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Mis-coordination and political misalignments in ticket-splitting: the case of Chile, 2005–2009

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Voters normally split their tickets when they do not feel sufficiently represented by only one political party or when politicians cultivate a personal vote regardless of party identification. Yet, voters might also split their tickets when they feel indifferent about like-minded parties or individual candidates. The authors distinguish between misalignment ticket-splitting (MATS), caused by a mismatch between voters' preferences and the alternatives offered by the party system, and mis-coordination ticket-splitting (MCTS), when like-minded parties offer choices equally acceptable to voters. MCTS is likely to occur under proportional representation systems with multiple parties. The authors apply our categorization to concurrent presidential and legislative elections in Chile in 2005 and 2009. There was plenty of MCTS but little MATS. The authors suggest that the two forms should be separately analyzed as they are reflective of different political phenomena.

Keywords: ticket-splitting; electoral rules; political party systems; electoral coordination; Chile

Not all ticket-splitting is the same. Sometimes, voters split their tickets because they do not feel sufficiently represented by any of the options available. Other times, they do so when they are indifferent about similar alternatives. Those two forms of ticket-splitting should not be lumped together. Voters normally split their tickets because they do not feel satisfied with all the candidates for different offices from one party. We define this as misalignment ticket-splitting (MATS). Yet, it might also be that ticket-splitting happens when voters are indifferent between similar candidates from different parties. We define this as mis-coordination ticket-splitting (MCTS). MATS can be defined as a bottom-up reaction by voters to parties not adequately reflecting people's electoral preferences. MCTS can be described as a top-down mechanism resulting from the overlapping of ideological like-minded candidates. Electoral rules will affect the type of ticket-splitting. Under proportional representation in multiparty systems, MCTS is more likely to occur.

To exemplify our point, we use the case of Chile, a country with multiple parties and a proportional representation system. Chile has seen varying levels of ticket-splitting in recent elections. In 2005, the opposition right-wing Alianza coalition received 38.7% in the concurrent legislative election, while its two presidential candidates got a combined 48.6%. In 2009, the ruling Concertación candidate Eduardo Frei received 29.6%, while his centre-left coalition got

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44.4% in the legislative election. Former Concertación legislator Marco Enríquez-Ominami (ME-O) received 20.1% and his alternative leftist coalition, Nueva Mayoría (NM), only 4.6%. A third Concertación-related presidential candidate received 6.2%. If we combine the vote for the Concertación and NM, their 49.7% is less than the vote share of the three left-of-centre presidential candidates (57%). To what extent the ticket-splitting in 2005 and 2009 was the result of a coordination failure by the Alianza and Concertación elites, respectively, that led like-minded voters to split tickets among presidential and legislative candidates with similar ideological positions? Or did ticket-splitting reflect dissatisfaction by voters who did not feel fully represented by either of the two coalitions?

After discussing what determines ticket-splitting, the role of electoral rules and how the literature on ticket-splitting would benefit from distinguishing between MATS and MCTS, we apply our categorization to concurrent presidential and legislative elections in Chile in 2005 and 2009.

Determinants of ticket-splitting

Ticket-splitting can only occur when there is a concurrent election where voters choose candidates for different offices. Voters split their tickets when they select a candidate from one party for one office and a candidate from a different party for a different office. As presidents concentrate more powers and attributions, winning the presidency is more important than winning the legislature in presidential systems. We assume that voters also see it that way. There will be ticket-splitting when they vote in the concurrent legislative election for a candidate from a party other than their presidential election choice.

To understand ticket-splitting, we first need to discuss the determinants of vote choice. Three complementary explanations focus on long-, medium- and short-term variables (Bartels, 2011; Dalton & Klingemann, 2007; Jennings, 2007; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Long-term variables associate political predispositions to permanent traits (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & McPhee, 1954), while political party alignments results from societal traits (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1976). Mid-range variables focus on socialization as determinants of vote choice (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Fuchs, 2007; Jennings, 2007; Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Knutsen, 2007; Mair, 2007; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976). Short-term variables assume that voters weight the performance of the outgoing government and expectations on the likely performance of candidates and parties (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007).

The divided government theory assumes that voters seek to balance power by voting for a presidential candidate and a legislative candidate from different parties (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996; Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2004). The electorate is assumed to have perfect information on the positions of candidates and parties (Saunders, Abramowitz, & Williamson, 2005). With incomplete information, and with candidates who blur party differences, or in countries with a less stable party system, this theory is less apt to explain ticket-splitting.

Explanations that use long- and mid-term variables would normally preclude the existence of ticket-splitting. Voters would support parties that reflect their preferences, either because they were so socialized or because party alignments reflect the societal cleavages that determine voters' preferences (Bartels, 2011). However, when ideologically similar party elites fail to coordinate and there is more than one presidential candidate representing the same electoral base, like-minded voters might end up splitting their tickets (MCTS).

Party identification has been cited as an inhibitor of ticket-splitting for two reasons. First, political parties work as information shortcuts (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1994). Explanations that use long- and medium-term variables assume that people vote consistently for the same parties. Party identification produces psychological effects. The sense of belonging breeds a certain loyalty

often superior to short-term cost–benefit analyses (Campbell et al., 1960). When party identification is strong, there should be little ticket-splitting. However, MCTS is consistent with high level of party identification. People identify with party X, but party X has temporarily or permanently broken into factions or different parties with their own presidential candidates.

According to Fiorina (1996), voters choose presidents based on ideology and congressional candidates based on the services provided to constituents (Born, 1994; Fiorina, 1996). In the USA, the median voter in presidential elections is not the same as the median voter in each congressional district. As a result, centrist voters who support a Democratic presidential candidate might end up voting for a Republican congressional candidate. Others argue that voters do not first choose their presidential or congressional candidate. Instead, they make up their minds concurrently on whom to vote for in both races based on their prior ideological positions (Grofman, Koetzle, McDonald, & Brunell, 2000). Voters whose electoral preferences are determined by short-term variables would be more inclined to favour a divided government or to punish or reward the incumbent party. Voters who favour a divided government reflect MATS. They want a president from one party and a congressperson from a different party.

When candidates cultivate a personal vote, explanations that rely on long- and mid-term variables associated with permanent traits have less predictive power (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Mervin, 1973). In focusing on individual candidates' traits, Jacobson (1989, 1990) defines ticket-splitting as a by-product of the advantage of being better known, the incumbent effect. Voters who choose presidential candidates based on long-, medium- or short-term considerations might be inclined to reconfirm an incumbent legislator from a different party. The existence of a personal vote is partially explained by the advantages incumbents have in campaign structure, resources – both financial and social networks – and name recognition that are difficult (Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart, 2000; Burden & Kimball, 1998; Cain et al., 1987; Carey & Shugart, 1995). Incumbency advantage would also reflect MATS, as voters inform their choices based on the services provided to them by their representatives in different offices who might be from different parties.

Voters' individual traits have also been cited to explain ticket-splitting. Campbell and Miller (1957) report that those with higher levels of education are less likely to split their tickets. DeVries and Tarrance (1972) find the opposite evidence and, also, that voters are less likely to split their tickets as they age. Maddox and Nimmo (1981) report that interest in politics affects ticket-splitting. Political sophistication was found to have a negative effect on ticket-splitting (Converse, 1964). The evidence is mixed as to what specific individual traits induce voters to split their tickets (Bawn, 1999; Beck, Baum, Clausen, & Smith, 1992; Gschwend, 2007; Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2004; Moser & Scheiner, 2005; Roscoe, 2003). Necessarily, when particular traits induce ticket-splitting, there is a MATS problem in the options offered to voters by parties.

Ansolabehere et al. (2000) posit that the incumbent's district performance explains their higher support in legislative races. Constituency service allows incumbents to maximize their reelection chances (Fenno, 1978). Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1984) find a strong relationship between constituency service and personal vote both in the American presidential and the British parliamentary systems. The personal vote has been associated to a scenario characterized by 'lack of party leadership control over access to rank on ballots' (Carey & Shugart 1995, p. 417) and to electoral rules, such as the district magnitude and the option to cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. As district magnitude increases, the value of personal reputation rises if the district's electoral formula fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.

Petrocik and Doherty (1996) argue that ticket-splitting is not caused by strategic and sophisticated voters seeking a divided government, but that it is the by-product of issue divergence between legislative and presidential candidates. Differences in issue orientation and in the

salience of each race – with the legislative candidate unable to gain as much notoriety as the presidential candidate – lead voters to split their tickets. For Petrocik and Doherty (1996), issue-ownership and the difference in salience of the elections explain ticket-splitting. For Jacobson, the difference is in the kinds of office (Jacobson, 1990). In this line of analysis based on the rise of the personal vote, ticket-splitting would generally be MATS. Yet, ticket-splitting might occasionally reflect MCTS when the personal vote is cultivated by different politicians from like-minded parties.

Recent work has looked further into institutional incentives for ticket-splitting (Ames, Baker, & Renno, 2009; McAllister & Darcy, 1992; Rallings & Thrasher, 2003). Electoral rules have an effect (Cox & Schoppa, 2002). In mixed electoral systems, voters might split their tickets as they have more than one vote (Gschwend, 2007, Moser & Scheiner, 2009). Strategic voting has been analyzed as an insurance policy for voters (Helmke, 2009). Distinctions have been made between sincere and strategic ticket-splitting (Brunell & Grofman, 2009). Institutional incentives might induce parties to split into like-minded factions and thus foster MCTS. For example, MCTS might occur when the electoral system combines concurrent presidential elections, with run-off majority provisions, and concurrent legislative elections with proportional representation. In countries with a two-party system, ticket-splitting would always reflect MATS, but in countries with multiple parties and with proportional representation systems, ticket-splitting might reflect either MATS or MCTS.

The mixed evidence on the determinants of ticket-splitting presented in the literature results from overlooking the possibility of different types of ticket-splitting. As the role of party elites has been systematically disregarded – and the effects of different electoral rules has been minimized – MATS and MCTS have been treated as the same. However, the way party elites nominate presidential candidates can foster or hinder ticket-splitting. When elites from ideologically similar parties nominate more than one presidential candidate to target the same electoral base, there is the opportunity for MCTS. Conversely, when the party system does not appropriately represent societal cleavages – or when parties nominate presidential candidates who do not reflect societal cleavages well – there will be MATS, as many voters will feel not represented by the existing candidates.

There are different empirical and theoretical implications for both forms of ticket-splitting. MATS reflects a tension between the electorate and the political party system. MCTS results only from a coordination failure among like-minded parties, and might be induced by proportional representation electoral rules. While MATS might threaten the stability of the political party alignment, MCTS is a coordination failure with few long-term implications for the stability of the party system and electoral alignments. We use the case of Chile, a country with multiple parties that normally (but not always) form multiparty coalitions, with a majority run-off presidential system and concurrent legislative elections with proportional representation, to show both forms of ticket-splitting.

The case of Chile

With the return of democracy in 1990, the three-way divide that characterized the Chilean party system before the 1973 breakdown – with parties aligned on a left-centre-right continuum (Sartori, 1976; Valenzuela, 1977; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1976) – began to coexist with a two-way split between opponents and supporters of the dictatorship (Montes, Mainwaring, & Ortega, 2000; Tironi & Agüero, 1999; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003). Pro-democracy parties formed the Concertación coalition and pro-Pinochet parties formed the Alianza coalition. The Concertación is comprised by the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the left-of-centre Socialist Party (PS), Party for Democracy (PPD) and Radical Social Democratic Party

(PRSD). The Alianza is comprised by the extreme right Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the more moderate National Renewal (RN).

The Concertación and Alianza have dominated elections since 1989. The fact that electoral politics is organized around two coalitions makes the Chilean political system resemble a two-party system. All presidential election run-offs have been decided from among Concertación and Alianza candidates. The Concertación won all presidential, legislative and municipal elections between 1989 and 2008. In 2009, the Alianza finally captured the presidency. However, since parties have kept their individual identities and have not always run as part of multiparty coalitions, the presence of ticket-splitting can still be assessed at the party level (and not just at the coalition level).

The electoral system in place since the return of democracy combines majority requirements for presidential elections (with a run-off if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round) and proportional representation for Congress. The country is divided into 60 Chamber of Deputies and 19 senatorial districts. Each district elects two seats by proportional representation. Candidates run in open lists and voters select candidates within party lists. The candidate with the most votes in the most-voted list automatically wins the first seat. The second seat is assigned using the d'Hondt allocation formula. In most cases, this seat goes to the candidate with the most votes in the second most-voted list. However, when the winning list gets twice as many votes as any other list, it gets both seats.

Because only two seats are assigned in every district, and in most cases they are equally divided between the two largest coalitions, the formation of the Alianza and Concertación coalitions is reinforced by the incentives of the electoral system. Most parties group under one of the two umbrella coalitions, but they keep their individual identities as they run separately in sub-pacts within each coalition. Occasionally, coalitions present more than one presidential candidate. Other times, parties join a coalition in the legislative race but run their own presidential candidates.

The superposition of the two-way authoritarian/democratic and three-way left-centre-right alignments poses problems to some voters. Since the Concertación and Alianza reflect the two-way divide, a voter who identifies as a centrist can find himself/herself splitting his/her ticket when neither the Concertación nor the Alianza has a centrist presidential candidate. Inversely, when a rightist voter has more than one ideologically compatible alternative in a presidential election, he/she might end up splitting his/her ticket between like-minded parties. The centrist voter would be faced with an ideological tough choice to make, while the rightist candidate would not (assuming that voters are aligned on the single-dimensional space). The first case would reflect MATS, while the second would reflect MCTS.

Naturally, when a multidimensional issue space is assumed, ticket-splitting might always reflect MATS or MCTS. Depending on what dimensions are relevant for different voters, those voters might be faced with a coordination problem having to choose among similar candidates or with a misalignment problem as candidates do not adequately represent their preferences. Here, we assume the simpler single-dimensional issue space, with voters and parties aligned on a left–right scale. Multidimensional issue space analysis might also distinguish voters by MATS or MCTS, but more information is needed on what informs voters' vote choices.

Chilean parties can form coalitions for legislative elections and, at the same time, they can run their own presidential candidates in the first round – expecting that like-minded parties will group around the Alianza and Concertación in the run-off election. In turn, voters must vote strategically in the legislative election to optimize the chances of their preferred candidate winning, but they can afford to choose their most preferred presidential option in the first round vote – knowing that a run-off will be likely. Thus, as voters will likely have more than one presidential candidate per coalition, the electoral arrangement in place in Chile induces MCTS (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Misalignment and mis-coordination ticket-splitting.
Source: Authors.

Methods

We conduct our study using two different levels of analysis. We first study the actual vote results at the municipal level. Chile is comprised by 345 municipalities that vary widely in population and electoral preferences. Since it is the smallest electoral unit, we analyze presidential and legislative election results at that municipal level. That allows us to assess the actual level of ticket-splitting in every election minimizing the ecological fallacy problem.

We also use Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) national pre-electoral polls. Because they are based on personal interviews – not phone calls – the fieldwork takes longer time, but it is fully representative of the national population. CEP polls are publicly available and have been widely used to study electoral and voting preferences in Chile. Unfortunately, CEP polls only ask about presidential vote intention, not legislative vote intention. Thus, we use identification with political parties as a proxy for vote intention.

While polls would normally suffice for an analysis of ticket-splitting, the fact that the highly reputed CEP poll does not ask for vote intention in the legislative election requires us to complement the analysis with the actual data. The combined use of municipal-level data and pre-electoral polls allows us to derive stronger and more reliable conclusions

Ticket-splitting in Chile

Our case discussion is divided into three stages. First, using national results, we show the extent and magnitude of ticket-splitting in Chilean presidential elections since 1989. Second, we cautiously use pre-electoral polls to compare the electoral support base of different presidential candidates as a proxy for vote intention. Third, we show scatter plots and use multinomial regression analyses with municipal-level data to present the differences in vote determinants for presidential candidates. In these models, we incorporate social and economic variables normally used to account for voter's preferences – such as ideological positioning, gender, age, socio-economic status, economic perception and presidential approval – as control variables. We expect like-minded candidates to have a similar ideological electoral base. This would reflect MCTS. Conversely, when the candidates' positions or parties they represent are not harmonious with the preferences of voters, we will witness MATS.

Table 1 shows the differences in the vote share for the Concertación and Alianza presidential candidates and legislative slates between 1989 and 2009. In the first two elections – 1989 and 1993 – each coalition had one presidential candidate. In 1999, the presidential election did not coincide with a legislative election, ruling out ticket-splitting. In 2005, the Alianza had two presidential candidates. In 2009, in addition to the official Concertación candidate, there were two other left-wing presidential candidates – and one additional left-of-centre legislative slate.

Table 1. Results in concurrent presidential and legislative elections in Chile, 1989–2009.

	Concertación					Alianza			Others	
	Presidential		Legislative	Diff.		Presidential	Legislative	Diff.	Presidential	Legislative
1989		55.2	51.5	3.7		29.4	34.2	−4.8	15.4	14.3
1993		58.0	55.4	2.6		24.4	36.7	−12.3	17.6	7.9
1997[a]		–	50.5	–		–	36.3	–	–	13.2
1999[a]		48.0	–	–		47.5	–	–	4.5	–
2001[a]		–	47.9	–		–	44.3	–	–	7.8
2005		46.0	51.8	−5.8	25.4	23.2	38.7	9.9	5.4*	9.5
2009	29.6 20.1	6.2	44.3 4.57	6.1		44.0	43.4	0.6	0.0	7.6

Source: Authors, with the data from http://www.elecciones.gov.cl
[a]In 1999, there was no concurrent legislative election and in 1997 and 2001 there were no presidential elections.
*Tomás Hirsch (5.4%) was the candidate of the PC/JP coalition, not a member of the Concertación that year.

In 2005, the Alianza had two candidates, Sebastián Piñera (RN) and Joaquín Lavín (UDI). As Table 1 shows, their combined vote was 48.6%. The Alianza legislative slate got 38.7%. The Concertación candidate, Socialist Michelle Bachelet, obtained 46%, short of the 51.8% received by her slate. As we show below, the fact that the two Alianza presidential candidates received a higher vote share than the Alianza slate, and that the opposite was true for the Concertación, points to some MATS. Some centrist voters opted for an Alianza presidential candidate and for the Concertación legislative slate.

In 2009, the Alianza had only one candidate, Piñera. As Table 1 shows, he got the same vote share as his legislative slate. The Concertación candidate, centrist Christian Democratic (PDC) Eduardo Frei, received only 29%, while his slate got 49%. The Concertación formed an electoral pact with the Communist Party (PC) in the legislative election, but the PC had its own presidential candidate, Jorge Arrate, a former Concertación leader, who got 6.2%. In addition, former Concertación legislator, ex Socialist Marco Enríquez-Ominami (ME-O), received 20.1%, but his legislative slate – Nueva Mayoría (NM) – only obtained 4.6%. Combined, the vote share for the three left-of-centre presidential candidates was 56.7% while the vote for the two left-of-centre legislative slates was 49.2%. The fact that the three Concertación-related presidential candidates received a higher vote share than the left-of-centre legislative slates points to some MATS.

However, if we only look at the vote share received by the Concertación presidential candidate and the Concertación slate, we will observe a higher level of ticket-splitting. We contend that the ticket-splitting combinations by left-of-centre voters should not be treated in the same way as the ticket-splitting that results from voters who cross the ideological line between the Concertación and the Alianza.

Table 2 shows the average vote differential in all 345 municipalities for different combinations of presidential and legislative choices. The average Lavín and Piñera combined vote at the municipal level was 13.1% higher than the Alianza legislative vote, with a standard deviation of 6.6. In 343 municipalities, the Alianza presidential candidates received more votes than the Alianza slate. In turn, Bachelet received an average of 4.1% fewer votes than the Concertación, with a standard deviation of 7.3. In two-thirds of the municipalities, Bachelet received fewer votes than the Concertación. Table 2 shows a significant amount of ticket-splitting in 2005, benefiting Alianza presidential candidates. As we show below, this points to the presence of centrist voters who supported the Concertación slate and an Alianza presidential candidate, MATS.

In 2009, on average, Piñera obtained 3.6% more than the Alianza in the 345 municipalities. In turn, Frei received 15.3% less than the Concertación, while ME-O got 15.4% more than his NM

Table 2. Average vote differential for presidential candidates and their respective coalition slates, 2005–
2009.

Year and vote combinations	Mean	Median	Standard deviation
2005			
(Piñera + Lavín) − Alianza	13.07	12.12	6.58
Piñera − Alianza	−10.09	−9.62	8.00
Lavín − Alianza	−11.28	−11.08	7.77
Bachelet − Concertación	−4.10	−3.34	7.34
Hirsch − JP	−1.39	−0.85	3.64
2009			
Piñera − Alianza	3.57	2.99	8.00
Frei − (ConcertaciónPC)	−10.09	−11.02	8.50
MEO − NM	13.93	13.68	5.90
Frei + Arrate − (ConcertaciónPC)	−5.31	−6.56	8.51
Frei + Arrate + MEO − (ConcertaciónPC + NM)	8.62	7.18	9.62
Number of municipalities	345	345	345

Source: Authors, with the data from http://www.elecciones.gov.cl

slate. The combined vote of Frei/Arrate/ME-O in the presidential election was on average 3.2%
higher than the combined vote of the Concertación–PC/NM legislative slates. This indicates a less
evident pattern of ticket-splitting between coalitions in 2009 than in 2005, MCTS.

A coordination failure in the two Alianza parties induced MCTS among right-wing voters
in 2005. However, the fact that the two right-wing candidates were moderate in different
dimensions – and that the Concertación's candidate was a leftist – allowed for some MATS by mod-
erate voters. The combined vote of the three left-of-centre presidential candidates was higher
than the vote for the left-of-centre legislative slates. That points to some MATS, but less than in
2005.

In 2009, the three presidential candidates and two legislative slates representing the centre-left
induced MCTS. Since one centre-left candidate attracted some centre-right voters, there was also
a limited amount of MATS as well. After discussing the evidence, we show that the high level of
ticket-splitting in Chile in 2009 does not reflect a tension between the party system and the clea-
vage structure of society. While ticket-splitting in 2005 reflects some MATS, most of the ticket-
splitting in 2009 reflects a coordination failure of like-minded leftist parties.

Individual-level analysis

In this section, using data from the CEP polls, we present how people placed, on a left–right scale,
the presidential candidates in 2005 and 2009.

Figure 2 also shows the ideological position of Alianza, Concertación and Juntos Podemos
(JP, the coalition led by the PC, to the left of the Concertación) sympathizers. In 2005, Chileans
placed the two right-wing candidates near each other to the right on the ideological scale. The
Concertación candidate Bachelet was placed left-of-centre, near the candidate of the Communist
and Humanist Parties, Tomás Hirsch. Whereas Bachelet was placed right next to the Concertación
median voter, the Alianza median voter had two attractive options, Piñera and Lavín. As we
argued, when the party system offers fewer options than cleavages exist in society, there will
be MATS. When like-minded parties fail to coordinate, we observe MCTS. In 2005, there was
MCTS for the typical Alianza voter.

In 2009, Piñera was perceived by all voters as the only right-of-centre candidate. Chileans
placed him slightly to the right than the Alianza median voter placed herself. For Concertación

Figure 2. Self-positioning of voters on ideological scale and perceived ideological position of presidential candidates, 2005–2009.
Source: Authors, with the data from Encuesta CEP #51, October–November 2005, *N* = 1506 and Encuesta CEP #61, October 2009, *N* = 1505. http://www.cepchile.cl

and JP sympathizers, there were more presidential options, as Arrate, Frei and ME-O were placed ideologically close to the Concertación and JP median voters. We contend that such arrangement facilitates MCTS. It might be the case that candidates differentiate themselves on dimensions other than the left–right single issue space. However, under the simple assumption that candidates and voters align on a single dimension, in 2005 Chilean right-wing voters had two options to choose from while in 2009 Chilean left-wing voters had three presidential alternatives.

The actual vote base of each presidential candidate can differ from coalition sympathizers. For that reason, we show in Figure 3 the self-positioning (on a left–right ideological scale) of voters

Figure 3. Vote intention by self-positioning on an ideological Scale, Chile 2005.
Source: Authors, with the data from Encuesta CEP #51, October–November 2005, *N* = 1506, and Encuesta CEP #61, October 2009, *N* = 1505. www.cepchile.cl. *We exclude Arrate because of his low vote intention in polls.

Figure 4. Vote intention by self-positioning on ideological Scale, Chile 2009.
Source: Authors with the data from Encuesta CEP #51, October–November 2005, $N = 1506$, and Encuesta CEP #61, October 2009, $N = 1505$. www.cepchile.cl. *We exclude Arrate because of his low vote intention in polls.

according to their presidential choice. The three top candidates, Bachelet, Piñera and Lavín, had their strongest support among centrist voters. Piñera and Lavín's support base was skewed to the right, while Bachelet's was skewed to the left. This points to MCTS for right-wing voters for whom Piñera and Lavín were ideologically similar options. However, it also might point to some MATS for centrist voters who might have split their tickets voting for one of the Alianza presidential candidates and the Concertación legislative slate.

With the data from the CEP pre-electoral poll of 2009, Figure 4 shows the self-positioning of Piñera, Frei and ME-O voters. It also shows the self-positioning of the sum of ME-O and Piñera (because Arrate had such low support in polls, we did not include him). Again, all the presidential candidates had their highest support among moderate voters, but Piñera's support was skewed to

Table 3 . Vote intention in presidential and legislative elections, 2005.

Vote intention in legislative election (% of all voters)	Bachelet (PS)	Piñera (RN)	Lavín (UDI)	Hirsch (Humanist Party)	DK/not voting/other	Total
UDI (10.5%)	3.4	16.6	76.6	0	3.4	100
RN (15.3%)	4.8	67.4	23.5	0.9	3.4	100
PDC (9.8%)	68.2	18.9	6.1	0.7	6.1	100
PRSD (0.9%)	84.6	15.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	100
PPD (12.1%)	78.6	11.5	3.3	1.1	5.5	100
PS (12.7%)	87.5	5.2	2.1	2.6	2.6	100
PC (1.9%)	37.9	6.9	10.3	41.4	3.5	100
DK/other/Not voting (36.8%)	–					
Total (100%)	39.4	22.6	18.9	2.9	16.2	100

Source: Authors, with the data from Encuesta CEP #51, October–November 2005, $N = 1506$. www.cepchile.cl

Table 4. Vote intention in presidential elections and political identification, 2009.

Identification with political coalition	Vote intention in presidential election					
	Arrate	ME-O	Frei	Piñera	DK/not voting/other	Total (%)
Alianza (18.5%)	1.1	6.5	4.0	84.2	4.2	100
Concertación (26.3%)	4.8	29.8	47.5	11.6	6.3	100
JP(6.2%)	19.4	36.6	18.3	23.7	2.0	100
Others/DK/NA (49.0%)	3.5	21.7	19.5	31.7	23.6	100
Total (100%)	4.2	22.0	24.0	35.6	14.2	100

Note: In 2009, CEP did not ask for vote intention in legislative election. We use identification with coalition as a proxy for vote intention in legislative election.
Source: Authors, with the data from Encuesta CEP #61, October 2009, *N* = 1505. www.cepchile.cl

the right while ME-O and Frei's were skewed to the left. For left-wing voters, there was MCTS while centrist voters faced some MATS as they split their support among the three top presidential candidates.

Since the CEP polls do not directly ask for vote intention in legislative elections, we use party identification as a proxy. Table 3 shows presidential vote by party affiliation. Party identification is strong, but 36.8% of people do not identify with parties. Thus, party identification only offers some insights as to how people vote in legislative elections. Precisely because that is an imperfect proxy, we also use actual electoral results below to show the presence of the two kinds of ticket-splitting. Not surprisingly, support for Bachelet was strongest among voters identified with the Concertación's four parties (PDC, PRSD, PS and PPD). Support for Piñera was strongest among RN sympathizers and support for Lavín was highest among UDI supporters. This shows strong ideological consistency among politically identified voters.

Table 4 shows vote intention by identification with political coalitions in the October 2009 CEP poll. Alianza voters were overwhelmingly in favour of Piñera, but barely less than half of the Concertación sympathizers supported Frei. Almost 30% of Concertación sympathizers supported MEO. Ideologically, voters were consistent in their preferences. Right-wing voters preferred Piñera while centre-left voters were for Frei or ME-O. Leftist voters were for Frei, ME-O and Arrate. Among those not identified (almost half of respondents), Piñera came ahead, with Frei and ME-O on a statistical tie. Not surprisingly, almost one in every four of those not identified was either not voting or undecided.

Very few Alianza right-wing sympathizers opted for a presidential candidate other than Piñera. Few Concertación sympathizers opted for Piñera. Table 4 shows a pattern consistent with MCTS. Concertación voters were split between the official Concertación candidate, Eduardo Frei, and the former Concertación-turned independent Marco Enríquez-Ominami.

Aggregate-level analysis: scatter plots

Since there are no reliable district-level polling data in Chile and since the Concertación and Alianza are multiparty coalitions that assign different districts to different parties, polls cannot be used to accurately measure vote intention by party. For that reason, we use municipal-level data to assess the presence of MATS and MCTS. In 2005 and 2009, Chileans in the 345 municipalities cast votes for a presidential candidate and for one candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. Since any kind of aggregate data risks an ecological fallacy problem, we use the lowest possible unit of aggregate date, the district level, to minimize the risk.

Figure 5. Scatterplot of selected ticket-splitting combinations, Chile 2005.
Source: Authors, with the data from www.elecciones.gov.cl

Figure 5 show a series of scatterplots with the percentage of ticket-splitting for presidential candidates and their respective legislative slates in 2005. *MATS would be observable with a perfect 45-degree angle going either southeast or southwest.* As voters are not fully represented by the options offered by political parties, they split their tickets between candidates from different coalitions. Conversely, *MCTS would be reflected by a 180-degree angle*, or the representation of no relationship between the loss of one candidate when compared to her/his slate and the gain of another candidate. Since there are 60 electoral districts, the effect of personal vote dynamics should cancel out when analysing the vote for the presidential candidate and the coalition slate.

Figure 5, on the upper left corner, shows the vote difference received by Bachelet minus the Concertación in 2005 and (Piñera – Alianza). Bachelet did better than the Concertación while Piñera did worse than the Alianza. A perfect 45-degree angle going southeast would indicate MATS by voters who opted for the Concertación and for Piñera. The upper right scatter plot in Figure 5 shows the same relationship between (Bachelet – Concertación) and (Lavín – Alianza).

The lower left scatterplot shows the (Piñera – Alianza) and (Lavín – Alianza). Piñera and Lavín attracted support from the Concertación voters. Each Alianza presidential candidate captured support from different kinds of Concertación legislative voters. The lower right scatterplot in Figure 5 shows a negative correlation between (Bachelet − Concertación) and (Piñera/Lavín – Alianza). The more advantage Lavín/Piñera had over their legislative slate, the larger the difference between the Concertación and Bachelet. The lower right scatterplot shows an almost perfect

Figure 6. Scatterplots of selected ticket-splitting combinations, Chile 2009.
Source: Authors, with the data from www.elecciones.gov.cl

representation of MATS. Some voters who supported the Concertación opted for Alianza presidential candidates. The upper right and upper left scatterplots show a less evident form of MATS as Lavín and Piñera attracted different kinds of Concertación voters. When we combine the vote for Piñera and Lavín, there is stronger evidence of MATS. The Concertación votes lost by Bachelet went to benefit the two Alianza candidates.

Figure 6 shows scatterplots for 2009. The upper left scatteplot shows (Piñera – Alianza) and (Frei – Concertación). That scatterplot confirms the presence of MATS. The handful of cases where ticket-splitting in favour of both candidates is positively correlated influence the slope of the relationship to make it less prouncedly diagonally than we would expect. The upper right scatterplot shows the relationship between (Piñera – Alianza) and (ME-O − NM). A perfect MCTS would show no correlation between the gain in favour of one candidate and the loss of the other. Interestingly, there is MATS between the Alianza and ME-O voters. Wherever ME-O did well, Piñera did worse than the Alianza. The lower left scatterplot shows (Frei/Arrate – Concertación/JP) and (ME-O − NM). Wherever ME-O did better than NM, Frei/Arrate only did marginally worse than the Concertación/JP. The lower right scatterplot shows a strong MATS between (Piñera – Alianza) and (Frei/Arrate/MEO – the Concertación/JP/NM). The lower right scatterplot in Figure 6 is almost identical to its equivalent scatterplot in Figure 5, indicating that the Concertación/Alianza divide in 2005 can also be observed in 2009.

Aggregate-level analysis: regressions

Finally, we use regression models on the determinants of the electoral base of different presidential candidates to test for MATS and MCTS. When two candidates have electoral bases with similar ideological preferences, there is evidence of MCTS. When there are ideological differences in the electoral bases of candidates, there is MATS.

Table 5 shows the vote for Piñera and Lavín in 2005 using vote intention for Bachelet as the reference category. Piñera and Lavín have similar vote determinants. In a pattern that points to MCTS, they both receive stronger support among right-wing voters and weaker support among left voters than Bachelet. However, Piñera also received weaker support from centrist voters than Bachelet. Lavín also had less support among centrists than Bachelet, but the number was not statistically significant. That points to some MATS by centrist voters who supported the Concertación in the legislative election but did not vote for Bachelet in the presidential election.

Higher socio-economic status also has positive effect on the vote for Piñera. Lavín did not have stronger support than Bachelet among well-to-do voters. This reflects previous claims that Piñera attracted high income voters, while Lavín competed with Bachelet among low-income voters (Morales, 2008). Both Piñera and Lavín were stronger among those who disapproved of the outgoing Concertación president. Lavín and Piñera were complementary in terms of their socio-economic support basis, but competed for the same right-wing voters.

The last column in Table 5 compares the combined vote intention for Piñera and Lavín with the vote intention for Bachelet. The model shows distinct electoral bases for right-wing candidates and Bachelet. Ideology is statistically significant. Right-wing voters are more likely to vote for Piñera/Lavín, and centrists and leftists are more likely to support Bachelet. Those who disapproved of the outgoing Concertación president were also more likely to vote for Piñera/Lavín. Women were more likely to vote for Bachelet.

The difference between Bachelet and the combined Lavín/Piñera vote has stronger statistical significance than the difference between the vote for Bachelet and either Piñera or Lavín. In 2005, the two Alianza candidates had a similar electoral base in terms of ideology, but not in terms of social class. When their support is combined, Lavín and Piñera were to the right of Bachelet and also had more support among higher income voters.

Table 6 presents a multinomial logistic regression model on the determinants of presidential vote intention in 2009. The reference category is Piñera. The regressions show that ideology is a strong determinant in the vote for Frei, ME-O and Arrate. Right-wing voters are more likely to support Piñera. Centrist voters are more likely to vote for Frei. Centrists are also more likely to vote for ME-O and Arrate, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Left-wing voters are strongly more likely to vote for Frei, ME-O and Arrate. The electoral bases of the three centre-left candidates were similar.

However, there were differences in the electoral bases of Frei, ME-O and Arrate. Those differences were associated with age, socio-economic status, economic outlook and presidential approval, not ideology. The youngest candidate, ME-O, had stronger support among younger voters. Frei had stronger support among low-income and older voters. Frei also had stronger support than ME-O or Arrate among those who approved of outgoing President Bachelet. Frei had less support among those with a negative economic outlook. After all, Frei was the official Concertación candidate.

On ideology, ME-O, Frei and Arrate were similarly distant from Piñera, as they shared the same ideological bases. Left-of-centre voters faced a MCTS problem. Because left-of-centre parties failed to agree on a single presidential candidate and one legislative slate, many leftist voters ended up splitting their tickets, but within leftist choices.

Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression on vote determinants in 2005.

Category	Piñera[b]	Lavín[b]	Bachelet vs. (Piñera/Lavín)
Intercept	−1.021**	−0.552	−0.180
	(0.376)	(0.405)	(0.330)
Political ID			
Right	1.276**	1.503**	1.368**
	(0.232)	(0.246)	(0.208)
Centre	−0.435*	−0.393	−0.433**
	(0.247)	(0.275)	(0.214)
Left	−1.365**	−1.784**	−1.499**
	(0.242)	(0.313)	(0.210)
None[a]			
Sex			
Men	0.621**	0.236	0.502**
	(0.167)	(0.185)	(0.153)
Age			
18–24	0.365	−0.339	0.114
	(0.262)	(0.308)	(0.240)
25–34	0.138	0.122	0.130
	(0.251)	(0.266)	(0.223)
35–54	0.190	−0.027	0.086
	(0.222)	(0.237)	(0.199)
55 and more[a]			
Socio-economic			
ABC1	1.379**	0.640	1.169**
	(0.414)	(0.507)	(0.405)
C2	0.698**	0.168	0.541**
	(0.279)	(0.332)	(0.265)
C3	0.348*	0.160	0.289*
	(0.183)	(0.201)	(0.166)
D/E[a]			
Economic perception			
Bad and very bad	−0.013	0.259	0.166
	(0.248)	(0.288)	(0.227)
Neither good nor bad	0.007	0.137	0.085
	(0.218)	(0.267)	(0.202)
Good and very good[a]			
Presidential approval			
Approves	−0.420*	−1.139**	−0.705**
	(0.244)	(0.252)	(0.212)
Disapproves	0.857**	0.831**	0.848**
	(0.297)	(0.290)	(0.262)
Neither[a]			
−2 log likelihood	2065.034	2065.034	1136.704
R^2 Cox and Snell	0.369	0.369	0.314
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.407	0.407	0.419
R^2 McFadden	0.193	0.193	0.272

Source: Authors, with the data from Encuesta CEP #51, October 2005 (http://www.cepchile.cl)
[a] Reference category.
[b] Reference category is Bachelet.
*Significant at 0.05.
**Significant at 0.01 $N = 1505$.

Table 6. Multinomial logistic regression on vote determinants in 2009.

Category	Frei[b]	Arrate[b]	ME-O[b]	Piñera vs. (Frei/Arrate/ME-O)
Intercept	0.303	−2.597**	−1.180**	−0.420
	(0.396)	(0.732)	(0.429)	(0.333)
Political ID				
Right	−1.555**	−1.327*	−1.805**	1.656**
	(0.249)	(0.515)	(0.240)	(0.183)
Centre	0.532*	0.342	−0.134	−0.221
	(0.227)	(0.472)	(0.238)	(0.194)
Left	1.542**	2.137**	1.265**	−1.476**
	(0.232)	(0.367)	(0.228)	(0.206)
None[a]				
Sex				
Men	−0.229	−0.339	−0.356*	0.302*
	(0.165)	(0.292)	(0.163)	(0.139)
Women[a]				
Age				
18–24	−0.597*	0.170	1.133**	0.274
	(0.272)	(0.451)	(0.268)	(0.223)
25–34	−0.746**	0.014	0.690**	0.049
	(0.251)	(0.421)	(0.257)	(0.208)
35–54	−0.133	−0.174	0.506*	−0.097
	(0.205)	(0.382)	(0.236)	(0.183)
55 or more[a]				
Socio-economic				
ABC1	−1.086*	0.388	−0.433	0.670*
	(0.433)	(0.713)	(0.409)	(0.338)
C2	−1.378**	1.189**	−0.181	0.498*
	(0.326)	(0.416)	(0.275)	(0.237)
C3	−0.770**	0.272	−0.042	0.366**
	(0.177)	(0.346)	(0.176)	(0.149)
D/E[a]				
Economic perception				
Bad and very bad	−0.432*	0.782	−0.040	0.135
	(0.255)	(0.424)	(0.251)	(0.215)
Neither good nor bad	−0.406**	−0.165	−0.257	0.314*
	(0.202)	(0.376)	(0.201)	(0.174)
Good and very good[a]				
Presidential approval				
Approves	0.594*	0.040	0.918**	−0.686**
	(0.299)	(0.524)	(0.315)	(0.240)
Disapproves	−1.092**	−0.869	−0.256	0.655*
	(0.452)	(0.703)	(0.417)	(0.322)
Neither[a]				
−2 log likelihood	1459.148	1459.148	1459.148	1107.802
R^2 Cox and Snell	0.336	0.336	0.336	0.262
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.368	0.368	0.368	0.353
R^2 McFadden	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.224

Source: Authors, with the data from Encuesta CEP #61, October 2009 (http://www.cepchile.cl)
[a] Reference category.
[b] Reference category is Marco Enríquez-Ominami.
*Significant at 0.05.
**Significant at 0.01.

Table 6 also shows a model that compares the combined vote intention for Frei, Arrate and ME-O with the vote intention for Piñera. Ideology is a strong predictor of vote intention. Left-of-centre voters were more inclined to vote for a leftist presidential candidate. Those identified with the right were more likely to vote for Piñera. Age is not significant, as the combined vote for ME-O, Frei and Arrate dilutes young people' preference for ME-O. As expected, there are socio-economic differences, with more support for Piñera among higher income voters. The models in Table 6 are consistent with MCTS, with left-of-centre voters splitting their tickets between the several possible combinations of presidential candidates and legislative slates (including independents and smaller parties).

Conclusion

Not all ticket-splitting is the same. MATS occurs when voter preferences are not appropriately represented by the options offered by political parties. MCTS occurs when like-minded voters have to choose between candidates located on a similar position on the left–right scale. In electoral systems that combine run-off provisions for presidential elections and proportional representation of small magnitude in legislative elections, parties have incentives to present several presidential candidates but coordinate on a unified legislative slate. Similarly, voters can vote for their preferred presidential candidate in the first round, but need to be strategic in their vote in the legislative election.

Ticket-splitting in 2005 in Chile responds to a combination of MATS and MCTS. Right-of-centre voters had one legislative slate and two presidential candidates to choose from (MCTS). Some centrist voters also supported Alianza presidential candidates and voted for the centre-left Concertación legislative slate (MATS). In 2009, left-of-centre voters had three presidential candidates to choose from and two legislative slates (MCTS). In 2009, there were few voters who crossed the ideological divide between the centre-right Alianza and the centre-left Concertación (MATS).

Although ticket-splitting might also be explained by the cultivation of personal vote or accounted for by a multidimensional issue space, the evidence in Chile points to a strong ideological divide between centre-left Concertación and centre-right Alianza voters and candidates. Candidates might cultivate a personal vote, but most voters do not cross the ideological line that separates the Alianza and Concertación. While there is a significant amount of ticket-splitting in Chile, most of it results from mis-coordination among party elites, not from an ideological misalignment between voters' preferences and the party system. Thus, whenever the Alianza and Concertación coordinate on one candidate and a single legislative slate per coalition, there should be little ticket-splitting.

Country with a multiparty system and proportional representation will be more likely to have MCTS, whereas countries with a two-party system will normally only see MATS. As electoral rules encourage parties to respond strategically to optimize their vote share, coordination failures among like-minded parties might induce MCTS ticket-splitting. When ticket-splitting points to mis-coordination among party elites (MCTS) rather than misalignment (MATS), we can expect it to be short term. As soon as party elites solve their coordination failure, ticket-splitting will disappear. However, if ticket-splitting points to misalignment (MATS), coordination by party elites will not be sufficient to reduce ticket-splitting.

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