

## Malaise in Representation in Chile: An 18-Year-Old Debate in Search of Evidence

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The debate about the malaise with representation—or with democracy in general—that allegedly exists in Chile has been a permanent feature of scholarly work on Chile and that of Chilean social scientists since shortly after democracy was restored in 1990. Claims that there is something wrong with Chilean democracy or that people are discontented with the way it has evolved have abounded over the past 20 years. In fact, however, the evidence is inconclusive.

This chapter first reviews the emergence and historical evolution of the argument of malaise in representation in Chile before going on to show that the data which should provide grounds for the persistence of this argument fails to conclusively demonstrate such malaise. I conclude by arguing that persistence of the view that something is wrong (or potentially wrong) with Chilean democracy responds to normative claims rather than empirical evidence. While making democracy work is unquestionably a challenge for most contemporary societies, there is nothing particular to Chile to justify the strength of its ongoing debate about malaise in representation which is about to turn 18 years old.

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## THE START OF THE DEBATE

After an admittedly unusual transition to democracy in 1990, Chile consolidated a democratic system under the ever-present shadow of the Pinochet authoritarian regime (1973–1990). Given that the end of the dictatorship began with a plebiscite called in 1988 by the dictatorship itself on a further eight-year presidential term for General Augusto Pinochet, the conditions under which democracy emerged were severely constrained by the military. Indeed, the transition took place under the institutional structure established by the authoritarian government. The 1980 constitution, custom-made for Pinochet, stipulated that if Chileans voted “No” in the 1988 plebiscite, democratic elections would take place a year later but, conveniently, included a number of authoritarian enclaves that would restrict the powers and attributions of the new democratically elected authorities.

When Chileans did, in fact, vote “No” by 56–44 percent in the plebiscite of October 1988, the transition to democracy began. In 1989, under strong pressure from the democratic opposition—united in the *Concertación for the No Vote*, a center-left multiparty coalition—the military agreed to eliminate some of the constitution’s authoritarian provisions ahead of the December 1989 presidential and legislative elections. The opposition acquiesced to these changes, but vowed to replace the authoritarian constitution with a new democratically produced text (Heiss and Navia 2007). The Concertación easily won the 1989 elections, but the authoritarian enclaves prevented its electoral majority from translating into a legislative majority. The presence of unelected senators and a malapportioned electoral system (Navia and Rojas 2005) that distorted seat assignments in favor of right-wing parties (Siavelis 1997) gave the right-wing Alianza coalition a majority in the Senate—the coalition has changed its name several times, but has always been formed by the conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the more moderate National Renewal (RN).

Although there has been ample debate about the limitations of Chilean democracy when it was restored in 1990 (Portales 2000; Garretón 1995; Huneus 2014), there was no question that the country had abandoned authoritarian rule and that, albeit constrained, a new democratic system had been put in place. In the early 1990s, lively debate quickly ensued about when the transition to democracy would end (Menéndez-Carrión and Joignant 1999). Some claimed that it ended in 1990 and was the result of a tacit pact between the outgoing regime and the incoming democratic government (Godoy Arcaya 1999). A number of intellectuals and political

actors, however, analyzed the first few years under democratic rule as if the country were still undergoing a transition to democracy (Elizondo and Maira 2000; Escalona 1999; Briones 1999; Maira 1999; Huneeus 1998; Zaldívar Larraín 1995; Moulian 1994; Foxley 1993).

The center-left Concertación won four consecutive presidential elections, ruling the country from 1990 to 2010. In that period, its governments embraced the basic tenets of the market-friendly economic model put in place by the Pinochet regime. The Concertación, claiming that it would give neoliberalism a human face, began to talk about a social market economy, with social policies tempering the brutally unregulated market-friendly model implemented by Pinochet. A significant increase in social spending and targeted economic subsidies helped bring poverty down from close to 40 percent in 1990 to around 15 percent by 2005. Stronger regulatory powers also increased the state's capacity to foster market competition and combat oligopolies. By all indicators, the pragmatic approach of Concertación governments to adapting the economic model inherited from Pinochet was successful. As Fig. 5.1 shows, Chile's




Fig. 5.1 Chile and Latin America GDP per capita, 1990–2014 (Source: Author)




Fig. 5.2 Tertiary educational enrollment and 18–24-year-old population in Chile, 1983–2011 (*Source:* Navia and Pirinoli 2015)

level of development in 1990 was similar to the average for Latin America but, by 2014, was almost 40 percent higher. In fact, by 2014, Chile was already the most developed country in the region.

Other indicators of social progress also showed impressive results. As seen in Fig. 5.2, enrollment in tertiary education began to grow rapidly in the years after democracy was restored. As education is seen as—and, in fact, constitutes—a tool for upward mobility, rising enrollment numbers reflected Chileans' growing acceptance of the prevalent economic model and their mounting demand to be a part of the success that, according to macroeconomic indicators, the country was experiencing.

Chile's high level of development and the rapid decline in poverty did, however, hide a darker element in the otherwise rosy picture. Its historically high levels of inequality persisted. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the Gini indicator (with a scale of 0–100) was, at 57.25 in 1990, one of the highest in the world. By 2000, it had dropped only to 55.2 and, although it reached 50.8 in 2011, the lowest on record, was still higher than in most countries with a similar level of development to Chile at that time. Thus, the country was in a paradoxical position in the late 1990s. On the one hand, democracy was flourishing,

the economy was growing, and poverty was declining rapidly, but inequality remained stubbornly high.

In the context of debate about a possible unfinished or incomplete transition, rapid economic growth, and high levels of inequality, several intellectuals began to raise the issue of the alleged growing discontent in Chilean society with the institutional, social, and economic model that had emerged in the first decade of democracy. An influential book written in 1997 by academic and public intellectual Tomás Moulián—*El Chile Actual. Anatomía de un Mito* (Moulián 1997)—became a best-seller and a symbol of discontent, at least in left-wing intellectual circles, with the shape that Chilean democracy and society were taking. Though Moulián's book was principally a criticism of the economic and political model put in place as a result of Chile's uniquely constrained transition to democracy, it was swiftly embraced by those who believed that behind the good economic numbers, a darker shadow of discontent was brewing among Chileans.

Many of those doubters saw the 1997 legislative election as confirming that things were going the wrong way. Turnout dropped sharply to 59.6 percent of the voting age population (VAP), down from 75.8 percent in 1993. Jumping to the conclusion that Chileans were increasingly dissatisfied with democracy, few seemed to notice the difference that, in 1993, the legislative election had been held concurrently with a presidential election, whereas, in 1997, there was no presidential election. Analysis of turnout trends since before the 1973 democratic breakdown would have suggested that the high turnout observed in the 1988 plebiscite and 1989 elections were an exception, rather than the norm for Chilean democracy. As Table 5.1 shows, turnout before 1973, like that in 1997, was in the 50–60 percent range. Rather than a crisis, the decline in turnout in 1997 should have been read as a normalization of the political process. True, turnout continued to decline after 1997, reaching a low of 39.2 percent of the VAP in the 2012 municipal elections. Although declining turnout has repeatedly been associated with a sense of discontent with democracy or at least with political parties, the evidence points to a more nuanced set of reasons behind this phenomenon in Chile (Contreras, Joignant, and Morales 2015; Contreras and Navia 2013).

The brewing perception that something was wrong with the way Chilean democracy was consolidating and Chilean society was evolving was most effectively reflected in the 1998 Human Development Report by the Chilean office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

**Table 5.1** Voter turnout in Chile, 1964–2012

<i>Election year</i>	<i>Voting age population (VAP)</i>	<i>Registered voters</i>	<i>Votes cast</i>	<i>Valid votes</i>	<i>Null, blanks, abstentions</i>	<i>Valid votes/registered (percent)</i>	<i>Valid votes/VAP (percent)</i>
1964	4088	2915	2530	2512	1576	86.8	61.6
1970	5202	3540	2955	2923	2279	83.5	56.2
1973	5238	4510	3687	3620	1620	81.8	69.1
1988	8062	7436	7251	7187	889	96.6	89.1
1989	8243	7558	7159	6980	1344	92.3	84.6
1992	8775	7841	7044	6411	2345	81.9	73.2
1993	8951	8085	7377	6969	1848	84.3	75.8
1996	9464	8073	7079	6301	3085	76.6	65.3
1997	9627	8078	7046	5796	3746	71.1	59.6
1999	9945	8084	7272	7055	2890	90.0	70.1
2000	10,100	8089	7019	6452	3648	86.8	63.9
2001	10,500	8075	6992	6107	4393	86.6	58.2
2004	10,700	8013	6874	6123	4577	85.8	57.2
2005	10,800	8221	7207	6942	3758	87.7	64.3
2008	12,066	8110	6959	6362	5704	85.8	52.7
2009	12,226	8285	7186	6938	5284	83.7	56.7
2012	13,388	13,388	5496	5261	8127	39.2	39.2

*Source:* Contreras and Navia (2013)

A team led by German sociologist—and longtime resident of Chile—Norbert Lechner issued a report entitled *The Paradox of Modernization* (UNDP 1998).<sup>1</sup> It was very critical of Chile’s modernization process:

Nevertheless, along with these important advances, there continue to exist significant levels of mistrust in inter-personal relationships as well as in relationships between the individual and the health, social security, education and work systems. This persistent social malaise suggests that the elements of security reaped from the current “pattern of modernization” are insufficient. The phenomena presented in the different chapters of this Report lead to the conclusion that although the country has progressed, Human Security in Chile has not reached satisfactory levels nor achieved an equitable distribution. (UNDP 1998)<sup>2</sup>

The document introduced the concept of “malaise” to refer to the apparent discontent that UNDP researchers identified in their study of Chilean society. The report went on to warn that social malaise represented a potential threat to the stability of Chilean democracy:

The aforementioned social malaise is neither a conscious sense of insecurity nor a collective complaint. Instead, it is a diffuse malaise (and perhaps more puzzling for the very fact that it is not spurned by a clear cause). Nevertheless, its diffuse character does not mean that it should be easily dismissed as an innate, inevitable human sense of dissatisfaction; in fact, *today's social malaise could produce an estrangement between citizens that would ultimately undermine the social order*. In any case, the registered social malaise suggests that Human Security in Chile is less laudable than what the macro-social indicators express. (UNDP 1998) (Author's italics)

Unfortunately, the report lacked sufficient data to demonstrate that levels of “mistrust in inter-personal relationships” were any higher in 1998 than in previous years or ever before. Without enough evidence to back up a causal link, the report concluded that the low levels of trust seen in Chile were somewhat associated—in fact, caused by—the development path that it had taken since adopting the market-friendly model and since the restoration of democracy. Thus, while identifying a problem, the report established an unjustified causal link since levels of trust could have been on the decline compared to the historical average or the increase could have been similar to that seen in countries experiencing similar rapid economic growth. Moreover, there was no justification for concluding that high levels of mistrust could pose a threat to the social order. Whether unfounded fear or wishful thinking (if those writing the report disliked the social order), the report's conclusions of a potential threat to the democratic order were not justified by the evidence.

The report was greeted with enthusiasm by those less sympathetic to the neoliberal economic model and those critical of the political institutional setup, with its many ongoing authoritarian enclaves. Concurrently with the report, and probably somewhat influenced by it, a debate emerged within the ruling Concertación coalition, with two documents produced by leaders of different member parties suggesting that a new cleavage was emerging within the coalition. Unlike the traditional division that separated its centrist parties (mostly the Christian Democrat Party, PDC) from its leftist partners (the Socialist Party, PS; Party for Democracy, PPD; and Radical Social Democratic Party, PRSD), the new cleavage cut across party lines, dividing the coalition into two groups that the press dubbed *autoflagelante* (self-flagellating) and *autocomplaciente* (self-complacent). The former shared the critical views of the UNDP report and argued that the Concertación had abandoned its foundational ideals and accepted the constitutional order and economic model inherited from the

military regime. The latter were more optimistic about the direction the country was taking and the democratizing and socially oriented economic reforms implemented by Concertación governments. Both groups issued documents outlining their views. This division subsequently reappeared from time to time, particularly during electoral campaigns, with the self-flagellating always urging a change in direction and the self-complacent always advocating faster and deeper progress along the same roadmap that the Concertación had embraced since the transition to democracy.

The UNDP Report also elicited some formal responses. One of the leading figures of the self-complacent camp, sociologist José Joaquín Brunner, wrote a long essay for *Estudios Públicos*, a quarterly journal published by the Centro de Estudios Públicos, a Santiago-based right-of-center think tank formed by business leaders eager to promote the market-friendly model and separate it from the human rights atrocities of the Pinochet dictatorship. During the dictatorship, Brunner had made a career as an intellectual at FLACSO, a center-left think tank that advocated the restoration of democracy and served as one of the havens for moderate opposition voices during this period. In *La Cultura Autoritaria en Chile* (Brunner 1981), he had argued that the dictatorship attempted to put in place an institutional setup based on authoritarian values. For him, the main challenge for the opposition to the dictatorship was to fight it in the cultural sphere so as to help a democratic culture to prevail. The fact that Brunner came out in the late 1990s to strongly criticize the UNDP report represented a significant break within the intellectual elite that had united to oppose the dictatorship.

In his response to the UNDP report, making a reference to the “*Chile, la alegría ya viene*” (Chile, happiness is on its way) slogan used by the democratic opposition in the 1988 plebiscite, Brunner summarized the perception of malaise that was already prevalent in 1998:

In intellectual and political circles in the Concertación, there is the image that Chilean society is not happy, that happiness has not returned. On the contrary, the belief is that a large majority of the population lives in displeasure, expresses insecurity, does not perceive real progress, is trapped in fear and malaise, and experiences mute uneasiness about their present situation and intense uncertainty about the future. In sum, as has recently been said ‘a diffuse malaise is at large in Chile’. (Brunner 1998: 174)

In the document, Brunner, who had also served as a minister in the second Concertación government’s cabinet (1994–2000), questioned the UNDP



report's conclusions and defended the achievements of the Concertación governments. Using survey data, he showed that Chileans reported high levels of satisfaction with their lives and high expectations for the future. Albeit acknowledging declining voter turnout, he argued that this was a phenomenon common to many well-functioning democracies. Reflecting on the report's argument that Chileans were feeling fear and insecurity, he wrote that "one wonders if societies were ever different, if fear and insecurity are not present—in different forms—in all eras" (Brunner 1998: 174).

To complement Brunner's argument about fear and insecurity, I return to the 1998 UNDP report. Part of the malaise, according to the report, reflected the growing perception of uncertainty prevalent in Chilean society. In fact:

One of the main reasons for insecurity reflected in the Report's studies is the uncertainty of access to existent opportunities and their persistent uneven distribution across diverse sectors of society. Especially notorious are the spheres of education and health-care where equal access to services for all beneficiaries is still not a reality despite advances made in recent years; in fact, more often than not, the socioeconomic level of the individual still determines his options. (UNDP 1998)

The report seems to assume that certainty is always better than uncertainty. However, it is demonstrable that the reverse may well also be true. For a person in the lowest income bracket, the certainty that living conditions will not change provides no relief. On the contrary, for that person, certainty is condemnation while uncertainty is synonymous of hope. The UNDP report incomprehensibly fails to make that point and simply treats insecurity and uncertainty as negative concepts. It correctly notes that unequal access to opportunities was the norm in Chile in 1998—and, in many regards, remains so—but fails to understand that when social programs are first implemented and opportunities begin to expand, the uncertainty that these new opportunities create is a far better status quo for the marginalized and excluded than the certainty that they will never be included. It is true that, as inclusionary policies help create opportunities for some, others will become increasingly anxious to benefit from the expanding opportunities. However, to conclude that this anxiety—or uncertainty—is the reason behind the alleged malaise is to miss the point by a wide margin. Only those who have never been the victims of the certainty of permanent exclusion will fail to realize that the uncertainty caused by limited and insufficient inclusion is far better than the certainty of permanent exclusion.

Despite its conceptual and analytical shortcomings, the UNDP report put alleged malaise with Chilean society and, perhaps, democracy (it did, after all, refer to a diffuse malaise) at the center of debate. Today, 18 years later, we are still discussing the alleged malaise with democracy—or, in this case, malaise in representation—that exists in Chile. Below, I will discuss some of the evidence, from 1990 to 2015, that calls into question the claim that Chileans are experiencing a particular malaise in representation.

### MALAISE IN REPRESENTATION IN CHILE TODAY

The argument that there is malaise in representation can be based partly on the paradox that, while Chileans are increasingly supportive of democracy as being preferable to any other form of government, trust in political parties has been declining. As Fig. 5.3 shows, support for democracy is now greater than when it was first restored, but mistrust of political parties has increased constantly since Latinobarómetro first began to ask the relevant question in its 1995 survey. Thus, as democracy has consolidated in Chile, trust in political parties has declined.





Fig. 5.3 Levels of trust in political parties and support for democracy in Chile, 1995–2014

The reasons behind this decline of trust in parties can be associated to malaise in representation, but can also be the result of a normalization of politics. The parties played a very important role in the restoration of democracy, defending human rights and individual liberties during the dictatorship, and leading a social movement that culminated in the 1988 plebiscite and paved the way for democratic restoration. Once democracy was reestablished, however, they lost the moral high ground they had occupied during the final years of the dictatorship. Since the art of politics requires parties to bargain and negotiate to form governments and pass legislation, people might have begun to perceive parties as what they are—groups of politicians interested in promoting certain policies but also in acquiring power and distributing the perks of office to their members. Especially in democracies governed by multiparty coalitions, bargaining, and horse trading are essential components of successful politics. In countries where parties are unwilling to bargain and the defense of principles hampers political compromise, the political process ends in stalemate. In fact, the success of the Chilean party system after the transition to democracy in 1990 has been related to an institutional setup that induces parties to compromise and build the long-term agreements that are possible because they have long-term horizons (Stein et al. 2006).

The negative externality of a successful party system—with parties that are more pragmatic than ideological and with governments that build multiparty coalition support—might be that voters end up distrusting parties that campaign on a certain policy position but then bargain their way into the government coalition by modifying their positions or strategically choosing which policy positions they will defend and which they will renounce in the bargaining process.

Since we do not know for sure why people no longer trust political parties—but we do know that, in general, levels of trust have gone down in Chile across institutions—we can also speculate that declining trust is a result of Chile's development rather than evidence of a particular crisis in the party system or any of the other institutions that have also experienced declining trust.

Higher levels of education among Chileans probably imply more awareness of the negotiations and deals that take place between parties. A more informed population will also be more aware of corruption scandals affecting political parties. This does not mean that there is not a problem. There might be, but assessing and correcting it in the context of more transparency, more access to information, and a more educated public is a difficult challenge.




**Fig. 5.4** Perceptions on the importance of political parties and support for democracy in Chile, 1995–2014

Surprisingly, lower trust in political parties has not led Chileans to discard parties as essential components of democracy. As Fig. 5.4 shows, the percentage of Chileans who believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government moves almost in tandem with those who believe that democracy cannot exist without parties. Between 1995 and 2013, there was a drop of 10 percentage points in those who believe parties are essential for democracy but this view continues to be held by a majority of Chileans. Moreover, the belief that democracy can exist without parties actually declined from a high of slightly more than 40 percent in 2001 to less than 30 percent in 2013. Thus, the concept of malaise in representation might be a result of the tension that exists in a society where people believe in the importance of parties but, at the same time, increasingly distrust them.

#### *Are Chileans Satisfied?*

Though Chileans seem to be increasingly discontented with their political parties, they hold more positive views about the direction in which the country is headed. The highly respected and widely cited twice-yearly



**Fig. 5.5** Is Chile making progress? 1900–2015 (*Source:* Author with data from CEP polls)

polls carried out by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) have tracked Chileans' perception of the country's progress. As the CEP has conducted national probabilistic sample polls since the late 1980s, we can assess the evolution of Chileans' perceptions of different issues.

Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of the perception of progress. CEP polls ask respondents to say if they think the country is making progress, is stagnant, or is going backwards. Though the middle category is somewhat biased toward a negative meaning—it would be better to offer the option “the same” rather than “stagnant” to avoid the suggestion that no change is negative—the fact that the CEP poll has tracked responses since 1990 permits some useful comparison in order to assess the validity of the alleged perception of malaise in representation (the objective of this volume) or with the way society in general has evolved (the ongoing debate on malaise in Chile that started in the late 1990s).

Figure 5.5 shows a sharp decline in 1998 in the percentage of those who thought the country was moving in the right direction. At the end of that year, an economic crisis in emerging markets, especially in Asia, hit Chile hard and provoked an economic recession in 1999, the first since



**Fig. 5.6** Perception about present and future economic situation, 1990–2015  
(*Source:* Author with data from CEP polls)

democracy was restored. Better economic conditions in the next few years helped Chileans become more positive about the country's direction. In early 2007, slightly ahead of the meltdown of the world economy, they again turned pessimistic. Since then, the mood has been less stable. In 2015, for the first time ever, those who think the country is moving backwards outnumbered those who think it is moving forward. Still, for most of the 25 years since democracy was restored, the views of Chileans about the future have been rather optimistic. If there is malaise in representation, that malaise is not expressed in the perception Chileans have about where the country is going.

The moderately positive views people have about the country's direction is consistent with Chileans' assessments of their own present economic situation and their expectations about their economic situation in 12 months' time. Figure 5.6 shows the time series for these two questions. Not surprisingly, the percentage of those with a negative assessment of their present situation increased sharply in late 1997—coincidentally, that was the moment when the UNDP conducted the national poll used as evidence for the diffused malaise identified in its 1998 report. When the economy began to recover after 2000, the percentage of those with a

pessimistic assessment of their present economic situation declined rapidly. The 2008 crisis also induced an increase in pessimists. Most recently, pessimism has again increased since early 2015, coinciding with a time of sluggish economic growth.

Interestingly, the expectations people have about the future have always been better than their perceptions of the present. In Fig. 5.6, the percentage with a negative future assessment is consistently lower than that with a negative assessment of the present. In fact, negative future assessment has varied less than negative present assessment, indicating that even when people were experiencing a difficult period, as in 1998, 2008, or 2015, far fewer had a negative assessment of the future. Since 2014, however, negative assessment of the future has grown as fast as negative assessment of the present. In other words, for the first time since the restoration of democracy, Chileans are becoming increasingly concerned about their future economic prospects.

#### *The Debate About Malaise and Discontent Today*

UNDP Human Development Reports have continued to assume diffuse societal discontent (UNDP 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2015). In its latest report in 2015, the UNDP Human Development team found a more politicized society (though the timing of the national poll used in the study, just a matter of weeks before the 2013 presidential election, would explain a higher level of politicization). Other intellectuals have joined ranks with contributions highlighting the alleged tensions that exist in society and constitute a threat to the stability of the economic model. In a 2012 bestseller, sociologist Alberto Mayol announced *El Derrumbe del Modelo* (The Collapse of the Model), claiming that Chileans' discontent with the model had reached an intolerable level (Mayol 2012). Others have also suggested that the neoliberal model is about to be replaced, but have been less clear as to when this would happen (Atria et al. 2013).

The dominant paradigm among public intellectuals in Chile, and among many social scientists, is that Chilean democracy is facing difficult hurdles. In an op-ed, published on June 30, 2015, in Spain's *El País* newspaper, sociologist Cristóbal Rovira warned the Chilean elite that "broken links of trust cannot be restored. The irruption of populism is around the corner" (Rovira 2015). Others have joined the chorus of apocalyptic predictions about the future of Chilean democracy. Citing the high levels of social protests—particularly among Chilean students—and basing their

conclusions on low approval of the political elite, those who insist on seeing signs of malaise will even deny the evidence indicating otherwise in order to continue to claim that “*esto no da para más*” (“this is about to explode”). In a column commenting the results of the last CEP poll in October 2015—which confirmed a more optimistic society—philosopher and university professor Max Colodro reflected that “when people are forced to look at themselves and evaluate their own situation, the country of malaise seems far away and disconnected from the very personal reality of its inhabitants” (Colodro 2015). However, rather than taking a clue from what people report in polls and updating his own reading of society, Colodro went on to insist there is a problem, arguing that “either Chileans simply lie when they talk about their lives or we are facing a phenomenon where connections between private and public are more complex and *diffuse*”. Using the favorite code word from the UNDP report, the paradox between a society that seems to be adapting to the new realities that Chile faces and an elite that insists on the presence of malaise is often explained away by the adjective “diffuse”.

### CONCLUSION

All democracies face challenges. Dahl warned that democracy would always be an unattainable ideal (Dahl 1971). Thus, he argued we should accept living in polyarchies. To a large extent, the notion of malaise in representation simply reflects the shortcomings of the democracies that actually exist today. Undoubtedly, technological developments and the structural difficulties of making representative democracy work (Przeworski 2010) are also present in Chile. However, rather than concluding that Chilean democracy is at risk or that there is a dominant malaise in (or with) representation, “we should be aware of the limits [of democracy] because otherwise we become prey to demagogical appeals, which more often than not mask a quest for political power by promises that cannot be fulfilled by anyone anywhere” (Przeworski 2010: 171).

### NOTES

1. An English summary of the report can be found at <http://desarrollohumano.cl/idh/informes/1998-las-paradojas-de-la-modernizacion/>.
2. All quotes are from the English summary (no page numbers provided).



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