925, the 1833 Constitution ruled Chile; from 1925 to 1973, the country was ruled by the 1925 Constitution. Between 1973 and 1989 no elections were held. Presidential and parliamentary elections were restored in 1989, but since the parliament was closed under the dictatorship, there were no incumbents. The 24 elections covered were held under three different constitutions and three different electoral laws. The 5 elections analyzed for incumbents seeking re-election were held under two different constitutions and two different electoral laws.

Table 1 about here

Electoral Arrangements before 1973

Chile adopted a Constitution in 1833 and major electoral reform was passed in 1890 (Valenzuela 1998). A political crisis erupted in 1891 between the executive and legislative. A social, political and military confrontation ensued, but in the end, Parliament prevailed (Collier and Sater 1996). Although the 1833 Constitution did not suffer major alterations, after president Balmaceda's death in 1891 parliamentary government was adopted. In fact, "no formal change was made to the constitution, but it was understood by everybody that hereafter a president should not be able to govern without submitting to the public will as expressed by parliament" (Reinsch 1909: 514). Since then, and until 1925, Chile was "the only country in the new world which has the cabinet system of government; parliamentary government exists here in its most extreme form, as the executive is not given the power of dissolving the popular chamber" (Reinsch 1909: 509). Yet, contrary to European parliamentary democracies, Chile's parliamentary system did not fully eliminate presidentialism. The president was directly elected and was often in the position of influencing the selection of congressional candidates.

The Parliamentary Republic, as the 1891-1925 period is known, witnessed the development of an industrial and mining working class (Meller 1996, Collier and Sater 1996). The election of Radical Party presidential candidate Arturo Alessandri in 1920 broke a tradition. Alessandri was the first president who did not belong to the Liberal or Conservative parties. An ongoing conflict between president Alessandri and parliament between 1920 and 1924 led to a new political crisis. The outcome this time favored the executive as president Alessandri successfully resigned to later return with increased powers and a new constitution. The 1925 Constitution was presidentialist, and the parliament lost many of the powers it enjoyed under the 1833 Constitution as interpreted after the 1891 Civil War. However, neither president Alessandri nor the 1925 Constitution was successful in bringing about political stability. In 1927, military strongman Carlos Ibañez became president after winning an unchallenged election. Ibañez's term came to an abrupt end in 1931 and a series of military and civilian governments alternated in power until new elections were held in 1932. Arturo Alessandri won those elections, supported chiefly by his former foes. Alessandri's election in 1932 marks the beginning of Chile's 40-year era of democratically elected governments.

Alessandri's term (1932-38) preceded three consecutive Radical Party (PR) governments (1938-1952). The PR, socialists and communists formed the Popular Front in 1938. Political turmoil and internal conflicts within the Popular Front brought the alliance to an end in 1947. Five years later, General Carlos Ibañez won the presidential election with a campaign that resembled General Perón's populism in neighboring Argentina. Ibañez's Agrarian Labor Party made a parliamentary debut in 1953 but Ibañez's own demise also brought his party down by 1958. The 1958 presidential election ended PR's domination of the political center, marked the rise of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the consolidation of the Socialists (PS) and Communists (PC) in the left. In 1964, conservative parties supported the PDC presidential candidate in order to prevent PS Salvador Allende from winning the election. The three-way right-center-left divide of Chilean politics returned for the 1970 presidential elections, and the 1973 military coup brought an end to electoral politics in Chile.

Between 1891-1925 and 1932-1973 Chile had stable elected governments. Before 1925 political participation was highly restricted to a male, literate, property-owning elite, but elections were held uninterruptedly every three years and representatives from opposition parties were elected and served in parliament. After 1925, parliamentary elections were held every four years and presidential elections every six years. Women gained the right to vote in national elections in 1948, literacy requirements were lifted in 1970, and enfranchisement was extended to 18 year olds.

Starting in 1925, the Chilean parliament was bicameral and members of both chambers were chosen from electoral districts grouped according to the political division of the country using a d'Hondt proportional representation system. There were 29 electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies and each district elected between 1 and 18 deputies. Districts in rural areas were over represented and districts in urban areas, particularly Santiago, were heavily under represented. This was a result of demographic changes and a decrease in the rural population that were not translated into changes in representation because no major re-districting or new apportionment was made after 1925. The Chamber of Deputies was composed of 147 members until 1969 and 150 thereafter. The rather permissive electoral arrangements with large district magnitude allowed for the emergence of several political parties. The threshold to clinch a seat in parliament in large districts in Santiago was less than 6%. Faundez (1997) and Navia and Sandoval (1998) have shown that the effective number of parties was on the decline when the democratic breakdown took place in 1973, but in general the system has been historically regarded as permissive in fostering the existence of a multi-party system.

Table 2 About Here

Electoral Arrangements after 1989

The military government (1973-1990) adopted a new Constitution in 1980 and democratic life was restored when General Pinochet lost a plebiscite in 1988 that would have made him a constitutionally elected president for an additional 8-year term. Democratic elections were held in 1989 under electoral rules established in the 1980 Constitution. The country was divided into 60 electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies. Proportional Representation was used to allocate seats, but the district magnitude was fixed at 2 seats per district. Districts were intended to be roughly equal in size, but because all 13 regions were guaranteed at least one district, smaller regions were over represented and larger regions (including Santiago) were significantly under represented. No constitutional provisions exist for reapportionment or redistricting to reflect changes in population trends. The new electoral system is often referred to as a binomial electoral system (Geisse and Ramirez 1989: 209-217), but it technically represents a PR system with district magnitude of 2 (Magar, Rosenblum and Samuels 1998).

The 1989 elections were founding elections (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 61-64) and thus were special in many ways not the least of which was that no incumbents were running for parliament. The military closed the parliament in 1973 and although some legislators from that body ran again in 1989, it would be far fetch to identify them as incumbents, since they had not occupied office for 16 years. In 1993 and 1997, some incumbents elected in 1989 ran for re-election. In 1993 and 1997 the number of political parties with parliamentary representation had

significantly decreased in comparison with 1989 as several small parties unified or merged into larger parties (Carey 1998, Navia and Sandoval 1998).

Political parties formed two broad coalitions for the 1988 plebiscite. In the opposition, the PDC, PS and several other small left and centrist parties formed the *Concertación por el No*, which evolved in 1989 into *the Concertación por la Democracia*. The *Concertación* defeated General Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite, won the 1989 elections and has won every national election since 1988. The parties that supported General Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite formed an alliance called *Unión por Chile (Unión)*.² Both the *Concertación* and the *Unión* have suffered desertions since, but continue to control most elected positions for conservatives in parliament and municipal governments.

Because the electoral system adopted in 1989 is Open List Proportional Representation using the D'Hondt formula and with district magnitude of 2, it is extremely difficult for a party or coalition to win both seats in any given district. To win both seats, a coalition must double the number of votes of every competing coalition. A distribution of 55%--35% gives one seat to each coalition while a 60%--29% distribution gives both seats to the winning coalition. Voters choose one candidate from an open list presented by each coalition/party. The candidate with the most votes takes the first seat. The second seat is assigned to either the candidate with more votes in the second list or to the second candidate of the first list if the total votes for the first list doubled the second list. Coalitions that place third or lower do not get any seats in the given district. In 1989, the *Concertación* doubled the Center-Right coalition in 12 of the 60 districts, thus winning 72 seats (60 + 12). The *Unión* won 48 seats. In 1993, the seat distribution varied slightly, the *Concertación* fell from 72 to 70 and the *Unión* went from 48 to 50. In 1997, the *Concertación* won 68 seats and the *Unión* kept 46. 2 seats went to the UCCP, a former and likely future *Unión* coalition partner. The remaining two seats went to independent candidates (one linked to the *Concertación* and the other with the *Unión*).

Table 3 About Here

Incumbency before 1973

Excluding the president, elected officials face no restrictions on seeking immediate re-election. A 1925 provision, ratified in the 1980 Constitution, allows members of parliament to seek re-election indefinitely. A head count of the seating members indicates that incumbents have made up an average of 39% of the Chamber of Deputies during the 20th century. Overall, there is an upward trend as it can be clearly observed in Figure 1 starting in 1933. Data on incumbency re-election rates is not available, but a head-count of incumbents shows a decline from 1900 to 1933. The Parliamentary Republic ended in 1925 when the 1925 Constitution, which came into effect after the 1932 presidential and 1933 parliamentary elections. The lowest percentage of incumbents returning to the Chamber of Deputies this century occurred after the 1933 parliamentary elections when 12.6% of the elected deputies were incumbents.

In a sense, the change in the political landscape often associated with a new Constitution took place in Chile after the 1932 presidential elections, seven years after the 1925 Constitution was adopted. After 1932, there has been an upward trend in the number of deputies that are

² The *Unión por Chile* was first named *Democracia y Progreso* and later renamed *Unión por el Progreso de Chile*.

incumbents. In the 10 elections between 1937 and 1973, 42.5% of the Chamber of Deputies was composed of incumbents. Here I do not consider incumbents those deputies that were elected in one district but run for re-election in a different district. This was a case more prevalent among deputies from leftist parties who used their name recognition to make headway for their party in new districts, giving their 'safe seats' to less known candidates from their parties. Incumbency was an important factor in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies from 1932 until 1997 as almost half of the members of the Chamber were incumbents from the same districts, and some were incumbents from different districts.

Figure 1 About Here

Although there is a clear upward trend from 1932 to 1973, there were four occasions where incumbent deputies lost ground to challengers. The first occurred in the 1941 after the election of Popular Front's Aguirre Cerda (1938-41) gave a boost to PR, PS and PC candidates in the first parliamentary election after Aguirre Cerda's victory. The second anomaly in the upward trend occurred in the parliamentary elections of 1953. After the Popular Front came to and end when General Ibañez was elected in 1952, his Agrarian Labor Party was well posed to make significant electoral gains in the parliamentary elections of 1953. Ironically, the rapid growth of the Agrarian Labor Party gave way to a rapid consolidation of existing political parties and after Ibañez's demise incumbent deputies from traditional parties consolidated their presence in the Chamber. In the 1961 election, incumbents comprised 51.4% of the Chamber of Deputies, then the highest in 20th century history.

The presidential election of 1964 consolidated the PDC in the political center. The support given to Frei by conservative parties allowed him to channel his popularity to PDC candidates in the 1965 election. Most of the seats gained by the PDC came from defeated Liberal and Conservative Party incumbents. The Liberal and Conservative parties combined to obtain 30.4% of the vote in 1961, but in 1965 their combined vote for the Chamber of Deputies fell to 12.5%. The centrist PR also fell from 21.4% in 1961 to 13.2% in 1965 (Cruz-Coke 1984: 86). The PDC improved from 15.4% in 1961 to 42.3% in 1965. Leftist parties maintained their share of the vote between 1961 and 1965, as shown in Table 2.

The fourth decline in incumbency presence in the Chamber of Deputies took place in the 1973. After Allende's victory in 1970, the PDC and conservative parties aligned to oppose Allende's Popular Unity coalition. The 1973 parliamentary elections were a show of force between the left and the united center-right opposition. As Table 2 shows, leftist parties went from 26.1% of the vote in 1969 to 38% in 1973 (excluding the PR). Internal negotiations between the PDC and conservative parties to form a unified slate forced both groups to make concessions to produce a unified slate. Strategic negotiations in the PDC-conservative alliance and the increased electoral strength of the left caused a decline in the number of incumbent deputies in 1973.

Table 2 About Here

Incumbents winning and losing reelection (1965-73)

For the three pre-1973 elections for which I have data (1965, 1969 and 1973), an average of 66% of incumbent deputies sought re-election. I only considered those deputies who sought re-election in the same district where they were originally elected. Incumbency is not just name recognition (which they enjoyed as deputies), but also includes services rendered to their constituencies. Table 3 shows that about two thirds of incumbent deputies in 1965, 1969 and 1973 sought re-election when their terms expired.

As I discuss below, post-1989 incumbents have also sought re-election at rates around 66%, a rate similar to what is observed for the three pre-1973 elections for which I have data. Clearly, more data needs to be gathered in order to make valid generalizations about the behavior of incumbent deputies when deciding to seek re-election. But the striking similarities between pre-1973 rates and post-1989 rates seems unusual given the changes in the electoral law adopted before the 1989 election. Different electoral laws create different incentives for incumbents to seek re-election. The adoption of a different electoral law in Chile seems to have had no effect on the incentive structure for incumbents to seek re-election. Explanations that rely on political culture or political traditions might help explain why 2/3 of the incumbent deputies run for re-election, but a story needs to be told about the structure of incentives that informs the decision of incumbents deputies when deciding to seek re-election to the Chamber.

Table 3 about here

Incumbency After 1989

After the transition of 1989, incumbent deputies have sought reelection at a rate of 70%. The continuity in the pre 1973 and post 1989 period is also striking because of the time elapsed between the two periods. Carey reports that 33% of deputies in 1998 were serving their first term, 39% were in their second term and 28% in their third term (1998: 35). Although not enough elections have taken place to identify clear patterns about tenure length in the Chamber, the intuition is that members of parliament seek re-election at high rates but a majority of them do not stay for a long period of time (Carey 1998). Only one in four deputies re-elected in 1997 was first elected in 1989. Table 4 shows that deputies elected after 1989 sought re-election at similar rates that what is reported for before 1973. The adoption of a different electoral arrangement apparently did not have a great effect in altering the pattern for incumbents to seek re-election.

Table 4 About Here

Table 5 About Here

What leads incumbents to seek re-election?

The striking similarities between the number of incumbent deputies seeking re-election before 1973 and after 1989 points to some structural incentives and disincentives not related to the electoral laws in place. Although electoral arrangements influence the choice incumbents make to run for re-election or retire, there are also other considerations at stake as well that

influence the decision to seek re-election. In addition, positive and negative incentives not present before 1973 might be at play after 1989 and as a result, the effect electoral laws might have on the decision to seek re-election is offset by these new variables.

Some of the variables not related to electoral laws that might influence the decisions made by incumbents to seek re-election might have to do with whether they can pursue political careers outside the parliament. Belonging to the party that controls the executive might provide incentives for deputies not to seek re-election and instead take a position in the government. The costs of running political campaigns might also discourage some incumbents from seeking re-election, particularly in districts where challengers announce their campaigns early on and in addition have access to large resources. Finally, the realignment of political parties might also discourage incumbents from seeking re-election. For example, incumbents from the Agrarian Labor Party in 1957 might have chosen not to seek re-election because they could not count on the popularity of the party leader (President Ibañez) as they did in 1953 when they were first elected. Finally, changes in the composition of the electorate within the district might also provide positive or negative incentives for incumbents to seek re-election. If the population in a given district increases substantially or if the urban/rural breakdown changes radically between elections, incumbents may choose not to run and avoid spending time and resources in an apparently uphill campaign.

Using 1992 census data from the 60 electoral districts, I ran a logit model to identify possible socio-economic variables that can shed light into what types of districts show higher rates of incumbents seeking re-election in 1997. I coded districts where no incumbent sought re-election as 0, districts where one incumbent sought re-election as 1 and districts where two incumbents sought re-election as 2. There were 4 districts coded as 0, 27 coded as 1, and 29 coded as 2. The model includes as explanatory variables in the incumbent's decision to run for re-election three socio-demographic variables and two political variables. The socio-demographic variables were obtained from 1992 census data. The percentage of the labor force in the service (non agricultural, non manufacturing) industry, the poverty level and level of education are used as indicators of income and quality of life in each district.

The effect of higher quality of life on the incumbent's decision to run for re-election might go in two directions. On the one hand, we can argue that incumbents have an easier time running for re-election in poor districts because they need to spend less to finance their campaigns. However, the same can be said about potential challengers, they need to raise less money to mount a successful campaign. The second way we can interpret the relationship between higher quality of life in the district and the decision to seek re-election has to do with the political career opportunities for the incumbents. Incumbents from wealthy districts usually have a larger campaign war chests and more media (public) exposure. Often, wealthier districts are seen as first steps in a political career aimed at the senate or the presidential cabinet. For example, the two deputies elected in 1993 in the wealthiest district in the nation (District 23, Las Condes) ran as candidates for the 1997 senate election representing one of Santiago's two senatorial districts. Deputies from poorer districts do not get the same media exposure and will have a more difficult time using their positions as a launching pad for higher office. Then, we can tell two stories about the effect of wealth on re-election decisions by incumbents. Greater wealth can deter incumbents from seeking re-election, or it can foster their likelihood of seeking re-election.

In addition to the socio-economic variables, I used two political variables in my model. In the first variable I coded as 1 all those districts where one incumbent was defeated in 1993

(there were no districts in 1993 where the two incumbents were defeated) and coded 0 all districts where no incumbents were defeated. I expected that if an incumbent was defeated in that district in 1993, it was more likely that the 1997 incumbent would abstain from seeking re-election. The second political variable I used was the electoral difference between the *Concertación* coalition and the *Unión* (% *Concertación* / *Unión* vote). Intuitively, I expected that the greater the difference between the *Concertación* and *Unión* vote in 1993, the more likely an incumbent (presumably the *Concertación* incumbent) would choose to seek re-election.

The logit model (reported in Table 6) correctly predicts 41 of the 60 districts. Two of the three districts where no incumbents sought re-election are predicted correctly, 19 of the 28 districts where one incumbent sought re-election and 20 of the 29 cases where the two incumbents sought re-election are also predicted correctly. Although the model predictions are quite robust, only one of the independent variables is statistically significant in the logit equation: low schooling has a negative effect on having two incumbents run for re-election in any given district. Overall, the model fits the data well, but we do not have a good explanation for why incumbents decide to seek reelection. Socio-economic and political variables in the different districts do not allow us to develop a well-specified model that explains the incumbent's decision to seek reelection. Alternative hypotheses should be explored to explain why some incumbents seek reelection and others retire. Internal political party dynamics might also provide a good explanation, but the fact that incumbents tend to behave similarly across parties points to a broader explanation. Access to public opinion polls in the years after 1989 apparently did not have an effect on the number of incumbents vying for re-election as compared to before 1973 where polls were not available.

Valenzuela and Scully (1997) point to several continuities in Chilean electoral preferences and political party structure before 1973 and after 1989. I concur with them in suggesting that there are similar continuities in the behavior of incumbent deputies as they make their decision on whether to seek re-election. Carey (1998) has suggested that some deputies choose not to make long careers in parliament and move on to other positions. He studied the case of Costa Rica where immediate re-election is not allowed (Carey 1997). Since democracy was restored in Chile in 1989, we have only two elections to study whether deputies decide to pursue long careers parliament. That is clearly an insufficient number of elections to make valuable generalizations. In addition, political re-alignments within the *Concertación* and the *Unión* after the 1989 make the 1993 election an unusual one with regard to incumbents (Navia and Sandoval 1998). Many deputies elected in 1989 who sought re-election in 1993 had already switched parties.

Table 6 About Here

Why do incumbents lose their re-election bids?

Seeking re-election does not automatically result in being re-elected, but being an incumbent helps a great deal to secure a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. In the U. S. Congress, the incumbency advantage has actually been measured (Gelman and King 1990). The term incumbency advantage was coined precisely as a result of the high re-election rates among incumbents observed in the U. S.. Chile showed a similar trend. As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of incumbent deputies who went on to serve in the next period from 1900 to 1997

(exception in 1925-33) was higher than 30%. Before 1925, it was close to 35%. Consistent with what Gelman and King report (1990), incumbency has also been a definite advantage in Chile.

The elections leading up to 1973 show a continuous decrease in the number of incumbents defeated. In 1965, despite the profound political turmoil and the radical change in the political party structure and on the overall political landscape caused by the rise of the PDC (Scully 1995), only 45.3% of incumbents were defeated. In 1969, the number went down to 28.6% and up to 33% in 1973.

The Liberal Party went from electing 28 deputies in 1961 to 6 in 1965. The Conservative Party saw its representation shrank from 17 deputies in 1961 to 3 in 1965. After the electoral debacle, Liberals and Conservatives merged into the National Party in 1967 and obtained 20% of the vote and 33 deputies in 1969. Most losing incumbents in the 1965 election were Liberals and Conservatives. Incumbents from the PS, PR, PC and PDC performed substantially better, obtaining re-election rates similar to those observed for the 1969 and 1973 elections. It is the demise of the Liberal and Conservative parties what accounts for the high rate of incumbent defeats in 1965. 1965 was an anomaly, the absolute number of incumbents re-elected in 1961 is higher than in 1969 and 1973. Although I do not have data for incumbents not re-elected in 1961, it is highly unlikely that the number of incumbents seeking re-election in 1961 was significantly higher than in the other 3 elections. Although most scholars argue that the 1965 election is extraordinary because of the demise of conservative parties and the rise of the PDC (Angell 1993, Collier and Sater 1996, Fleet 1985), the 1965 results conform to the incumbency re-election rates pattern observed for other elections.

Before 1973, Chile had an Open List PR system. Voters could select one candidate from any party. Parties could present as many candidates as seats were available in any given district. With open list systems, parties have much lesser leverage to influence the composition of their parliamentary representation than with a closed list system. In the latter, the party ranks the candidates within the list and voters choose a party, not particular candidates within the party. I am not aware of any other study that systematically compare incumbency between PR and First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) systems. I have not found studies that compare Open List PR with Closed List PR systems either. One could argue that it is more difficult to defeat incumbents in single member districts because a challenger needs to obtain a simple majority to unseat an incumbent. Yet, because there is usually more than one incumbent in PR districts, challengers need not to secure a majority of the votes to defeat one of the incumbents. But in PR systems, both challengers and incumbents need to secure a smaller share of the vote to gain a seat. When the PR list is closed, voters can hardly have any influence on determining whether a particular incumbents wins reelection. In the case of Chile, because voters vote for individual candidates but seats are assigned according to the combined number of votes obtained by all the candidates in a given list, voters have less control over re-electing incumbents. For example, if an unpopular incumbent runs in a list with other popular candidates, the unpopular incumbent might still get elected because of the trickle down effect of her list partners' popularity. It's not altogether clear whether district magnitude has a positive or negative effect on incumbents successfully seeking re-election.

The evidence from Chile suggests that, whatever the cause, incumbents performed relatively well under a PR system before 1973. With re-election rates of 71.4% and 67% in 1969 and 1973, incumbent deputies experienced only slightly lower re-election rates than incumbents in the more majoritarian PR system in place after 1989. Since 1989, success rate among incumbents seeking re-election was 80.1% in 1993 and 85.7% in 1997 (Figure 2, Table 4). In

fact, if we consider that as in the United States, there is an increasing trend in the rate of incumbents winning reelection, the higher reelection rates in Chile after 1989 may also be understood as evidence of this trend rather than the result of a different electoral arrangement adopted in 1988. The change in the electoral formula apparently did not alter or accelerate the upward trend of re-election success for incumbents in Chile.

Chile adopted a new electoral system after the 1988 plebiscite. Known as a binomial system, the new electoral system is an Open List Proportional Representation system with a district magnitude of 2. Because there were no incumbents in 1989, there are only two elections that can be used in the post 1989 period. After a period of party re-organizing between 1989 and 1993, the 1993 and 1997 elections showed strikingly similar preferences among the electorate as Table 5 shows. Given stable electoral preferences nationally, two issues come to the forefront. First, around two-thirds of all incumbents seek re-election, mirroring the pre-1973 pattern. Second, re-election rates for incumbents are high, even higher than those observed before 1973. Only 17 incumbents lost re-election in 1993 and 12 did in 1997. Because there are only two valid elections after 1989, no definite conclusion can be reached about the equilibrium, if any, that will arise on incumbency in Chile. But so far incumbency has clearly offered an electoral advantage.

Gelman and King (1990) provide a sound model to estimate incumbency advantage, but there are two problems when trying to apply that model to Chile. First, the Gelman and King model was developed for single member districts. Chile had an Open List PR system before 1973, and after 1989 it adopted a Open List, PR system with a fixed magnitude of 2. Second, the number of political parties competing in every election in Chile has changed over time and therefore it becomes extremely cumbersome to estimate an indicator similar to that used by Gelman and King (1990) when studying the incumbency advantage in the U.S. Congress under a single member district electoral system and with two political parties competing in most districts.

Nonetheless, since most incumbents seeking re-election after 1989 were successful, an explanation of the advantage incumbents have over challengers is warranted. Although the number of incumbents who fail to get re-elected was small in 1993 and 1997, it is worth exploring any possible structural explanations to account for their defeats. In 1993, 17 deputies lost their re-election bids. Two of them were elected in the *Concertación* slate in 1989 but switched to the Communist Party in 1993. They were the only two incumbent deputies that switched coalitions in the period, and they both lost their re-election bids. Nine incumbent deputies lost to intra-coalition challengers, seven in the *Concertación* and 2 in the *Unión*. The remaining 6 deputies lost to challengers from other coalitions, three of them were from the *Concertación* and three from the *Unión*.

Part of the intra-coalition defeats is explained by the re-alignment within the parties of the *Concertación*. After the 1989 election, all socialist factions merged into the new PS. The Party for Democracy (PPD), originally formed as an umbrella party to circumvent legal restrictions preventing the legalization of the PS, developed an independent life and political identity. The PR continued to lose electoral and political influence and in 1993 it merged with the Social Democrats (SD) to form the PRSD. Three of the incumbents who lost to intra-coalition challengers belonged to the PR. Similarly, the conservative National Renovation Party (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) found their distinct conservative electoral niches after the 1989 election. As a result in 1993 and 1997 UDI picked up some seats lost by RN in southern districts. The RN and UDI consolidated as strong *Unión* parties. Other conservative parties, like the Center-Center Progressive Union (UUCP) and the Southern Party

(PSur) have come in and out of the *Unión* for particular elections, but in general vote alongside *Unión* parliamentary delegation.

Table 7 About Here

In 1997, 12 deputies lost their re-election bids. Six lost to intra-party coalition challengers and the other six lost to challengers from other coalitions. The *Concertación* lost two deputies to the *Unión* but also picked up two seats from *Unión* incumbents. The remaining two seats lost to out of coalition challengers went from *Unión* incumbents to pro-*Unión* conservative independent challengers. There were fewer intra-coalition incumbent defeats in 1997 than in 1993. However, there was one district in 1997 where both incumbents lost their seats. In district 14 (Viña del Mar), incumbents Makluf (PDC) and Urrutia (RN) lost to challengers from the PPD and UDI respectively. Concerns over high unemployment and notorious cases of corruption and abuse of power might help explain the bad performance of deputies in that district. In total, seven of the twelve losing incumbents belonged to RN. Internal shifts within the *Unión* alliance as well as RN's internal split over the more pro-Pinochet rank and file members and the more centrist leadership resulted in a heavy electoral loss by the party.³

Table 8 About Here

I ran a logit model for the 1997 elections to identify why incumbents were defeated. I coded districts where at least one incumbent lost as 1 and districts where no incumbents lost as 0. There was only one district where two incumbents lost, so the total number of districts coded as 1 was 11 (although there were 12 incumbents who lost seats). Because of the high re-election rates among incumbents, a simply a priori prediction is that all incumbents would win. That would have been correct in 49 out of 60 cases in Chile in 1997. Any useful model would then need to predict better than 80%.

I used a set of socio-economic variables for the 60 districts that include the illiteracy level among adults, the % of the population with low schooling, the infant mortality rate, the poverty level, the percentage of the working age population employed in agriculture and the percentage of population employed in the service industry in each district. I also used three electoral variables, the percentage of votes for the *Concertación* in 1997, turnout in 1997, the *Concertación/Unión* ratio in 1997 in each district. I also used two 'political' variables, the

³ There are five districts where incumbents lost both in 1993 and 1997. Those districts are 1 (Arica), 11 (Los Andes), 26 (La Florida), 34 (San Fernando) and 51 (Carahue). In district 1 (Arica), the 1989 incumbents ran for re-election in 1993, but a PPD candidate defeated a sitting PDC candidate, the RN candidate was re-elected. In 1997, a RN incumbent, elected in 1989 and re-elected in 1993, lost to a pro-UDI independent candidate. In District 11 (Los Andes), an incumbent PDC lost to a PPD in 1993. In 1997, the incumbent PPD obtained the nation's highest majority, doubling by himself the votes obtained by all the other candidates in 1997. Thus, by a trickle down effect, he carried along a PDC challenger and defeated a RN incumbent. In District 26 (La Florida), the *Concertación* picked up one seat in 1993 when a PDC candidate defeated a RN incumbent. IN 1997, RN recovered that seat by defeating the PDC incumbent. In District 34 a PRSD candidate defeated a DC incumbent in 1993. A PDC challenger regained the seat in 1997. Finally, in District 51, a PRSD incumbent lost his re-election bid to a PPD challenger in 1993 and an incumbent RN deputy lost his re-election bid to a PSur challenger in 1997.

number of incumbents in 1997 who ran for re-election in that district and the number of incumbents defeated in that district in 1993. This last variable identifies electoral volatility in any given district (although it might also point to more subjective interpretations, like “voters know incumbents can be defeated”). The results are shown in Table 9 and the model correctly predicts 8 of the 11 cases where incumbents lost. It also predicts correctly 47 out of the 49 cases where no incumbent lost re-election. Altogether, the model predicts 92% of cases correctly, significantly better than the 80% predicted by the oversimplified assumption “incumbents always win.”

In 1997 incumbent deputies were more likely to lose in rural and small urban than in metropolitan areas. In fact, only one incumbent lost in Santiago. This might result from structural conditions (such as greater discontent in poor rural areas that leads to successful challenges against incumbents) or from less access to mass media in rural districts. Less access to the media could have two distinct effects. On the one hand it restricts incumbent access to her constituency and it makes it less expensive for a challenger to mount a successful campaign based on personal contact rather than mass media messages. Surprisingly, the size of the district had no effect on incumbency advantage in either direction. With or without district size, the model predicts equally well (district size is not included in the model reported in Table 9). Smaller districts were no more prone to successful challengers than larger districts. This runs against the intuition that it is easier to defeat incumbents in smaller districts because less financial resources are needed to mount a successful campaign.

The logit equation reported in Table 9 is mainly driven by the *incumbency defeated in 1993* variable. Yet, using that variable as the only predictor of an incumbent defeat in 1997 results in a rather poor prediction. Although the other variables in the equation are either not statistically significant or are significant only at the 0.10 level, the model predicts fairly well the districts where incumbents will be defeated. The fact that there seems to be a vicious cycle of incumbents being defeated developing in some districts should not escape our analysis. True, it takes longer for freshmen congressmen to develop whatever it is that constitutes incumbency advantage. Yet, freshmen incumbents in districts where incumbents retired in 1993 did better in keeping their seats than freshmen incumbents who came to office in districts where an incumbent was defeated in 1993.

Table 9 About Here

Incumbency on PR and FPTP systems

Students of the incumbency advantage in the U.S. Congress who have reported an increase over time in the rate of incumbents re-elected in the U.S. are not alone. Chile, with its Open List PR system, has also experienced an increase in the total number of incumbents elected and the success rate of incumbents who seek re-election. Moreover, a change in the district magnitude of the Open List PR system apparently did not alter the upward trend in incumbent reelection rates. It remains an open question how incumbency re-election rates vary in countries with Closed List PR systems.

Yet, the high reelection rates enjoyed by incumbents in Open-List PR system poses a different challenge to democratic theory. Given that the structure of incentives to punish individual deputies and force them out of office is different than in FPTP, the lessons we can

learn from Chile can help us understand the way in which high incumbency re-election rates affect accountability and responsiveness in Open List PR systems. Ferejohn reminds us that "voters might be well-advised to pay attention to the incumbent's performance in office rather than to the hypothetical promises of competing candidates. By basing their votes on evaluations of performance, voters may be able to motivate office holders to pay attention to the interests of electors (1986: 7). Shugart and Carey suggest that "voters need only have the opportunity to impose sanctions on elected officials at the next election. Officials can be expected to anticipate such sanctions if they stray too far from voters' wishes between elections" (1992: 44).

The type of accountability described above is usually associated with presidential rather than with parliamentary systems (Powell 1989). Clearly, in a parliamentary system direct accountability is more difficult to achieve since parties tend to govern in coalitions and coalitions may change between elections. Moreover, the electoral system also affects accountability. FPTP systems function like presidential systems in that there is direct accountability in the fashion described by Ferejohn, and Shugart and Carey, on a district basis. PR systems, however, make it more difficult for direct accountability to exist. With PR systems, it becomes more difficult to "throw the rascals out." The larger the district magnitude, the easier it is for an incumbent to nurture particular constituencies and secure a seat with fewer votes. True, the larger the district magnitude, the easier it is to win enough seats to win a seat in parliament for a challenger, but preventing "the rascals" from returning to parliament also becomes more difficult.

PR systems with low district magnitude pose additional difficulties to "throw the rascals out. The hurdles posed by the PR system (binomial) in place in Chile since 1989 have made it difficult for parties to aspire to win both seats in any given district. Only in a handful of districts has a coalition clinched both seats (12 in 1993 and 8 in 1997, of a total of 60 districts). With such an electoral arrangement, incumbents need to worry more about challenges from coalition partners than from opposition parties (Magar, Rosenblum and Samuels 1998). Because it is highly unlikely that a coalition will double the votes of the other coalitions, the only credible threat comes from the other candidate within one's coalition. In 1997, six of the 12 losing incumbents lost their seats to coalition partners. Among the other six losing incumbents, 2 went to independent candidates (the other big threat to incumbents). In the remaining four cases, the *Concertación* twice doubled the *Unión* and twice the *Unión* picked a seat in districts where they had been 'doubled' in 1993.

For that reason, in Open List PR systems with low district magnitude "throwing the rascals out" is almost impossible. In Chile, since most districts are split between one *Concertación* and one *Unión* deputy, voters would need to overwhelmingly support the candidates in one of the coalitions in order to prevent the candidate from the other coalition from reaching a seat. A 60%-35% split between the two coalitions would still lead to the election of one deputy from each district. Only a 66%--33% split (actually, one vote over 66% and one vote less than 34%) would result in both seats going to the same coalition. Table 10 shows four examples where a large shift in electoral preferences of voters fails to alter the seat distribution in a given district. Throwing the rascals out becomes increasingly more difficult in PR systems with a small district magnitude. The smallest magnitude possible for a PR system is 2, and that is what Chile uses. As a result, "throwing the rascals out" in Chile requires either large shifts in electoral preferences (to give both seats to the other party) or smaller shifts that will simply change the 'politician' within the party that gets elected.

Notice, however, that the problem posed by the small district magnitude of Chile would exist even if re-election were not allowed. The political parties that hold a seat could still benefit

from the distortion caused by the electoral law. It is the fact that re-election rates are high what makes the distortion caused by the electoral law the more pervasive. Because re-election rates were high even before the present electoral law was implemented, we can safely argue that high re-election rates are independent of the existing electoral law. In Closed List PR systems, we can only speak of political party accountability. Individual legislators cannot be personally punished. In Open List PR systems, individual legislators can be punished, but other considerations may make it more difficult for voters to penalize individual legislators.

Conclusion

The theory tells us that reelection is a necessary condition for retrospective voting to induce accountability and responsiveness. However, it is not a sufficient condition. There are other conditions that must be met for accountability to exist. Reelection per se, without a properly designed electoral system, might in fact make it more difficult for accountability to exist. In the case of Chile post 1989, only a large shift in the electoral preferences of voters could significantly alter the almost inevitable split of seats between the *Concertación* and *Unión*. Voters in Chile have the choice between two candidates of their preferred coalition, but it is more difficult for them to prevent one of the two coalitions from gaining electoral representation (Magar, Rosenblum and Samuels 1998).

Manin, Przeworski and Stokes suggest that: “we need *accountability agencies*, independent of other branches of government and subject to direct popular control, perhaps through elections” (1999: 20). In Chile, incumbency re-election rates are high, the electoral law in place fosters intra-party (or coalition) competition and, therefore, incumbents are more concerned with challenges from within their coalition than from political opponents. Accountability is not fostered and voters find it difficult to ‘throw the rascals out.’

Following Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, I would argue that given the high levels of incumbency re-election, the benefits associated with an experienced and professional parliament (Carey 1998b) and the stability provided by strong parties (Valenzuela and Scully 1997), a new electoral legislation can serve as an *accountability agency*. The design of a new electoral law must take into consideration historical features that shape and characterize the political party system in Chile. Well-established political parties combined with high incumbency re-election rates in an Open List PR system seem to provide a good mix of political party strength and individual leadership on the part of politicians. An electoral law that fosters accountability must take into account the existing characteristics of Chile’s electoral arena.

As it now stands, the combined effect of the electoral arrangement and high incumbency re-election rates make it difficult for accountability to work in Chile. In fact, because Chile shows historically high reelection rates for incumbents, in order to develop an electoral arrangement conducive to accountability, one must include features that make it easier to “throw the rascals out” and replace them with opposition candidates rather than with intra-coalition challengers. In addition, the advantages provided by incumbents to the political process—such as the know-how, stability and expertise on issues—may be severely undermined if there are no strong incentives for incumbents to be accountable to their constituencies. Otherwise, accountability is damaged and the high levels of incumbency re-election combined with the electoral law become a detriment rather than an asset to the well functioning and consolidation of democracy in Chile.

Table 1. Incumbency in the Chamber of Deputies 1903-1997

Year	Incumbents Re-elected	Size of Chamber of Deputies	% Incumbency	Year	Incumbents Re-elected	Size of Chamber of Deputies	% Incumbency
1903-06	28	94	30.0%	1941-45	44	147	30.0%
1906-09	38	94	40.4%	1945-49	72	147	49.0%
1909-12	34	94	36.2%	1949-53	66	147	44.9%
1912-15	44	118	37.3%	1953-57	55	147	37.4%
1915-18	49	118	41.5%	1957-61	68	147	46.3%
1918-21	37	118	31.4%	1961-65	74	144	51.4%
1921-24	38	118	32.2%	1965-69	52	144	36.1%
1924	40	118	33.9%	1969-73	70	144	48.6%
1926-30	39	132	29.5%	1973	67	147	45.6%
1930-32	33	132	25.0%	1993-97	71	120	59.2%
1933-37	18	143	12.6%	1997-01	72	120	60.0%
1937-41	52	147	35.4%	Total	1161	2980	39.0%

Table 2. 1961-1973 Parliamentary election results

Political Party	1961	1965	1969	1973
Liberal Party	16.1	7.3	--	--
Conservative Party	14.3	5.2	--	--
National Party*	--	--	20.0	21.0
Christian Democratic Party	15.4	42.3	29.8	32.4
Radical Party**	21.4	13.3	13.0	7.7*
National Democratic Party	6.9	3.2	1.9	0.4
Popular Unitary Action***	--	--	--	2.5
Christian Left****	--	--	--	1.2
Socialist Party	10.7	10.3	12.2	18.4
Comunist Party	11.4	12.4	13.9	16.0
%of vote by largest four parties	67.2%	78.3%	76.7%	87.8%

* National Party was created in 1967 by the fusion of the Liberal and Conservative parties. ** The Radical Party was divided into three parties in 1973: RP, Radical Left and Radical Democracy. *** The Popular Unitary Action and the Christian Left were splinters of the Christian Democratic Party that joined Allende's Popular Unity.

Table 3. Incumbent reelection rates in the Chamber of Deputies, 1961-1973

Election Year	Incumbents Re-elected	Incumbents Not Re-elected	Total number of incumbents seeking re-election
1961	74 (n.a.)	n.a.	n.a. of 147
1965	52 (54.7%)	47 (45.3%)	99 of 147 (67.3%)
1969	70 (71.4%)	28 (28.6%)	98 of 150 (65.3%)
1973	67 (67.0%)	33 (33.0%)	100 of 150 (66.7%)
Total	189 (63.6%)	108 (36.4%)	297 of 447 (66.4%)

From: Servicio Electoral.

Table 4. Incumbent re-election rates in Chamber of Deputies, 1989-1997

Election Year	Incumbents Re-elected	Incumbents Not Re-elected	Total number of incumbents seeking re-election
1993	71 (80.1%)	17 (19.9%)	88 of 120
1997	72 (85.7%)	12 (14.3%)	84 of 120
Total	143 (83.1%)	29 (16.9%)	172 of 240

Compiled with information from <http://www.camara.cl/>

Table 5. Electoral results of parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1997

Political Party	1993 Parliamentary %	1997 Parliamentary %
National Renovation (RN) (Unión)	16.3	17.0
Independent Democratic Union (UDI) (Unión)	12.1	14.4
Southern Party (Psur) (Unión)	0.2	0.4
National Party (PN) (Unión)	0.1	----
Progressive Center-Center Union (UCCP) (ex-Unión)	3.2	1.2
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) (<i>Concertación</i>)	27.1	23.0
Radical Social Democratic) (PR-PRSD) (<i>Concertación</i>)	3.0	3.1
Social Democratic (PSD) (<i>Concertación</i>)	0.8	----
Party for Democracy (PPD) (<i>Concertación</i>)	11.8	12.6
Socialist (PS) (<i>Concertación</i>)	11.9	11.1
Communist (PC/MIDA) (left)	5.0	6.9
Humanist (PH) (left)	1.0	2.9
Others	7.5	7.7

From <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/>

Table 6. Logit model on the decision to run for re-election. Chamber of Deputies 1997.

Variable	1 Incumbent seeking re-election	2 Incumbents seeking re-election
Constant	-0.053 (7.59)	-3.18 (7.743)
Incumbent defeated in 1993	0.83 (1.897)	1.60 (1.876)
% of Population in Service Sector	-0.06 (0.090)	0.09 (0.093)
% Population Below Poverty Line	0.15 (0.223)	0.31 (0.223)
% of Population with Low Schooling	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.12 (0.594)**
<i>Concertación/UPCh</i> ratio	2.51 (1.785)	0.92 (1.767)
N	60	
Log Likelihood	-38.247	
Chi-Squared	30.458	
Degrees of Freedom	10	
Significance Level	0.00072	

*=significant at 0.1; **=significant at 0.05; ***=significant at 0.01.

Poverty level = % of population who live under poverty level; Service = % population working in service industry (not factories or mining); Low schooling = % of adult population with primary education not completed; All socio-demographic data from 1992 census.

Frequency of Actual and Predicted Outcomes

Actual	Predicted			Total
	0	1	2	
0	2	1	1	4
1	0	19	8	27
2	1	8	20	29
Total	3	28	29	60

Table 7. Incumbents defeated in 1993

District	Losing Incumbent	L.I. party > new deputy	Type of change
1	Luis leBlanc	DC > PPD	intra coalition defeat
2	Vladislav Kuzmicic	MIDA > PPD	incumbent switched coalition
8	Jorge Morales	RN > PS	out of coalition defeat
11	Sergio Jara	PDC > PPD	intra coalition defeat
16	Adriana Muñoz	PPD > PDC	intra coalition defeat
18	Andrés Sotomayor	RN > PPD	out of coalition defeat
23	Eliana Caraball	PDC > RN	out of coalition defeat
26	Gustavo Alessandri	RN > PDC	out of coalition defeat
27	Hernán Rojo	PDC > UDI	out of coalition defeat
28	Mario Palestro	MIDA > UDI	incumbent switched coalition
29	Guillermo Yunge	PDC > RN	out of coalition defeat
34	Hugo Rodriguez	DC > PR	intra coalition defeat
38	Jaime Campos	PR > PPD	intra coalition defeat
51	Jose Peña	PR > PPD	intra coalition defeat
4	Mario Devaud	PR > PPD	intra coalition defeat
56	Carlos Recondo	RN > UDI	intra coalition defeat
58	Juan Perez	RN > UDI	intra coalition defeat

Table 8. Incumbents defeated in 1997

District	Losing Incumbent	L.I. party > new deputy	Type of change
1	Carlos Valcarce	RN > Ind	out of coalition defeat
2	Ramon Perez	RN > PDC	out of coalition defeat
4	Ruben Gajardo	DC > UDI	out of coalition defeat
6	Armando Arancibia	PS > DC	intra coalition defeat
11	Claudio Rodriguez	RN > DC	out of coalition defeat
14	Jose Makluf	DC > PPD	intra coalition defeat
14	Raul Urrutia	RN > UDI	intra coalition defeat
26	Mariana Aylwin	DC > RN	out of coalition defeat
34	Sergio Morales	PR(SD) > DC	intra coalition defeat
35	Jose Hurtado	RN > UCCP	out of coalition defeat
48	Fco Bayo	RN > UDI	intra coalition defeat
51	Teodoro Ribera	RN > PSur	intra coalition defeat

Table 9. Logit model on incumbents defeated in 1997

Variable	At least one Incumbent lost§	
	Coefficient	Standard Error
Constant	-59.600	29.470**
Illiteracy	-0.066	0.3384
Low schooling	0.003	0.0280
Infant Mortality Rate	0.060	0.2763
Poverty Level	0.262	0.1761
Agriculture	0.318	0.1651*
Service Industry	0.461	0.2365*
<i>Concertación</i> Vote in 1997	-0.00002	0.0001
Turnout in 1997	0.171	0.1750
<i>Concertación/Unión</i> ratio	0.828	1.3350
Number of Incumbents in 1997	8.320	3.8125**
Number of Incumbents defeated in 1993	3.602	1.7395**
N	60	
Log Likelihood Function	-11.4181	
Chi-Square	29.1958	
Degrees of Freedom	11	
Significance Level	0.00211	

*=significant at 0.1; **=significant at 0.05; ***=significant at 0.01.

§In total, 12 incumbents lost; but because two lost in the same district, there were 11 districts where at least one incumbent lost and 49 districts where no incumbent lost. Illiteracy = % of district adults who are illiterate; low schooling = % of adult population with primary education not completed; Poverty level = % of population who live under poverty level; Agriculture = % of labor force working in agriculture. Service = % population working in service industry (not factories or mining). All demographic data from 1992 census.

Frequency of Actual and Predicted Outcomes

Actual	Predicted		Total
	0	1	
0	47	2	49
1	3	8	11
Total	50	10	60

Table 10. Some changes in voters' preferences that do not alter existing seat distribution

Coalition	First Election % (a)	Distribution of seats after 1 st election (b)	Second Election % (c)	Distribution of seats after 2 nd election (d)	Vote Difference (e)
<i>Concertación-Unión</i>	55-45	1-1	65-35	1-1	+10, -10
<i>Concertación-Unión</i>	51-49	1-1	65-35	1-1	+14, -14
<i>Concertación-Unión</i>	40-60	1-1	60-40	1-1	+20, -20
<i>Concertación-Unión</i>	35-65	1-1	65-35	1-1	+30, -30
<i>Concertación-Unión</i>	66-34	1-1	34-66	1-1	-32, +32

Figure 1. Incumbents in Chamber of Deputies
(Incumbents as % of total membership)





Figure 2. Incumbency Re-election Rates & % of Incumbents in Chamber of Deputies. Chile 1965-97



References

- Alesina, Alberto. 1995. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Angell, Alan. 1993. "Chile since 1958" in Leslie Bethel (ed) *Chile Since Independence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Archer, Ronald P. and Matthew S. Shugart. 1997. "The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (ed.) *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buendía Laredo, Jorge. 1998. "Reelección ¿Para qué? *Nexos*. (Octubre).
- Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Carey, John. 1997. "Strong Candidates for a Limited Office: Presidentialism and Political Parties in Costa Rica" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (ed) *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, John. 1998. "Parties, Coalitions and the Chilean Congress in the 1990's" Paper Presented at the Latin American Studies Association Conference. Chicago, September 1998.
- Carey, John 1998b. *Term Limits and Legislative Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collier, Simon and William F. Sater. 1996. *A History of Chile, 1808-1994*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cruz-Coke, Ricardo. 1984. *Historia Electoral de Chile. 1925-1973*. Santiago: Editorial Jurídica.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Erikson, Robert S. 1971. "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." *Polity* 3:395-405.
- Faundez, Julio. 1997. "In Defense of Presidentialism: The Case of Chile, 1932-1970" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (ed.) *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferejohn, John. 1995. "The Spatial Model and Elections" in Bernard Grofman (ed) *Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control" *Public Choice* 50: 5-25.

Fiorina, Morris. 1989. *Congress. Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fleet, Michael. 1985. *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1990. "Estimating Incumbency Advantage without Bias" *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 1142-64.

Grofman, Bernard. 1995. "Toward an Institution-Rich Theory of Political Competition With a Supply Side Component" in Bernard Grofman (ed) *Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Jones, Mark P. 1995a. *Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies*. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.

Jones, Mark P. 1995b. "A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas" *Electoral Studies* 54: 1.

Jones, Mark P. 1997. "A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas: An Update." *Electoral Studies* 16: 1.

Jones, Mark P. 1997. "Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (ed) *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Mark P. 1999. "Electoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections." *Journal of Politics* 61: 1.

King, Gary and Andrew Gelman. 1991. "Systemic Consequences of Incumbency Advantage in Congressional Elections" *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 110-38.

Magar, Eric, Marc R. Rosenblum and David J. Samuels. 1998. "On the Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double-Member Districts: The Case of Chile." *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (6) (December).

Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes. 1997. "Elections and Representation" in Przeworski, Adam, Stokes Susan C. and Bernard Manin (ed.) *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Navia, Patricio and José Miguel Sandoval. 1998. "Binomial Electoral Law and Multi-Party System: The Chilean Contradiction." Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Conference. Chicago. September 1998.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore: Jphn Hopkins University Press.

Popkin, Samuel L. 1995. "Information Shortcuts and the Reasoning Voter" in Bernard Grofman (ed) *Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1989. "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1:107-30.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reinsch, Paul. 1909. "Parliamentary Government in Chile" *American Political Science Review* 3: 4. pp. 507-538.

Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Siavelis, Peter and Arturo Valenzuela. 1996. "Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability: The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile" in Lijphart, Arend and Carlos H. Waisman. 1996. *Institutional Design in New Democracies. Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Boulder: West View Press.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1998. *La ley electoral de 1890 y la democratización del régimen político chileno* Working Paper (Helen Kellog Institute for International Studies) No. 247. Notre Dame: The Hellen Kellog Institute for International Studies.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Timothy R. Scully. 1997. "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile. Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy" *Comparative Politics* 29: (4) (July).