

Chapter Four

Legislative Candidate Selection in Chile

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Since the return of democratic politics two important political coalitions have dominated Chilean politics, the center-left Concertación (Coalition) and the conservative Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile). In this chapter I discuss how the Concertación and the Alianza selected their candidates for legislative elections between 1989 and 2001. The parties that make up the Concertación are the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or PDC), the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, or PS), the Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia, or PPD), and the Radical Social Democratic Party (Partido Radical Social Demócrata, or PRSD). The Alianza's members are National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, or RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, or UDI).

Party elites in Chile exercise effective veto power in the candidate selection process, but they do not fully control it. Negotiations between parties within each political coalition give party elites additional power to block aspirants from other parties and promote candidacies from their own. Often the preferences of political parties with respect to candidate selection are trumped in the interests of coalition unity. In the cases where internal pro-democracy reforms have resulted in closed or semiopen primaries to select the candidates, party elites have retained power to overrule primary results. So far, though open primaries have been occasionally used to select legislative candidates at the party level, the results can be overruled when parties engage in the process of negotiations with coalition partners, reflecting the strong influence of party elites. For all of these reasons, Chilean legislators fit firmly into the category of *party loyalists* and the Chilean case provides substantial support for the guiding theoretical suppositions of this volume (see Chapter 1). However, despite being the quintessential *party loyalists*, the diffusion of pre-electoral polls, fierce competition that exists between coalition partners, and small district magnitudes have forced parties to pay more

and more attention to the personal characteristics and electability of potential Chilean legislative candidates.

After discussing electoral results for the period, I analyze candidate selection as a dependent variable. I first explore the legal variables that shape the electoral process for legislative elections and then analyze their interaction with party variables. Next, I discuss the candidate type as an independent variable, exploring how it affects legislative behavior and primarily the current dynamics of executive–legislative relations that have been so central to the success of Concertación governments. I conclude by highlighting that a combination of political tradition and institutional incentives has contributed to make *party loyalists* Chile's primary type of legislator, whose genesis and behavior largely conform to that described in Chapter 1.

The Electoral Results

Chile's national Congress has two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

The Concertación has won all legislative elections between 1989 and 2001 (see Table 4.1), but overall, it lost votes and seats during this period. After a high of 55.4 percent of the votes and seventy seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1993, the Concertación only managed to obtain 47.9 percent of the votes and sixty-two seats in 2001. The conservative Alianza increased its share of votes and seats during this period. Despite these trends, there has been more continuity than change in Chamber of Deputies elections over this four-election, twelve-year period.

Table 4.2 shows the results for Senate elections for the same period. A growth of electoral support for the left-wing Concertación parties made up for the loss in electoral strength experienced by the PDC. On the right, the Alianza increased its vote share from 34.9 percent in 1989 to 44 percent in 2001. Overall, the Concertación always got more votes than the Alianza.

In 2001, because it was unlikely that the Concertación could clinch both seats in any district (because of the unique features of Chile's legislative electoral system, which are explained in a later section), the Alianza sought to avoid intracoalition competition. To do so, in seven of the nine senate districts, that coalition presented only one candidate (or two candidates from the same party, rather than presenting one from each major party). As a result, the Concertación increased its share of votes because it had more candidates but not its share of seats. Although the government coalition, the Concertación, obtained 47.9 percent in the Chamber of Deputies election, its share of the vote in the Senate election was 51.3 percent.

The Alianza consistently obtained a higher share of seats than its share of votes (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Although the Concertación also benefited by obtaining

TABLE 4.1 Chamber of Deputies Elections, 1989–2001

Party	1989		1993		1997		2001	
	Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats
PDC	26.0	38	27.1	37	23.0	38	18.9	23
PPD	11.5	16	11.8	15	3.3	16	12.7	20
PS	—	—	11.9	15	11.1	11	10.0	10
PRSD	3.9	5	3.8	2	12.6	4	4.1	6
Others	10.1	10	0.8	1	0.5	1	2.2	3
Concertación total	51.5	69	55.4	70	50.5	69	47.9	62
RN	18.3	29	16.3	29	16.8	23	13.8	18
UDI	9.8	11	12.1	15	14.5	17	25.2	31
Others	6.1	8	8.3	6	5.0	7	5.3	8
Alianza total	34.2	48	36.7	50	36.3	47	44.3	57
Others	14.3	3	7.9	—	13.2	4	7.8	1
Total	100	120	100	120	100	120	100	120

Source: Author's calculations, based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

TABLE 4.2 Senate Elections, 1989–2001

Party	1989			1993			1997			2001		
	Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats		Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats		Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats		Percentage of Votes	Number of Seats	
PDC	32.2	13		20.2	4		29.2	10		22.8	2	
PPD	12.1	4		14.7	2		14.6	1		12.7	3	
PS	—	—		12.7	3		4.3	—		14.7	4	
PRSD	2.2	2		6.4	—		1.8	—		1.1	—	
Others	8.1	3		1.5	—		—	—		—	—	
Concertación total	54.6	22		55.5	9		49.9	11		51.3	9	
RN	10.8	5		14.9	5		14.9	2		19.7	4	
UDI	5.1	2		10.2	2		17.2	3		15.2	3	
Others	19	9		12.2	2		4.5	4		9.1	2	
Alianza total	34.9	16		37.3	9		36.6	9		44.0	9	
Others	10.5	0		7.2	—		—	—		4.7	—	
Total	100	38		100	18		100	20		100	18	

Source: Author's calculations, based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

a higher share of seats than votes, the Alianza benefited more, successfully preventing the Concertación from transforming its electoral superiority into a safe commanding majority of seats between 1993 and 2001, particularly in the Senate.¹

Candidate Selection as Dependent Variable

Legal Variables

There are a number of legal variables that affect the candidate selection process and shape the strategies of candidates, parties, and coalitions. These variables include those set out in Chapter 1 (district magnitude, list type, reelection rules, geographic organization, and legislative power), each of which is analyzed separately here. They all contribute to making *party loyalists* the most common candidate type, in some ways following the ideal typical *party loyalist* path set out by Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern in Chapter 1, and at times diverging slightly. However, this analysis confirms the major thrust of their framework in that all of the variables analyzed tend to push the power of recruitment and selection into the hands of elites, reinforcing candidate loyalty to them. In addition, the exigencies of coalition formation and maintenance push Chilean legislators even more toward the *party loyalist* type, as I explore in detail later.

Chile uses an open-list proportional-representation system for legislative elections, commonly referred to as the binomial system. Senators are elected for staggered and renewable eight-year terms and deputies are elected for renewable four-year terms. Two legislators are elected in each of the nineteen Senate districts and sixty Chamber of Deputies districts using the d'Hondt seat-allocation method. Seats are allocated first to parties, then, within parties or coalitions, seats are allocated to candidates according to the candidates' individual vote share.

The system, which was imposed by the Pinochet government, was created with two objectives in mind: to limit the number of political parties that had existed under Chile's historic PR (Proportional Representation) system and to maximize the number of seats that conservative parties could obtain, given their minority support (Siavelis 1993; Siavelis and Valenzuela 1997; Rabkin 1996; Fuentes 1999; Navia 2003). Numerous studies attest to the fact that although the system did disproportionately benefit the right, it did little to reduce the number of significant parties in Chile, and the multiparty system in existence before 1973 quickly reemerged after 1990 (Siavelis 1997; Montes, Mainwaring, and Ortega 2000; Scully 1995; Valenzuela and Scully 1997).

1. In addition, the existence of nonelected senators tilted heavily in favor of the conservative coalition and gave the Alianza a majority control of the Senate between 1990 and 1998 and between 2002 and 2005.

In fact, the binomial system can be best understood as an insurance mechanism against an electoral defeat for conservative parties (Navia 2005). Given the dynamics of the system described, if a party can secure one-third of the votes in a district, that party will get one of the two seats (50 percent) in the district. This system has helped consolidate an electoral duopoly in legislative elections. Since the threshold to secure the first seat is rather high, about one-third of the vote, parties have incentives to form electoral coalitions to pool their votes to secure half of the seats in every district. The Concertación and Alianza have almost uniformly split the two seats in most districts, largely irrespective of their level of electoral support. In fact, the more competitive the election, the more likely it is that the seats will be split between the two coalitions. Thus, the fact that coalitions are almost guaranteed one seat per district creates strong institutional incentives for candidates to be *party loyalists*. They must curry favor to secure their party's endorsement and to make sure that they remain in the game when their parties sit down to negotiate with the coalition. It also gives elites an incentive to intervene in selection, both to ensure the election of their candidates and to secure a good deal from the coalition.

Therefore, even though Siavelis and Morgenstern posit that low-magnitude and open-list systems push politicians toward the *constituent servant* type, the incentives generated by the election system combined with the centralized organizational characteristics of Chile's parties push more toward the *party loyalist* type. This is the case primarily, and in line with the Siavelis–Morgenstern hypothesis, because this combination of legal variables in Chile unexpectedly gives elites more power (and generates more candidate loyalty toward them) than would be the case in another context of party competition.

As noted in the volume's framework, reelection can push toward either *constituent servants* or *party loyalists*, depending on the variables that precede it with regard to list type and magnitude. In Chile, no reelection restrictions exist for incumbent legislators, again reinforcing the tendency toward *party loyalists*, because renomination largely depends on continuing to secure party endorsements. As Table 4.3 shows, a high number of deputies seek reelection. Between 1993 (the first election with incumbents) and 2001, 73.3 percent of the sitting deputies sought reelection. Their success rate was 82.2 percent. Consequently, about 40 percent of all deputies in each legislative period were serving their first term. Thus, though there are no reelection restrictions, the turnover ratio in the Chamber of Deputies is rather high (Carey 2002). Although the moderately high reelection levels could give way to the emergence of *constituent servants*, *group delegates*, and *entrepreneur* candidates, the fact that parties control the nomination process means that all incumbent deputies have to get their party's consent to gain renomination.

TABLE 4.3 Deputies Seeking and Losing Reelection Bids, 1993–2001

Election Year	Deputies Seeking Reelection		Deputies Losing Reelection Bids	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1993	88	73.3	17	19.3
1997	84	70.0	12	14.3
2001	92	76.6	18	19.6
	264	73.3	47	17.8

Source: Author's calculations, based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

Chile's unitary political system also yields the centralized form of candidate selection and party organization predicted in this volume's framework. Political life is largely centered in Santiago and consequently Chile's unitary political system tends to reinforce centralized party organization with weak regional or local parties. Some parties have stronger local organizations than others. Even in these cases, however, national party elites often exercise effective veto power over candidate selection in these local party organizations. This framework further encourages the selection of *party loyalists*.

Furthermore, though Chile's Congress is not nearly as formally strong as some other legislatures on the continent, it wields important informal powers and cannot be counted out of the policy process. Though the president is uniformly considered the most important legislative actor, and members of Congress can extract relatively little pork in comparative regional perspective, the president has actively negotiated with members of both his own coalition and with the opposition in order to extract support for his initiatives. This *de facto* power has made the Chilean Congress more powerful than it might appear at first glance, and provided a certain power and prestige that goes along with the legislative office.

Thus, in some important ways the Chilean political system provides strong incentives for the emergence of *party loyalists*, sometimes precisely in the way set out in the framework of this volume, and sometimes with slight variations. However, there are additional contextual variables that also push candidates toward the *party loyalist* type. First, one cannot understand the emergence of Chile's *party loyalists* without considering the role of coalition politics, which reinforces the power of party elites, which cements candidate loyalty toward them. Two or more parties can form a nationally binding electoral coalition. For vote-counting and seat-allocation rules, each coalition is treated as one party. Coalitions can also include affiliated independent candidates. Since 1989, two dominant coalitions have emerged, the center-left Concertación and the conservative Alianza por Chile. Since that time they have combined to obtain 98.3 percent of all the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and an average of 89.2 percent of the vote. Though provisions for coalition formation

were originally absent from the electoral law, when the outgoing military dictatorship introduced legislation to establish the binomial electoral system, provisions for coalition formation were also introduced (Allamand 1999a: 125–47, 189–212; 1999b).

Second, although restrictions on independent candidates are somewhat lax, independents have largely failed to win legislative seats. To get their names on the ballot, independents must collect enough signatures to pass a threshold set at 0.5 percent of the votes cast in the corresponding district in the previous election. Independent candidates must have had no party affiliation for at least two months before the registration deadline. In addition, the deadline to register a coalition slate or an independent candidacy for the legislature is 150 days before the election. Such a long registration deadline makes it harder for independents to get their names on the ballot. But because of their high name recognition, incumbents who are not nominated by their parties might find it easier to run as independents.² Yet, if their chances of winning a seat are high, it is likely that they will have already been co-opted by a party in the first place, because carrying a party label makes it much easier to win and such a candidate will be an asset to a party.

The incentives to form coalitions create additional pressures on candidates to remain *party loyalists*. Because parties negotiate within their coalitions for the slate of candidates, aspirants who have made careers as *constituent servants*, *group delegates*, or *entrepreneurs* can be easily punished by their parties. Individual parties can readily trade away candidate slates in any given district in exchange for other districts where *party loyalists* are aspirants for their coalition's nomination. Thus, even independent-minded *constituent servants* have incentives to associate with and remain loyal to existing political parties to get their names on the coalition slate.

Party Variables

There has been a good deal of variation in the methods used by Chilean parties to choose legislative candidates. In this section I provide some general background on the nomination process in both coalitions, then provide specific details concerning the evolution of candidate selection methods with respect to the internal dynamics of parties. Each makes reference to the most important party variables set out in the volume's framing chapter, including centralization, inclusiveness, and the different forms of party organization and decisionmaking.

Political parties react to existing electoral rules, strategizing to maximize the number of seats they can get, given their expected electoral support. Parties seek to nominate candidates who will get more votes in a given district than what the party

2. A similar point is tangentially made by John M. Carey and Peter Siavelis (2003).

would otherwise expect. In addition, however, given that the very nature of the coalitions prevents parties from having candidates in all districts, parties seek to identify districts where they can nominate strong candidates and have better chances of transforming those votes into seats. Thus, because parties end up negotiating within their coalitions, strong candidates who are not *party loyalists* can be blocked from running by party elites who cede slates to other parties for any variety of reasons related to coalition maintenance or perceived lack of candidate loyalty.

The parties that make up the two coalitions have experienced different success rates in getting their candidates elected to the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 4.4). This rate is called the elected/nominated percentage, a figure calculated by dividing the number of elected candidates by the total number of candidates. Because of these distortions (differences between the percentage of votes received and the percentages of seats won), the success rates of the Concertación and Alianza coalitions fluctuate around 50 percent. Success rates within coalitions, however, vary from party to party and across elections. For example, in the 2001 election, the PPD did remarkably well by having twenty of its twenty-four candidates elected.

Senate election results also reflect the strategies developed by different political parties to secure safe districts and to get as many of their candidates elected as possible. In the Concertación, there seems to be a zero-sum game. In 1989, the PDC got thirteen of its fifteen Senate candidates elected, but the PPD got only four of its nine. The best PDC performance was in 1997, where that party got its ten candidates elected in each of the ten Senate districts where it ran. Altogether, the other Concertación parties did rather poorly, winning only one seat, despite having candidates in all ten Senate districts. In 2001 the opposite was the case. The PDC only got two of its nine candidates elected in the nine senate districts up for election.

There is usually a fierce competition among Concertación Senate candidates. That competition is partially moderated in Chamber of Deputies races, where sitting deputies can successfully prevent many strong contenders from running on Concertación slates. But when it comes to Senate races, the Concertación parties tend to present strong aspirants willing to compete for the single seat that the coalition will likely get. Since 1989, there have been only four occasions where the Concertación has clinched two seats in a Senate district, three of those in 1989 and one in 1997. Thus, Concertación parties understand that the seats that go to the PDC are seats lost for the PS-PPD and PRSD, and vice versa. Incumbency also constitutes a strong advantage in the Senate. Most incumbents have chosen to seek reelection, but naturally, as incumbent senators age, the number of open seats increases. In 2001, seven of the nine (77.8 percent) incumbent Concertación senators ran for reelection, and six (85.7 percent) won. In 1997, seven out of ten (70 percent) incumbents ran for reelection, with six succeeding (85.7 percent). However, the success rate of incumbents has not deterred challengers from other Concertación parties.

TABLE 4.4 Chamber of Deputies Elections, Number of Candidates and Number of Elected, 1989–2001

Party	1989		1993		1997		2001	
	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected
PDC	45	84.4	48	77.1	55	69.1	54	42.6
PPD	25	64.0	25	60.0	29	55.2	24	83.3
PS	—	—	28	53.6	26	42.3	21	47.6
PRSD	16	31.3	15	13.3	8	50.0	14	42.9
Others	30	33.3	4	25.0	2	50.0	7	42.9
Concertación total	116	59.5	120	58.3	120	57.5	120	51.7
RN	66	43.9	41	70.1	52	44.2	45	40.0
UDI	30	36.7	29	51.7	47	36.2	54	57.4
Others	23	34.8	50	12.0	20	35.0	20	40.0
Alianza total	119	40.3	120	41.7	119	39.5	119	47.9
Others	184	1.6	144	—	203	2.0	142	0.7
Total	419	28.6	384	31.3	442	27.1	381	31.5

Source: Author's calculations, based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

The Alianza has employed different strategies from year to year in the Senate candidate selection process. In 1989, RN had fifteen senate candidates. The UDI had only three and the other twenty candidates were conservative independents. The strong presence of independents continued in 1993, when eight of the eighteen Alianza Senate candidates were independent. But that year their success rate was dismal: only one of the eight independent conservative candidates won a seat. RN got five of its six candidates elected. In 1993, as in 1989, the UDI only succeeded in electing two Senate candidates. Because it was initially focused on increasing its legislative presence in the Chamber of Deputies, the UDI did not focus on Senate elections until 1997. That year, the UDI succeed in electing three of its five Senate candidates. In addition, two independents who were elected joined the UDI in 1998. RN's performance in 1997 was unsatisfactory. Only two of eight candidates won Senate seats. In 2001, as discussed earlier, the negotiations between the UDI and RN allowed for the two parties to exclude independents and divide the nine available districts in the following manner: four districts for RN candidates, three districts for UDI candidates, and two Senate districts with competition between RN and UDI candidates (in the end, those two districts were equally split by RN and UDI winners).

Both in the Concertación and the Alianza, parties punish non-party loyalists. Even in cases where aspirants emerge through cultivating a profile of *constituent servants*, *entrepreneurs*, or *group delegates*, party loyalty is still required by political parties to nominate those candidates and defend their bid before the multiparty coalitions. Because parties negotiate their coalition slate of candidates with other coalition partners, party elites can punish candidates who are not *party loyalists* by ceding those districts to other parties in the intracoalition bargaining.

Candidate Selection in the Concertación

Because the electoral system makes it difficult for coalitions to get more than one seat in every district, the party elites have a lot of power to determine which aspirants actually make it onto the coalition slate of candidates. The dynamic negotiation process can be explained succinctly. There are sixty districts where each party can have at most one candidate per district.³ The PDC has exercised a leading role in the Concertación, with two of the four presidents so far coming from the PDC. Because the PDC will likely present candidates in most districts, the real strategizing occurs among the other Concertación parties.

Siavelis (2002, 424) has explained how the Concertación initially solved the problem of assigning districts to its different members by the formation of two subparts: one a grouping of parties led by the PDC and the other led by the PS-PPD. The other Concertación parties, which eventually merged into the PRSD after 1993, could bargain with either subpart to maximize the number of

3. Only once has that principle been violated, when in 1989 two PDC candidates ran in District 34.

districts where it could field candidates. Because Siavelis (2002) looked primarily at the 1993 and 1997 elections, he tended to treat the PS and PPD interchangeably as one party. Post-1997 political developments have led the PS and PPD to seek distinct identities. They should no longer be treated as two wings of the same party. I discuss in more detail later how each Concertación party has strategized to maximize the number of districts where it can place candidates on Concertación ballots and the number of candidates that actually were elected. Overall, whereas the PDC did fairly well in the first years of this democratic period (84.4 percent of its candidates were elected in 1989 and 77.1 percent in 1993), the PPD did outstandingly well in 2001.

Also, the number of candidate slates that each Concertación party has been assigned remained fairly constant from 1993 to 2001 (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5). Again, 1989 is not a good year to evaluate, since the PS was not legally established and many PS members ran as PPD candidates or as independents on the Concertación ticket. The relative weight of independent candidates within the Concertación slate has diminished. But that is as much a reflection of the ban on the PS that was lifted only in mid-1989 as evidence of the consolidation of the four-party nature of the Concertación coalition. Yet, the informal agreement within the Concertación relies on the assumption that there are two subpacts, one composed of the PDC and the other of the PS-PPD. No PPD candidate has faced a PS candidate in any of the sixty districts since 1993. Every time that possibility has arisen, one of the two parties has vehemently opposed it.

Because neither subpact has candidates in all sixty districts (since PRSD candidates must be accommodated), the subpacts negotiate which districts each subpact will keep and which districts will go to the PRSD. In 2001, the PDC secured fifty-four districts, but in additional districts the independent candidates that ran on the PDC subpact were PDC sympathizers.⁴ Thus, there were fifty-six districts with PDC candidates in 2001 (93 percent). Logically, there is less strategizing in the PDC on which districts to select than there is in the PS, PPD, and PRSD.

The PPD, PS and PRSD, however, bargained intensively to divide the remaining Concertación slates. From a high of seventy-five available slots (those not taken by PDC candidates) in 1989 to a low of sixty-four in 2001, the other Concertación parties have to identify districts where they stand a good chance of getting more votes than the PDC candidates. Although that strategizing was constrained by the close links that existed between the PPD and PS in 1989 and 1993, much of it occurred within the PS and PPD as the two parties negotiated over which districts each party would keep for its candidates in 1997 and 2001.

The dynamism of this process requires that additional considerations be taken into account. First, all Concertación deputies who seek reelection are almost

4. This was the case of Jorge Canals in District 26 and Alejandra Sepúlveda in District 34.

TABLE 4.5 Senate Elections, Number of Candidates and Number Elected, 1989–2001

Party	1989			1993			1997			2001		
	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected	Number of Candidates	Percentage of Elected
PDC	15	86.7	6	66.6	10	100.0	9	22.2				
PPD	9	44.4	4	50.0	4	25.0	4	100.0				
PS	—	—	4	75.0	5	—	3	100.0				
PRSD	4	50.0	3	—	1	—	2	0.0				
Others	8	37.5	1	—	0	—	—	—				
Concertación total	36	61.1	18	50.0	20	55.0	18	50.0				
RN	15	33.3	6	83.3	8	25.0	6	66.7				
UDI	3	66.6	4	50.0	5	60.0	4	75.0				
Others	20	45.0	8	25.0	6	66.7	4	50.0				
Alianza total	38	42.1	18	50.0	19	47.4	14	64.3				
Others	66	0	19	—	—	—	14	—				
Total	110	34.5	55	32.7	66	30.3	46	39.1				

Source: Author's calculations, based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

automatically guaranteed to keep their districts (Siavelis 2002.) Only rarely has a party lost a district where the incumbent deputy seeks reelection. Whenever that was the case, the deputy lost the seat because the party elite chose not to exercise its *holder's-keeper* right, whereby incumbents choosing to run for reelection could not be challenged by others from within the party. Thus, because approximately 75 percent of deputies seek reelection, the actual number of open slots for PS, PPD, and PRSD is lower than sixty. Out of the thirty-one PS-PPD-PRSD deputies elected in 1997, twenty-six sought reelection in 2001. Among them, twenty-three ran in the same districts where they had been elected in 1997. Three others switched districts, and two of these won reelection to the Chamber in their new districts.

Second is the potential running mates that PS-PPD candidates will have on the Concertación ticket. Parties often self-select out of districts where there is a strong incumbent from a different Concertación party or where no strong candidate from the party has expressed the intention to run. Again, the process is dynamic in the sense that potentially strong candidates often choose not to pursue a candidacy if they think that the candidate from the other subpart is too strong. Also, because incumbents have a moderately high reelection rate (more than 80 percent between 1993 and 2001), districts where an incumbent from the other subpart seeks reelection are understandably considered difficult districts. Occasionally incumbents do lose. For example, in 2001, twenty-five incumbent PDC candidates sought reelection, but only seventeen won (68 percent). In general, however, candidates have fewer chances of winning when running together with an incumbent from another party from the same coalition.

To be sure, the Concertación occasionally manages to win two seats in some districts, but it is not evident ahead of time which those districts will be. In most districts where the Concertación has won both seats, the success results from a high concentration of votes for one candidate. The running mate benefits primarily from the trickle-down effect of the d'Hondt seat-allocation rules. Thus, although there is evidence that in 1989 and 1993 the Concertación did place strong candidates in districts where it had good chances of winning the two seats (Siavelis 2002; Carey and Siavelis 2003), in recent years, as politics has become more competitive, fewer two-strong candidate slates are being assembled by the Concertación or the Alianza in Chamber of Deputies elections.

Because all parties will have more aspirants than slates on the ticket, party leaders can easily punish aspirants who are not *party loyalists* even when they have a good chance of getting elected. True, in order to become strong candidates, aspirants often need to build their bids as *constituent servants*. They are more likely to be nominated by their party if they can show that they are strong candidates in their districts—and they often build personal strength by serving their constituents, usually from government-appointed positions. This is likely an effect confirming Siavelis and Morgenstern's contention that low-magnitude closed-list

systems tend to push toward the formation of *constituent servants*. But if being a *constituent servant* helps win a party nomination, party loyalty is what ultimately determines whether the parties will defend that nomination before their coalition partners when they are bargaining over the Concertación slate of candidates. In the next section, I discuss how each of the Concertación's parties has sought to maximize the number of candidacies it receives in the Concertación's internal bargaining process, and how this process reinforces the power of party elites and facilitates the formation of *party loyalists*.

PDC. In 1989, PDC legislative candidates were selected by provincial committees (*juntas provinciales*), which appointed candidates for each of the sixty Chamber of Deputies districts and to fifteen of the nineteen Senate districts (in the remaining four, the PDC had previously agreed to support the candidate from the PR). In Concertación negotiations, the PDC withdrew candidates from several districts to make room for other Concertación parties. The party made concessions to its coalition partners with the expectation that the popularity of the Concertación presidential candidate, the PDC's Patricio Aylwin, would marginally benefit PDC legislative candidates. Despite the use of provincial committees, elites still exercised ultimate control over selection, either through elite veto power, or because the committees simply ratified de facto elite choices. In the end, the PDC did fairly well, succeeding in electing thirty-eight of its forty-five candidates to the Chamber in 1989.

In 1993 and 1997, the PDC held closed primaries to select candidates in districts where more than one aspirant sought to run. Although most strong challengers were dissuaded from running against an incumbent, some primaries were held to select PDC candidates.⁵ Most of those primaries were not highly contested. Tellingly, in a few cases the winner of the closed primaries lost the slot when the PDC agreed to cede that district to other Concertación parties. In 1993 and 1997 the PDC ceded districts to make room for candidates from smaller Concertación parties. In both years, Eduardo Frei (Chile's president from 1994 to 2000) intervened to convince the PDC to give up districts in favor of other Concertación parties' candidates, another testament to elite influence. In part because the PDC had more candidates, the percentage of nominated candidates who were elected decreased in 1993 with respect to 1989. That year, thirty-seven of forty-eight candidates nominated by the PDC won Chamber of Deputies seat. The percentage was still higher for the PDC than for the Concertación as a whole (77.1 versus 58.3 percent). In 1997, the percentage was 69.1 percent, slightly lower than in 1993, but still higher than for the entire Concertación (57.5 percent).

In 2001, the PDC experimented with open primaries to select its candidates, and in most cases incumbents were not challenged. But in Senate District 15, an incumbent, Senator Jorge Lavandero, easily defeated a challenger, Deputy

5. For example, that was the case in District 10, where Ignacio Walker won a closed PDC primary in 1997.

Francisco Huenchumilla. In Chamber of Deputies District 24, after the results of the open primaries were challenged, the PDC's National Committee (Junta Nacional) exercised elite veto power and ruled that the incumbent deputy, José Jocelyn-Holt, should be the candidate, despite having lost an open primary. In part because of the overall decline in support for the PDC and the stabilization in the electoral strength of the PS and PPD, the percentage of those elected decreased again in 2001 to 42.6 percent (fifty-four candidates nominated, twenty-three elected), lower than the Concertación yield of 51.7 percent.

Overall, the PDC has fostered a process in which militants rather than elites have a growing influence in selecting candidates. However, as several interviewees suggested, the PDC has suffered from unilaterally promoting more participation in the candidate selection process. As a former party president, Gutenberg Martínez, suggested in an interview, when closed primaries (or open primaries with low turnout) are held, a small organized faction of PDC militants can select an aspirant who lacks skills and appeal beyond party militants. When only one party promotes democratizing candidate selection, other parties can benefit by strategically identifying stronger candidates who can then obtain more votes than the less broadly appealing, yet democratically elected, PDC candidate.

PS. The PS has experimented with different mechanisms to select its candidates. In 1989, the then illegal PS managed to present candidates in two different coalitions, the Concertación and the PAIS. Because the party was undergoing a reunification process as the deadline for candidate registration approached, the selection process was particularly convoluted. Indeed, some PS delegates took advantage of dual party militancy to negotiate slates from within the PPD and promote the names of the candidates that the PS Central Committee had agreed upon. Furthermore, only those candidates proposed to the PPD National Council by the PS central committee were selected as PPD candidates. In addition, the PS directly negotiated with the entire Concertación coalition to place some of its members—who were not formally affiliated with the PPD—as independent candidates in the Concertación ticket. Finally, a few PS members opted to run in the PAIS ticket, with the PS making sure that no other PS or PPD candidate could run in the same district on the Concertación ticket.⁶

By 1993, the PS and PPD had formally separated and the two parties competed against each other in the negotiations within the Concertación. The differences between the PS and PPD were increasingly evident in the 1997 negotiations. That year, Santiago's two senate districts were up for election. Initially, the PPD and PS had agreed to assign one district to each party. Yet the PS, under the leadership of Deputy and party president Camilo Escalona, offered to trade five Chamber of Deputies districts initially assigned to the PS in exchange

6. I thank Jorge Arrate, former PS general secretary, for explaining this point.

for the PPD senate slate in Santiago. The PPD immediately agreed. In the end, the gamble did not pay off, as both PS candidates lost against PDC candidates. Even worse, the PS lost four seats in the Chamber of Deputies, dropping from fifteen to eleven.

Between 1993 and 2001, the PS used different mechanisms to select its legislative candidates. These mechanisms have ranged from closed party primaries to selection by the party's Central Committee. At first glance it appears that the local party organization had strong influence in selecting the candidates. When the PS has held primaries, only registered party militants have been allowed to vote. Yet, the primary winners have not always gone on to become candidates in the parliamentary election, either because the party has given up that district in negotiations with other Concertación parties or because the party has overruled the primary results on technicalities. Having a Socialist Party primary does not automatically result in the nomination of the winner by the central socialist party leadership.⁷

Although the party has made efforts to introduce more internal democracy in its selection processes, the ability of local party caudillos to exercise control of the small number of party members often results in the nomination of a candidate that is correctly deemed unelectable by the national party leadership. Yet, the PS has not moved to change its system of candidate selection. Instead, the party has passed resolutions to make the system more accountable to the local party organization and reduce the influence of the PS Central Committee in determining the names of the PS candidates.

PPD. Since 1993, the PPD has formally empowered its Directiva Nacional (National Board) with the power to nominate candidates. However, the way the process has actually worked has varied over the years. In some instances, regional councils have made proposals to the Directiva Nacional and on other occasions, there have been closed primaries to select the nominee. This was the case in 1997, when Patricio Hales won the closed PPD primaries in District 19 to become the candidate and win 31.9 percent of the vote. In some instances, when there is more than one person interested in running in a district, the Directiva Nacional has unilaterally chosen the candidate that it perceives has a better chance of winning.⁸ Yet, some informal rules can be identified. The holder's-keeper principle applies. Incumbent deputies are almost guaranteed their slots, but the party leadership has also convinced some incumbents to switch districts and use their name recognition to successfully run in a new district. That happened in 2001 in Districts 32 and 14, where the incumbent PPD deputies switched districts and won.

The PPD national leadership takes an active role in recruiting potential candidates and securing good districts for them. It actively recruits potential

7. I thank the former Chamber of Deputies candidate Álvaro Elizalde for clarifying this point.

8. I thank the former PPD secretary general René Jofré for clarifying this point.

candidates by offering them districts where they stand a good chance of winning. Oftentimes that means that the PPD will not seek as many districts as possible nor will it go after the most populated districts (where a good electoral performance will carry a greater weight in increasing the overall national vote for the party), but instead it selects those districts that can be matched with an electable candidate. Centralized decisionmaking processes have allowed the PPD leadership to successfully use pre-electoral polls to identify winnable districts and effectively name candidates to them. According to party leaders and to leaders from other Concertación parties, the ability of the party leadership to name candidates and to negotiate districts without the pressure from candidates who have won closed party primaries has allowed the PPD to achieve the highest elected/nominated yield among all Concertación parties.

PRSD. Because it is the smallest of the four Concertación parties, the Radical Social Democratic Party strives to maximize two objectives when negotiating for seats with other parties. On the one hand, the PRSD wants to get some deputies elected. On the other, the party needs to get enough votes to pass the 5 percent minimum national vote threshold to maintain its status as a legally registered political party. Since the Radical Party merged with the Social Democratic Party after the 1993 elections (thus forming the Radical Social Democratic Party), that party has sought to negotiate concurrently with the PDC and PS-PPD. In 1997, the PRSD obtained eight slots in eight different districts. In 2001, the PRSD got fourteen slots in fourteen different districts, but in most cases those slots were located in districts where the incumbent PDC deputy was widely expected to win reelection. Surprisingly, two PRSD candidates managed to defeat incumbent PDC deputies and another ran in a district where the Concertación managed to gain both seats.

Candidate Selection in the Alianza

There has been less continuity in candidate selection mechanisms in the Alianza coalition. The RN has consistently lost districts since 1989, and the UDI has gained them over the years. In part this is a result of the fact that Alianza had several independents elected in 1989. Most of those districts are now held by UDI deputies, either because previous independent candidates have formally affiliated with the UDI or the party has picked up new seats. In addition, there were always more districts where there was no Alianza incumbent, since the Concertación has historically been more successful in capturing both seats in a larger number of districts. Given that there were more open seats for the Alianza and that challenging an independent Alianza incumbent did not generate intracoalition conflicts, the UDI could initially grow by competing against non-RN incumbents and by having strong candidates in open districts.

Yet, because it has been much less likely for the Alianza than for the Concertación to win two seats (the Alianza has done so three times, only in the Chamber of Deputies and always in district 23), once there is an Alianza legislator seeking reelection, it is highly unlikely that another Alianza candidate can run successfully in that district. Thus, the overall increase in the UDI's legislative contingent simply reflects the party's ability to successfully identify districts where it has a good possibility of winning a seat. Table 4.4 also shows how the UDI evolved from having candidates in only half of the districts in 1989 to having well-established national presence in 2001, fielding candidates in fifty-four of the nation's sixty districts.⁹

That dynamic has allowed for the emergence of some non-party loyalists as candidates among Alianza parties. Because the Alianza has usually allowed for intracoalition competition in Chamber of Deputies elections, RN has sometimes allowed entrepreneurial and *constituent servant* aspirants to try to unseat an incumbent UDI deputy. But because RN has also sought to prevent an overtly open confrontation with UDI in all sixty Chamber of Deputies districts, the number of *entrepreneur* and *constituent servant* candidates that actually makes it to the ballot has remained low. Moreover, entrepreneurial candidates that do win have a strong incentive to become *party loyalists* in the Chamber so that the party will protect the candidate from open competition from the other coalition partner in the next election.

The candidate selection process in the Alianza has become simplified over the years. As the UDI has grown and consolidated, independent candidates only run in districts where neither the UDI nor RN have a presence. Negotiations within the Alianza follow a two-step process. First, RN and UDI announce in which districts they will present candidates. In selecting districts consider whether there are conservative incumbents and whether the Concertación has any chance of getting both seats. Second, they complete their party candidate list with independents that need to be aligned with either party and then sit down at the negotiating table.

UDI. The UDI has developed a very centralized candidate selection process, with an electoral commission that works during nonelection years to identify and prepare potential candidates for districts where there is no UDI legislative representation. Similarly, in districts where the incumbent UDI deputy will likely seek a senate seat, or vacate the seat for whatever reason, the UDI works to identify an attractive new candidate.

According to the UDI General Secretariat, the best rationale to take advantage of the electoral rules is that individual legislative careers are less important than the strength of the party. This is telling testament to the preponderance of *party loyalists* in Chile. Be it because weak incumbents are replaced by more

9. For more on the UDI, see Alfredo Joignant and Navia (2003).

electable candidates or new recruits are assigned into districts years before the election is to take place, the UDI's electoral commission has successfully centralized the candidate selection process with one objective in mind: to get the highest possible nominated/elected yield so that the number of safe UDI districts will constantly increase.¹⁰ This strategy has taken the UDI from a low of thirty districts in 1989 to a high of fifty-four in 2001.

Of all political parties with legislative representation, the UDI has the most centralized and top-down approach to candidate selection. The party leadership controls the entire process. That party does not promote closed or open primaries to select its legislative candidates, nor does it consider them necessary. Because the party has been so successful in increasing its legislative representation, other parties have underlined the apparently negative effects of promoting bottom-up mechanisms in candidate selection.

RN. RN's method for filling candidate slates in negotiations with the UDI has not formally varied over the years. The Consejo General (National Council) ratifies all candidacies. Yet the informal mechanisms used to agree on the list of names to be presented to the Consejo General have varied markedly over time and across districts. Because RN is a party primarily comprising local leaders with very little ideological homogeneity, the Consejo General is highly respectful of local leadership and incumbents. In some instances, where the party does not have local presence, the Consejo General can centrally appoint candidates. These candidates are assigned the district following a franchising rationale. If the candidate wins, he or she will become the RN leader in the district and will join other local leaders in the Consejo General. If the candidate loses, the party will likely not consolidate a presence in the district unless the candidate, or someone else, is willing to do it alone without the visibility and attractiveness that comes with begin a deputy.

In that sense, RN is much more an electoral than an ideological party. RN leaders stay together because the RN banner allows them a party structure that can protect them against the growing hegemonic power of the UDI, but the party does not require them to obey the decisions and agreements reached by the national leadership. Because the party is a loose association of local leaders, they are more than willing to give up other districts to the UDI if they can be guaranteed that they will not face strong competition from UDI candidates in their own districts.¹¹

Candidate Selection as Dependent Variable: Summary

Chile's leading political parties use different mechanisms to select their legislative candidates (see Table 4.6). Because those internal mechanisms produce candidates who are in turn subject to intracoalition bargaining to determine the coalition

10. I am grateful to Juan Antonio Coloma, UDI's general secretary, for clarifying this point.

11. I thank an RN party leader, who preferred to remain anonymous, for his interview.

TABLE 4.6 Candidate Selection Mechanism by Party, 1989–2001

	Party	1989	1993	1997	2001
Concertación	PDC	Provincial juntas	Closed primaries	Closed primaries	Open primaries
	PPD	National Board	National Board	National Board	National Board
	PS	Central committee	Central committee or closed primaries	Central committee or closed primaries	Central committee or closed primaries
Alianza	RN	National Council	National Council	National Council	National Council
	UDI	Party leadership	Party leadership	Party leadership	Party leadership

Source: Author's compilation.

slate, the process is not a clear-cut two-step process. A good deal of strategizing goes on within parties and within coalitions without following clearly defined rules. But at the end of the day, because party leaders bargain with other coalition partners, *party loyalists* are privileged over other candidate types. In fact, other types of candidates are often punished by the parties in the negotiations with other coalition partners.

To be sure, only the PDC has made significant strides in promoting internal democracy in its legislative candidate selection process. Other parties have continued to control the selection mechanism at the national, or in some instances local, level. Yet because the PDC suffered a dramatic erosion in its electoral performance and a corresponding loss of legislative seats, the expansion of democratizing practices to select candidates is not likely to occur in other parties.

Thus, although the adoption of reforms that promote the use of open primaries might be desirable, a unilateral adoption of open primaries by a party might not produce positive results for that party. Moreover, given that the final decision over which parties will have candidates in which districts depends on the intracoalition negotiations, the adoption of open primaries will not automatically result in the nomination of candidates who win their party primaries. Unless primaries are held at the coalition level rather than the party level, the adoption of open or closed primaries will not limit the existing power of party elites to influence the candidate selection process in Chile. If primaries are eventually held at the coalition level, then the presence of *party loyalists* will be significantly hindered, since voters—rather than party elites—will make the decision as to who actually makes it on the ballot.

Finally, Table 4.7 depicts the nature of legislative candidates given the candidate selection process. When transition to democracy first occurred, there were

TABLE 4.7 Candidate Types as Dependent Variable, in Legislative Elections, 1989–2001

Candidate Type	1989	1993	1997	2001
<i>Party loyalists</i>	Concertación/ Alianza	Concertación/ Alianza	Concertación/ Alianza	Concertación/ Alianza
<i>Constituent servants</i>	Few, Concertación/ Alianz ^a	Few, Concertación/ Alianz ^a	Few, Concertación/ Alianz ^a	Few, Concertación/ Alianz ^a
<i>Delegates</i>	—	—	—	—
<i>Entrepreneurs</i>	Few, Alianza	Few, Alianza	Few, Alianza	Few, Alianza

Source: Source is TK

a. In the Alianza, important to secure party nomination and to keep district for party in coalition bargaining.

some candidates that could be best described as *delegates* or *entrepreneurs*, but as parties consolidated their strength and coalitions were primarily dominated by a few parties, *party loyalists* emerged as the dominant candidate type.

Although some aspirants build up support in their districts as *entrepreneurs* and *constituent servants*—including some incumbents—the ultimate choice as to who can run on coalition tickets is made by party leaders. Thus, party loyalty, more than any other variable, influences decisively the likelihood of an aspirant actually becoming a candidate. However, an aspirant's ability to cultivate personal support in his or her district might have a significant influence in allowing that candidate to defeat a coalition list partner for the only seat that the coalition is likely to garner in the district.

Party Loyalists: Candidate Type as an Independent Variable

The interaction legislators have with the executive and with their own parties is a variable that itself grows out of institutional design and the way parties respond to it. Because Chile has only had presidents that belong to the Concertación coalition, the dynamics of legislative–executive interactions that we have observed so far might be more the result of internal Concertación dynamics than purely a function of institutional design. Several scholars have highlighted the strong nature of Chile's presidential system (Siavelis 2000; Londregan 2002; Aninat et al. 2004), although Siavelis has appropriately described Chile as a strong presidential system with moderate presidents (2000). Yet, despite their moderation, the strong powers granted to the president by the constitution give the executive an enormous influence over the legislative process. For all practical matters, the president exerts agenda control in the legislature (Aninat et al. 2004). Yet presidents still require the legislature to approve the initiatives they send to Congress. Moreover, given that the legislature has the ability to block and delay—although not radically alter—the executive's legislative initiatives, one should not discount Chilean

legislators as irrelevant actors. The legislature's ability to position itself as a veto player that can successfully block and delay the executive's legislative initiatives is what induces the president to use some restraint in exercising the enormous constitutional powers granted to the Chilean executive.

Party Discipline and Executive–Legislative Relations

Because the electoral system for legislative elections can be best described as an insurance mechanism against an electoral defeat, the influence a president can have on the legislature does not depend on the president's electoral or popular approval. The president cannot credibly threaten the legislature to use his or her popularity to significantly influence the future composition of either chamber. Because it is highly likely that a large majority of seats will be equally split between the two large coalitions, the president's popularity will not represent a credible threat to legislators from either the opposition or the government coalition. Instead, the loyalty of coalition legislators to a large extent depends on intra-coalition party discipline. Similarly, the president's ability to get opposition legislators to support his legislative initiatives depends on the executive's ability to reach agreements with the opposition party leadership. Or, as it has occasionally been the case with RN legislators, the executive can also negotiate with individual RN legislators who are not likely to be penalized by its decentralized party leadership.

Formally, the legal arrangement in the legislature is such that individual legislators are free to vote as they please on any legislative initiative. Yet some institutional arrangements do promote a certain level of discipline within each chamber. Committee appointments are made by party leaders in each chamber and negotiated with other party leaders. Thus, independents have strong incentives to join existing political party delegations (*bancadas*) to improve their chances of getting into their desired committees. Thus, the formal rules of committee appointment encourage party discipline and make it easy for party leaders to punish entrepreneurial or *constituent servant* legislators.

Because the legislature is primarily made up of *party loyalists*, levels of party voting discipline are high (Alemán and Saiegh 2005). In fact, rather than negotiating directly with legislators, presidents are compelled to negotiate their legislative initiatives directly with national party leaders. After reaching an agreement with a national party leader, the president can almost assuredly bank on support from that party's entire legislative delegation. These patterns of discipline reinforce the party-centered nature of political life in Chile, further reinforcing tendencies toward *party loyalists*, and inducing them to remain disciplined party legislators, with very positive consequences for executive–legislative relations.

Some of the most important legislative initiatives that have been introduced by the three democratically elected presidents since 1990 have been previously negotiated with the opposition parties' leaders. They have been sent to the Congress after an agreement has been reached—and often signed with much fanfare—with opposition parties' leaders (Navia 2004). True, some other pieces of legislation are not agreed upon with the opposition and are sent directly to the legislature, where they are often modified, blocked, or significantly altered. Yet the three Concertación administrations have continuously sought to negotiate their most important legislative initiatives with opposition party leaders before sending them to the legislature. To some extent, something similar has happened between the executive and Concertación parties. Although Concertación presidents have enjoyed considerable legislative support for their initiatives, they cannot automatically count on the support of their coalition allies. Instead, presidents have had to lobby for the support of their coalition partners. In some instances, the initiatives are handled directly with the legislative delegations from the different parties, but whenever symbolic legislative initiatives are discussed, Chilean presidents have opted to negotiate directly with party leaders, both from their own coalitions and those from the opposition.

In this sense, Chile might be considered the ideal combination in Siavelis and Morgenstern's framework in its marriage of *party loyalist* legislators with *party insider* presidents. When deals are negotiated, presidents can count on these deals being carried out. This contention not only applies within the Concertación. Indeed, the existence of *party loyalists* in the opposition assures that deals will be upheld even when they are negotiated across the aisle.

This seemingly unequivocally advantageous combination is not without its drawbacks, however. If the pattern of cross-alliance negotiations breaks down, *loyalists* will remain *loyalists* in the opposition, and they may yield to centrally dictated instructions to vote against presidents. In this sense, without a dynamic of consensus, *constituent servants* might be the more ideal pairing with *insider* presidents, because presidents can attract the support of some from the opposition who may not be so worried about pleasing party elites (see Chapter 15, this volume, for more discussion of pairings of types of candidates).

In addition, this high level of party discipline often undermines one of the legislature's central roles. Because the core components of most legislative initiatives are agreed upon outside the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, legislators have few incentives to spend time in studying legislative initiatives. What is more, for the true *party loyalist*, loyalty and service to the party take the place of loyalty and service to constituents. Because the ability to legislate is not a central determinant in one's chances to win reelection, legislators often overlook their role as lawmakers. Moreover, because party leaders often negotiate the terms of legislative initiatives with the presidents that send them, *party loyalists* will pay a

heavy price if they opt to resist their party's political agreements. On the other hand, however, the fact that party discipline is a central outcome of the candidate selection process means that party leaders can credibly commit their legislative delegations' support. Naturally, leaders cannot automatically force their parties' legislators to go along with any agreement they reach with the executive. Leaders must also take into account the views of their legislative delegations. Thus, in that sense party loyalty is both an asset and a liability. Party leaders can punish legislators who are not *party loyalists*, but party leaders will lose their leadership positions if they alienate their legislative benches.

Because political parties form electoral coalitions, the nomination process often represents a major challenge for coalition unity. The nomination for the coalition presidential candidate raises tensions within the Concertación and the Alianza coalitions because it is an indivisible good. The Concertación has moved over time toward open primaries for the nomination of its presidential candidate. In 1999, in the first fully open presidential primaries—where all registered voters not formally affiliated with opposition parties could cast ballots—the PS-PPD candidate Ricardo Lagos handily defeated the PDC candidate Andrés Zaldívar. The Alianza has continued to trust party leaders to negotiate over the coalition's presidential candidate. Although some voices within the Alianza have asked for open primaries, that coalition has yet to follow the Concertación in granting its *adherents* the power to choose presidential candidates (see this volume's Chapter 10, by David Altman, for a full analysis).

So far, primaries have not been widely adopted to select legislative candidates, but if the trend set by the Concertación for presidential elections is expanded to include legislative nominations, the strong presence of *party loyalists* will undoubtedly diminish. Consequently, the strength of national parties and the solid level of party discipline that we observe in Chile today might also weaken. Thus, although open primaries might in fact be a desirable step toward more participation, transparency, and democracy, they might have an unintended consequence of diminishing the strength and cohesion of political parties.

Conclusion

The candidate selection process reflects and reinforces the strength of existing political parties in Chile. When analyzed as a dependent variable, the candidate selection process for legislative elections signals how the combination of legal arrangements, such as electoral rules, and their interaction with party and coalition variables makes it difficult for aspirants other than *party loyalists* to become successful candidates for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Because parties have actively used the incentives provided by the existing electoral rules,

aspirants who are not *party loyalists* are often prevented from becoming candidates and incumbents who do not behave like *party loyalists* are easily punished when they seek to win reelection.

When analyzed as an independent variable, the emergence of Chile's model candidate type, the *party loyalist*, is facilitated by the consolidation of political parties as the central legislative actors in negotiating with the executive. Because legislators are primarily *party loyalists*, party leaders can credibly negotiate on behalf of their legislative delegations with the executive. That has facilitated discipline within the government coalition and it has also made it easier for the executive to broker agreements with the opposition. However, because party leaders can directly negotiate with the executive, the role of the legislature as a lawmaking body has been somewhat undermined. Because legislative candidates are primarily *party loyalists*, the strength of political parties continues to be a central component in Chile's democracy. As parties can successfully punish and reward loyal behavior, legislative candidates remain committed *party loyalists*, thus further strengthening already strong Chilean political parties. What is more, much of this loyalty is cultivated by the pathways that bring Chilean legislative candidates to power.

Appendix: Interviews Conducted by the Author

Partido Demócrata Cristiano

Patricio Aylwin, president, 1990–1994; former party president; senator. Interviewed January 6, 2004, in Santiago.

Alejandro Foxley; party president and senator, 1998–2006. Interviewed January 4, 2004, in Santiago.

Eduardo Frei, president, 1994–2000; party president; senator, 1990–94; lifetime senator. Interviewed January 8, 2004, in Santiago.

Gutemberg Martínez, deputy, 1990–2002; former party secretary general. Interviewed January 13, 2004, in Santiago.

Ignacio Walker Prieto, deputy, 1994–2002; senate candidate in 2001. Interviewed on January 5, 2004, in Santiago.

Partido Socialista

Jorge Arrate, former party president and general secretary; Interviewed January 9, 2004, in Santiago.

Álvaro Elizalde, candidate for deputy, 2001; former Socialist Youth president. Interviewed December 31, 2003, in Santiago.

Partido por la Democracia

René Jofré, chief negotiator in 2001; party secretary. Interviewed January 8, 2004, in Santiago.

Sergio Bitar, senator, 1994–2002; former party president. Interviewed February 20, 2004, in Santiago.

Renovación Nacional

Andrés Allamand, deputy, 1994–98; senate candidate, 1997; former party president. Interviewed January 15, 2004, in Santiago.

Unión Demócrata Independiente

Juan Coloma, deputy, 1990–2002; senator, 2002–10; party general secretary. Interviewed January 22, 2004, in Santiago.