

## **The 1999 Presidential Election in Chile: Electoral Participation and a Sketch of the “New” Chilean Voter**

Patricio Navia and Alfredo Joignant

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According to many, deep and profound changes in the electoral preferences and behavior of Chileans can be drawn from the process that culminated with the election of Ricardo Lagos as the third president since democracy was restored in 1990 (Fontaine 2000). Others argue that the more things change, the more they remain the same (Garretón 2000). Here, we analyze the electoral results of the presidential election of December 12, 1999 and the run-off election of January 16, 2000. We claim that even though this election was substantially different from all the other post-Pinochet elections, some patterns that have characterized the Chilean electorate since 1988 were also observed. Although there is some evidence of a substantial change in the electoral preferences of Chileans, the political cleavage resulting from the 1988 plebiscite—that divided the country between the Yes and No vote on Pinochet—should not be totally disregarded. In that sense, we should view the most recent presidential election as a transitional one. Chile is moving from being a clearly polarized society, where the two choices are the *Concertación* and Pinochet, to a more diverse society where new choices and options are available and the Yes-No plebiscite cleavage is losing relevance. Yet, the last election does not give clear indications as to what are those new cleavages and electoral groupings that are emerging in Chile today.

Here, we discuss three major aspects of the 1999-00 electoral process in Chile: the holding of a presidential election run-off for the first time in Chile’s history, trends in electoral participation and the realignment of the electoral preferences of Chilean voters. We claim that even though we can observe changes in the electoral preferences of Chileans in 1999-00, the strength and persistence of the 1988 Yes-No cleavage, institutional constraints on electoral participation and the existence of run-off provisions in the Constitution, helped make this election, at the end of the day, similar to all the other post-1988 elections: the *Concertación* won. Certainly, electoral preferences should not be only understood in terms of ideology or unvarying party identification of Chilean voters. As in other countries, Chileans are also, to varying degrees, rational voters whose preferences are affected by the economic situation, traits of the candidates, campaigns and other variables.

### **Basic Facts**

The *Concertación* governing coalition chose former minister Ricardo Lagos as its candidate. The conservative opposition selected Joaquín Lavín, a member of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the former mayor of Las Condes. The Communist Party’s (PC) presidential candidate was its Secretary General, Gladys Marín. Former Chilean ambassador to New Zealand Tomás Hirsch was the Humanist Party (PH) candidate, former Christian Democratic senator Arturo Frei represented the populist-conservative Progressive Center-Center Union (UCCP) and environmental activist Sara

Larraín ran as an independent. For the first time in Chile's history, two women ran in a presidential election.

Ricardo Lagos was elected as the *Concertación* candidate in open primaries held on May 30, 1999 where he defeated Christian Democratic (PDC) senator Andrés Zaldívar. The *Concertación*, comprised of the PDC, the Socialist Party (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD), devised an open primaries system to select its presidential candidate after the PS, PPD and PRSD had agreed to support Lagos and the PDC aligned with Zaldívar. Rather than selecting the candidate among the party elites, the *Concertación* opted to hold open primaries allowing all party militants and government sympathizers to vote for their preferred candidate. With more than 1.4 million voters, Lagos obtained 71.4% of the preferences. Senator Zaldívar gave renewed strength to the governing alliance with a quick and smooth concession speech and the four parties vowed to support and work on behalf of Ricardo Lagos. The *Concertación* sought its third consecutive presidential election victory since the restoration of democracy in 1990.

The conservative candidate, Joaquín Lavín, was chosen by consensus among the party elites that form the Alliance for Chile coalition (previously known as *Democracy and Progress* and later as *Union for Chile*). Lavín's own party, the UDI, and the center-right National Renovation Party (RN) agreed to support Lavín early in 1999. The presidential candidates of the PC, UCCP and PH were designated by their party leaderships and independent candidate Sara Larraín secured a place in the ballot when she obtained enough signatures of Chilean voters—05% of those who voted in the previous presidential election.

The six presidential candidates had access to free TV time during the official 30-day presidential campaign period. In addition, they conducted public campaigns, where financing is unregulated and no spending limits exist, until 3 days before the December 12, 1999 first round election. That day, 7.2 million Chileans (90% of those registered and 73.1% of those of voting age—see Table 2) gave a narrow margin of victory to Ricardo Lagos with 47.96% of the vote, but not enough to avoid a run-off. Joaquín Lavín was the runner-up with 47.52% of the 7,055,128 valid votes cast. He obtained only 31,140 votes less than Lagos. PC's Gladys Marín received 3.19%, Hirsch came fourth with 0.51%, Larraín got 0.44% and Frei Bolívar ended last with 0.38% of the vote. The virtual tie between Lagos and Lavín forced a run-off election on January 16, 2000 where Lagos edged Lavín out with 51.31% of the 7,178,727 votes cast. Lavín got the remaining 48.69%.

Once Lagos was declared president-elect, some analysts immediately began to suggest that the political preferences of Chileans had drastically changed and that the "Yes-No" cleavage that had characterized all the post-1988 elections—where the No was always a clear majority—was no longer decisive. Several different alternative models and explanations were discussed in the mass media and among experts. They all suggested the emergence of new cleavages. In what follows, we argue that we should not yet discard the 1988 Yes-No cleavage. Instead, if we look at the historical cleavages and assume that voters are rational, we can better understand and explain the most recent election in Chile. Electoral participation and institutional incentives that foster the formation of two electoral coalitions are the two key concepts to bear in mind. We choose that path rather than to speculate about the new electoral cleavages that might be

emerging in Chile today because there is no definitive evidence that identifies what those cleavages are how they will influence future elections.

In what follows, we first look at the economic and political situation in Chile before the election. Then, we show that electoral participation has fallen dramatically since 1988. The 1999 election had a high turnout among registered voters, but a growing number of eligible Chileans are not registered to vote. Because most unregistered voters became eligible after 1988, their absence from the electoral process has helped the Yes-No cleavage remain a defining element in Chilean elections. We then discuss the institutional constraints and incentives that foster the formation of two large electoral coalitions and finish with some thoughts about the first round and run-off elections. We suggest that, at the end of the day, they look very similar to what has characterized elections in Chile since 1988.

### **A Decade of *Concertación* Governments and the Asian Crisis**

Eduardo Frei's government (1994-00) will likely be remembered for its successful four first years and the economic, social and political crises of the last two years. That is what makes the Frei administration unique and its legacy difficult to assess. In 1994, Chile's GDP grew at a healthy 5.7%, in 1995 it registered a 10.6% growth, and in 1996 and 1997 it expanded at a 7.4% rate. Yet, the economic difficulties resulting from the crisis in the Asian markets in late 1997 reached Chile in 1998 and 1999 when the GDP grew at 3.4% and -1.1% respectively (Banco Central 2000a). In an election year and for the first time since the mid 1980s, Chile's economy fell into a recession. In 1999, unemployment reached its highest level in the 90s with a 9.7% rate (Banco Central 2000b). Given those economic problems not seen in Chile during the *Concertación* tenure, a fall in the electoral support for the government should not have come as a surprise.

As many have argued and shown, voters react negatively to economic crisis and tend to support opposition candidates when the economy does not grow, unemployment goes up and inflation increases (Jackman 1987, Alesina and Rosenthal 1993, Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal 1993). In 1999, Chile was no exception. One could argue that voters, rather than having an ideological shift that turned them away from the *Concertación*, simply 'punished' the government for the poor economic conditions.<sup>1</sup>

All governments suffer a loss in votes after a long tenure (Almond and Verba 1963, Alesina and Rosenthal 1993). The presidential election in Argentina in 1999 shows that even governments with successful economic policies lose as a result of their prolonged tenure. In Chile, the *Concertación* reached power in 1989, and from then on, it has won a majority vote in every election. Between 1989 and 1997, the *Concertación* won two presidential elections, three parliamentary and two municipal elections. The five times<sup>2</sup> that Chileans went to the polls after the 1988 plebiscite—which incidentally was also won by the No vote—the *Concertación* claimed victory by securing a majority vote.

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<sup>1</sup> "punishment" would be, rather than a homogeneous behavior among individual voters that punish another individual, as a proxy for the behavior of citizens resulting in part from strategies aimed at effecting some form of social surgery based upon professional opinions made by politicians, journalists (in the form of interviews to 'randomly selected' voters and candidates) and political scientists (see Offerlé, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Excluding the June 1999 plebiscite held to ratify 59 constitutional reforms agreed upon by the dictatorship and the *Concertación* to modify some of the more anti-democratic provisions in the 1980 Constitution.

Although a lengthy period in government should not be sufficient to bring about an electoral defeat (let's recall that there are many countries where the same coalition has governed for decades), the combination of an economic crisis and the wearing out of electoral support after a decade in power posed a formidable challenge to the *Concertación* as the presidential election approached.

### **The Pinochet Arrest, Open Primaries and the Hegemony of the Concertación**

Some political developments, despite the evidence to the contrary discussed above, were interpreted early in 1999 by many as evidence of a likely and all but secured new electoral victory for the governing alliance. In fact, three events helped make the economic crisis a secondary consideration in the electoral analyses and forecasts made during the first 8 months of 1999. The arrest of former dictator General Augusto Pinochet in a London clinic in October of 1998, the successful open primaries organized by the *Concertación* in May of 1999 and the fact that the winner of that national primary and therefore the *Concertación* candidate was a socialist—rather than a Christian Democrat as Aylwin and Frei were—helped many underestimate the negative effect the economic crisis on the preferences of voters in the upcoming presidential election.

General Pinochet's arrest led the RN and UDI to strongly voice their support for the General, their opposition to the arrest and their interest in having the Chilean government aggressively pursue the general's release. However, Lavín eventually distanced himself from the general and his legacy. Early in 1999, Pinochet lost legal battles and a speedy return to Chile was all but certain, as election day approached and as most national surveys and polls indicated that most Chileans did not care much about the future of Pinochet—and many were indeed happy to see him tried—Joaquín Lavín successfully distanced himself from the general and, although not directly, indicated that he would like to see Pinochet tried in Chile. Lavín was informed by a simple and powerful logic. In 1988 Pinochet lost the plebiscite. Although he did better than any other conservative candidate in recent decades, Pinochet was not successful in his effort to command a majority of the electorate. Thus, if Pinochet could not attract a majority vote—and if indeed there was a majority opposed to the general—distancing from the general's legacy (and from the general himself) was a necessary condition if one sought to win a majority vote in an election in Chile. The physical absence of General Pinochet made it easier for Lavín to do that. And even though some conservative groups and actors resisted the move, because they considered a treason and a compromise of their principles, the highly disciplined UDI and Lavín's superb control over the official discourse of the conservative parties allowed his campaign to successfully portray Lavín as different and not-loyal to Pinochet. In addition, because the 1999 presidential election was not held concurrently with parliamentary elections, Joaquín Lavín was successful in presenting himself as independent of the political parties that supported his candidacy. Lavín campaigned as an independent. He claimed he would not govern with any political party and that he would seek the best qualified people, regardless of their party identification, to join his government. If the 1999 presidential election were to have been held concurrently with parliamentary elections, Lavín's strategy of independence from political parties and from Pinochet's legacy would have been more difficult to carry out.

The success of the open primaries organized and held by the *Concertación* on May 30, 1999, brought excessive optimism to the Lagos camp. The surprisingly high

turnout—it was the first open primary ever held, but experts predicted that turnout would be 30% lower than what was registered—and the overwhelming victory obtained by Ricardo Lagos led many *Concertación* strategists and sympathizers to believe that the presidential race had already been won. The 71% support Lagos obtained among the 1.4 million voters led the candidate and his close advisors to a complaisant mood. Believing that Lagos would obtain an easy victory in the December election, the candidate and his campaign strategists chose to delay the beginning of his presidential campaign. In part, they thought that the waiting time would allow them to wound the heels left by the primaries and in particular among PDC leaders and militants who had strongly campaigned for Zaldívar and against Lagos. In the mean time, Joaquín Lavín campaigned enthusiastically throughout Chile and successfully counteracted the snowball effect in Lagos's popularity caused by his primary victory. Through a well-orchestrated media campaign, Lavín successfully positioned himself as the candidate of change. By contrast, by making sure the entire PDC was on board with his campaign, Lagos could not escape the label of being the government's candidate and, consequently, he was also blamed for the economic crisis, the recession and the high unemployment.

The *Concertación* primaries were carried out primarily with the objective of securing its unity. The threat of a break up over the choice of the alliance's presidential candidate convinced the political parties elites of the need to solve the succession question in a democratic manner. The *Concertación* was formed to oppose General Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite, it then became an electoral coalition for the 1989 presidential and parliamentary election and it transformed into a government coalition when Patricio Aylwin was elected president and the combined votes of the *Concertación* parties comprised a majority of the elected seats in both chambers. Some ideological and programmatic differences between the *Concertación*'s major parties (PDC, PS and PPD) threatened on occasion the unity of the coalition (Cavallo 1998), but the alliance stayed unified and continued to win a majority vote in every election. Yet, the decision over the presidential candidate of the alliance constituted the most significant source of tension for the *Concertación*. In 1989, Patricio Aylwin, a member of the PDC, was chosen as the candidate given the political and electoral climate of the time (the socialists quickly agreed to withhold their own presidential aspirations to make the transition to democracy more fluid). When Aylwin's period was coming to an end, PDC's Eduardo Frei was well ahead in the polls. The *Concertación* held closed primaries (restricted to official party militants), but the election was a mere rubber stamp procedure as it was well-known in advance that the PDC had more registered militants than the PS and PPD combined. When Frei's period was in its fifth year, socialist Ricardo Lagos—who had lost to Frei in the 1993 closed primaries—was well ahead in the polls. Several PDC politicians were also jockeying to secure their party nomination, but none had a clear commanding lead within the PDC. Eventually, senator Andrés Zaldívar was chosen by the PDC as its presidential candidate and all the *Concertación* parties agreed to hold open primaries so that voters could choose the *Concertación* presidential candidate. Lagos' good standing in the electoral polls was reflected in the results of the primaries, he carried the day easily with a 3-to-1 victory over Zaldívar. The PDC senator quickly accepted his defeat and compromised his and his party support for Lagos for the December 12 elections. The unity of the *Concertación* had been preserved despite the change in leadership from the

PDC to the socialists, but such change would eventually have electoral effects as well with Chilean voters.

Voters have party preferences and they often vote accordingly. Yet, voters do not necessarily follow their preferred parties in the electoral coalitions these parties form. For that reason, obtaining the official support of the PDC did not represent a guarantee for Lagos that he would also obtain the support of all PDC militants and sympathizers. Following the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), if there is no candidate that represents the “center”, voters will choose among candidates placed to the left or the right. Downs predicts that rightist and leftist candidates will converge to the center (something that was often mentioned in the Chilean election by people who claimed that Lavín and Lagos were promising the same, talking about the same issues and showing few real distinctions between their platforms), but the convergence towards the median voter is not an automatic or a smooth process. Given that Lagos was correctly perceived as being more leftist than Aylwin or Frei, his convergence towards the median voter necessarily implied a longer ideological journey towards the center than previous *Concertación* candidates. Because Lavín was also converging towards the center, there would necessarily be a non-trivial number of voters that would end up supporting Lavín rather than Lagos. Some center and center-right voters who had supported Frei in 1993 (when he got more than 58% of the vote) would find themselves closer to Lavín’s initial position than to Lagos’. Lavín’s aggressive effort to portray himself as a centrist candidate and Lagos’ more difficult journey—given his strong party identification with the PS, PPD and his left-of-center track record—would necessarily represent a loss of votes for the *Concertación* candidate. If we assume rational voters to have strong party identification, the absence of a centrist candidate will have a negative effect on the support for a center-left coalition of parties, just as the absence of a leftist candidate—as it was the case in 1993—would foster the emergence of alternative leftist presidential candidates.<sup>3</sup>

The combined effect of the three states of affairs described above—the Pinochet arrest that allowed Lavín to distance himself from the general’s legacy, the overconfidence expressed by the *Concertación* and its candidate after the primaries, and the non-trivial fact that the *Concertación* candidate was no longer a PDC member but a socialist—allowed the conservative candidate to position himself well with the electorate and using the discontent caused by the economic crisis, mount a campaign that posed a real challenge to the otherwise unbeatable *Concertación*.

### **Electoral Participation in 1999**

One of the most common explanations used to account for the fall in the *Concertación* vote, and indirectly the surprisingly high support for Lavín, has been the ‘disenchantment’ reported among Chileans. Evidenced in the impressive sales of books criticizing the *Concertación* government from the left and the center (Moulián 1997, Jocelyn-Holt 1998) and in academic publications very critical of the ‘success’ of the

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<sup>3</sup> We know voters have party identification from comparative studies (Abramson 1987, Searing 1986, for a good review Mayer and Perrineau 1992), although there are alternative models that explain voters’ decisions, such as salient issue voting (Feldman and Johnston Conover 1983, Johnston Conover and Feldman 1989), prospective evaluations about public policy statements made by candidates (Lau, Smith and Fiske 1991), and international variables (Krosnick and Brannon 1993) among others.

*Concertación* social and economic policies (Petras and Silva 1994, Collins and Lear 1995), the ‘disenchantment’ with the *Concertación* was first ‘observed’ among voters in the 1997 parliamentary election, when turnout fell to its lowest level since the return of electoral democracy in 1988. Yet, when comparing the post-1988 with the pre-1973 turnout rates (Tables 1-3) we can observe that even though turnout fell after 1988 it was still higher in 1997 than before 1973. In that sense, the fall in turnout after 1988 would simply mean that electoral participation was going back to its historic level, down from an unusually high level in 1988—a special election in many regards, including the fact that it was the first in 16 years—to a healthy, higher than the historical average, level.

In addition, because the 1997 election was parliamentary, unlike 1989 and 1993 when presidential and parliamentary elections were held concurrently, turnout should have naturally declined. When elections are more important and higher elected offices are involved, turnout increases (Ferejohn and Fiorina, Powell 1986, Grofman 1995). For that reason, it should have come as no surprise that electoral participation went up in 1999 compared to 1997. Moreover, as election day approached as the race seemed closer than expected, the incentives to turnout to vote were also higher, voters had a greater chance of being pivotal. As Table 2 shows, electoral participation among registered voters increased in 1999, reaching levels not seen since the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential and parliamentary election. As the theory predicts, when elections decide important matters and the results are uncertain, turnout increases (Uhlaner 1995, Aldrich 1993, Boyd 1986, Jackman 1987, Rae 1971, Riker and Ordeshook 1968).

Between the first round and the run-off election (table 2), turnout increased slightly. More than 7,727,000 voters cast ballots in the first round and 7,316,000 went to the polls in the run-off. In an electoral universe of 8.1 million voters, the slight increase should not be surprising. The first round was expected to be close, candidates campaigned heavily throughout the country and interest was high. Those who abstained in the first round did so probably because they were physically prevented from going to the polls rather than uninterested. In the cumbersome Chilean electoral system, voting is mandatory, but registration is not. In addition, a registered citizen is expected to notify the electoral service of a change of address if moving out of the electoral district. If they fail to notify the electoral service, they are expected to vote in the district where they are officially registered. However, if they notify the local police that they are at least 200 kilometers away from their electoral district on election day, they are not required to vote in the mandatory election (*Ley Orgánica Constitucional Sobre Votaciones Populares y Escrutinios*, article 139). Many Chileans who are registered to vote but reside in cities other than where they are registered often abstain from voting and are not subject to the mandatory fine applicable to those who abstain from going to the polls.

Most likely, a majority of those who abstained in the first round resided in cities other than those where they are registered to vote. For them, voting was costly as it involved traveling long distances to their official voting sites. For the run-off, although many of them would have liked to vote, they were physically prevented from doing so. Consequently, the call made by Lagos and Lavín to non first round voters to participate in the run-off only resulted in an increase of 42 thousand new voters. The number of blank and null votes, however, decreased significantly from the first round to the run-off. As table 3 shows, null and blank votes went from 216 thousand in the first round to 148 thousand in the second round. This decrease results from having fewer options to choose

from (which makes confusion less likely to occur) and from the plebiscite nature of a run-off election. The call made to their supporters by three of the first round losing candidates (Marín, Frei Bolívar and Hirsch) to nullify their run-off vote did not find support.

Even though turnout increased among registered voters, a significant number of voting age Chileans are not registered with the electoral service. Most of them reached voting age after the 1988 plebiscite. As Arend Lijphart has suggested, institutional barriers in place in some countries prevent voting age persons from exercising their right. In fact, those constraints, according to Lijphart, represent today's equivalent to property ownership restrictions and literacy requirements used earlier in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to prevent certain groups from participating in the electoral process (1997). In Chile, all those aged 18 or older are eligible to vote provided that they register with the Electoral Service. As Tables 2 and 3 indicate, the number of unregistered voting age Chileans has increased since 1988. Thus, even though turnout among registered voters was 90% in 1999, only 73.6% of those aged 18 or older turned out to vote. The low number of those aged 30 or younger (those who turned 18 after 1988) that are registered to vote has been often used as evidence of the 'disenchantment' with politics expressed by the Chilean youth. Although that might be true, the experience from other countries indicates that when registration barriers are lifted, electoral participation increases (Lijphart 1997). In addition, the question remains, would have those unregistered Chileans gone to the polls on December 12 if they knew they could cast a ballot?

In his first national address after his inauguration, President Lagos announced he would propose a constitutional amendment that would make registration automatic and voting voluntary. If adopted, this reform would increase the number of eligible voters from 8 to 10 million immediately. This change would also significantly decrease the mean and median age of the Chilean voter. The newly enfranchised voters would have no strong personal memory of the 1988 plebiscite (because they did not vote, because they were too young or because they were not politically active) and the Yes-No cleavage that has characterized all elections after 1988 would definitely lose some relevance.

In addition, the decision to make registration automatic and voting optional implies that the government and politicians will need to earn legitimacy by seeking both a majority support and a good turnout. Higher turnout gives more legitimacy and voters have an additional tool to punish politicians when voting is not compulsory.

Certainly, changes in turnout levels do not affect all parties similarly. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) have shown that negative campaigning reduces turnout and favor those candidates with a hard core constituency. Several authors have argued that higher turnout levels favored leftist parties in Chile before 1973 (Valenzuela 1985, Valenzuela and Scully 1997, Meller 1996, Cruz Coke 1983). Yet, after 1988, the evidence is not conclusive as to what parties benefit from higher turnout (Navia, 2000).

### **Institutional Mechanisms that Foster the Formation of Strong Centrist Coalitions**

Downs (1957) argued that in a two-candidate election, the candidate's platforms would converge towards the median voter. The winner would be the candidate that obtained the support of the median voter. The dynamics centered around obtaining the support of the median voter would eventually make the two candidates propose very similar policies and would make them almost undistinguishable for voters. Empirical studies and theoretical refinements of the model have shown that even in a two-candidate



election, the platforms of each candidate are distinguishable (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Bartels 1996).

Before 1973, there were no run-off provisions in presidential elections. If none of the presidential candidates obtained a majority, the parliament was mandated to choose from among the top two vote-getters. The 1958 and 1970 were decided by the Chilean parliament (the combined votes of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate). In both cases, the parliament voted to ratify the candidate with the first plurality, but it was legally possible to have chosen the second plurality winner as president.

The 1980 Constitution included, in Article 26, a run-off provision in case there was no majority winner in the first round. The top two vote getters would compete in a run-off election held 30 days after the first round. Unlike run-off provisions in other countries, the 1980 Constitution allowed for a rather extended period of time between the first round and the run-off.<sup>4</sup> In the 1999 presidential election, Joaquín Lavín came second in the first round, but he did well as compared to previous conservative candidates and Lagos did poorly compared to the vote obtained by Frei and Aylwin. Naturally, people perceived Lavín as being the real winner of the first round. Lagos' rapid response to the first round results—that included a change in the campaign slogan and a new campaign manager—allowed him to successfully stop an otherwise inevitable drainage of votes towards the Lavín camp. Had there been less time between the first round and the run-off, it would have been much more difficult for Lagos to stop the snowball effect that Lavín's good showing could have had among voters.

Yet, the run-off provision provides a different set of incentives for electoral behavior among parties and candidates. In order to be elected president, one must obtain a clear majority either in the first round or the run-off. Thus, parties have incentives to form coalitions even before the first round but certainly for the run-off. Contrary to what has been suggested, the electoral law in place in Chile (known as the binomial law—a proportional representation system with district magnitude of 2) does not foster the formation of two large centrist coalitions. Magar, Roseblum and Samuels (1998) have shown that Chile's electoral law fosters the development of coalitions (not necessarily two) that do not converge toward the median voter. This is so because the electoral threshold to guarantee one parliamentary seat in every district is 33%. Rahat and Sznajder (1998), Valenzuela and Scully (1997), Siavelis and Valenzuela (1996) and Scully (1995) have also shown that Chile's electoral laws distorts proportional representation and makes it unduly difficult for smaller parties to secure representation. While the 33% is the minimum threshold to secure a seat, it also guarantees 50% of the seats in parliament. Rather than fostering stability and guaranteeing representation to larger coalitions, the electoral system in place in practice eliminates any possibility of real competition between coalitions. In order to secure a seat (in each two-seat district), a party requires 33% of the vote. In order to clinch both seats, the party must obtain 66.7% (twice as much as any other electoral coalition). Because the threshold to win both seats is too high, there is little inter-coalition competition going on in parliamentary elections. The real competition occurs within each coalition. The two candidates of each coalition know that their coalition will likely get just one seat and, therefore, they seek to outnumber their coalition list partner in the election.

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<sup>4</sup> In France, for example, there is a 15-day margin between the first round and the run-off.

A run-off provision in presidential elections, on the contrary, provides the correct incentives for candidates to move towards the center (median voter theorem) and fosters the development of strong centrist coalitions. When presidential elections are not concurrent with parliamentary elections, the trend toward the median voter is even more pronounced because there are no strategic considerations about the ideological positioning of parliamentary candidates. But when parliamentary elections are not held concurrently with presidential elections, the incentives to form coalitions decrease.

### **The Election Results: The More Things Change, The More They Remain The Same**

If analyzed in a strict historical context, the 1999 presidential election results should not be very surprising. In the first round, Lagos obtained 59.3% of the vote in district 45 (a traditional left wing region of miners, fishermen and industrial workers) while Lavín obtained 34.3%. In Las Condes (the wealthiest district in the nation), Lavín obtained 71.3% and Lagos got 26.5%. Lagos won where the left has historically won and Lavín won where conservative parties have historically been strong. Despite the decrease in the support for the *Concertación*—as shown in Tables 4 and 5—the historical trends did not change dramatically. Perhaps the difference is that Lagos won where the left always win, but by a slimmer margin and Lavín won where the right always win, but by a wider margin.

Table 6 shows the first round results for the 18 senatorial districts in Chile. Lagos did best in the northern region of the country, the Concepción region (industrial and mining), the Punta Arenas region (industrial and oil producing) and western Santiago (the poorer sector of the metropolitan area). Lagos also did well in the center-south VI and VII regions (industrial and export-led agriculture), a trend observed by the left in all elections since 1988. On the other hand, Lagos did worst in regions IX, X and XI, a traditional agricultural producing regions. Those results are consistent with 20<sup>th</sup> century electoral patterns.

Yet, the results in Regions I, V and Eastern Santiago diverge from historical patterns. The surprisingly good showing by Lavín those regions might result from the negative effect of the economic crisis, which heavily hit Santiago and the Valparaíso region (V Region). The results in Region I (Arica and Iquique) clearly respond to that region's dissatisfaction with the lack of a development strategy on the part of the *Concertación* government for northern Chile. As we mentioned, some have argued that Lavín's surprisingly good showing is evidence that Chilean voters no longer respond to traditional electoral patterns and that, in particular, the cleavage in place since 1988 caused by the Yes-No vote in the plebiscite can no longer explain electoral preferences in Chile. Yet, because there was an economic crisis in 1999, there is at least one competing hypothesis. Namely, that Lavín did well because of the economic crisis and that in the absence of such crisis, the *Concertación* would have once again secured a solid majority. The decrease in the electoral support for the *Concertación* could be the result of the one of the two hypotheses, or a combination of both. Yet, the regional differences in the level of support for Lagos and the substantial fall in the support for the *Concertación* in the regions worst hit by the 1999 crisis points to the economic crisis as a central explanatory variable. In addition, because the historic regional patterns of support for the left and conservative candidates was also present in 1999, we should not be so quick to discard

the old social cleavage. Things are changing, but they change from a starting point and that starting point is the 1988 plebiscite. They are certainly changing more rapidly than what the *Concertación* would have preferred (given its 1988 victory) but slower than what the Lavín camp would have wished (given that, after all, there was an economic crisis and, nonetheless, Lavín lost). We must not forget, however, that as Table 5 shows, the support for the *Concertación* has been falling continuously since it reached a peak of 58% in 1993. In 1999 the *Concertación* obtained its lowest electoral support ever, falling almost 2% from the previous low of 50.6% observed in 1997. In that sense, we can not overlook the decline in support for the governing alliance.

If we assume that *Concertación* voters are comprised of some who identify themselves with the left and others who see themselves as centrists, the fact that the *Concertación* presidential candidate was a left-of-center politician made it easier for centrist voters to look elsewhere when making their decision as to who to vote for. Yet, if Joaquín Lavín had chosen not to move towards the center or if the economy had not fallen into a recession in 1999, would have those centrist voters chosen to abandon the *Concertación* simply because the presidential candidate was more left-of-center than the previous presidential candidates?

The lack of reliable polls that could allow us to analyze individual considerations and reasoning prevent us from providing a definitive answer to that question, but a basic rational choice assumption about ideology positioning of voters would lead us to expect that rational voters would be more likely to switch their support for the government if the official candidate moves farther away from their preferred position and the opposition candidates comes closer to where the voters stand. But good survey data from election day (as in exit polls) does not exist in Chile. The international and well-respected MORI polling company reported in later November 1999 that according to its last poll, Lagos would obtain 42% of the vote, Lavín would get 36% and the remaining four candidates would combine for a total of 17%. Other polling companies, some associated with conservative parties and others with several years in operation, also erred in predicting the first round results. And even though some polls did predict a tie in the first round, they actual percentages that the two leading candidates were expected to get were predicted wrongly (Kerber 1999).

By selecting Lagos, the *Concertación* moved to the left. Conversely, by distancing himself from Pinochet and agreeing to constitutional reforms to democratize the political system, Lavín moved center. Thus, rather than a change in the electoral preferences of Chileans, we could be observing a change in the ideology positioning of the candidates and their coalitions. The *Concertación* moved left and therefore lost centrist votes. The conservative coalition moved to the center and thus won some of the votes lost by the *Concertación*.

In part, this move to the center on the part of Lavín was possible because there were no concurrent parliamentary elections—where the incentives to move to the center are fewer since a 33.4% of the vote guarantees a seat—and because Lagos was himself more to the left than either Aylwin or Frei had been. On the left, the fact that the *Concertación* candidate was less of a centrist than previous candidates had a negative effect on the support for alternative leftist candidates. And as pre-election polls indicated that Lavín was doing fairly well, leftist voters had incentives to cast ballots strategically to prevent their least desired candidate (Lavín) from winning the presidency. Just as

Eduardo Frei's candidacy in 1993 motivated some leftists within the *Concertación* to support the alternative leftist candidates, the 1999 campaign by Lagos led many voters to abandon their preferred candidates (Marín, Larraín or Hirsch) and vote for Lagos. Something similar might have happened on the right, where Frei Bolívar did poorly as Lavín concentrated the core of the conservative vote. This is particularly striking because Frei Bolívar had originally attempted to place himself between Lagos and Lavín to obtain the support of centrist (mostly Christian Democratic) voters. Frei Bolívar's strong defense of General Pinochet and Lavín's distancing from the aging ex-dictator eventually helped Lavín positioned himself to the center of Frei Bolívar. If the *Concertación* had chosen a centrist as its candidate, it could have probably helped prevent the flight of votes from the center, but some votes would have been lost on the left of the *Concertación*. In addition, a Christian Democrat would have paid a higher price for the economic crisis than Lagos did. After all, even though he was a member in president Aylwin and Frei's cabinet, Lagos did belong to a different party than Frei and Aylwin, and voters were well aware of that.

Another aspect that merits attention is in the observed gender differences among Chilean voters. In the first round and the run off, Lavín won a clear majority among women voters. This is particularly important since there are 4.2 million women and only 3.9 million men registered to vote (Table 7). Moreover, women have higher participation levels than men. Thus, if there are more women voters, if they vote at higher levels and if they continue to vote for conservative candidates as they did in 1999, the prospects for the right are very good.

The left has historically faced difficulties when courting women's votes (Cruz Coke 1984, Valenzuela and Scully 1997). This was also true in the 1988 plebiscite, where Pinochet did better among women than among men. After 1988, *Concertación* presidential candidates did equally well among women and men voters. Yet, the PDC has historically done well among women, so it should come as no surprise that Aylwin and Frei obtained high levels of support among women. When the presidential candidate was a socialist, rather than a PDC, the *Concertación* faced the same difficulties with the woman vote than the left had faced before 1973. Although Lagos never obtained more votes among women than among men, he successfully passed the 50% threshold among women voters in the run off in 7 of the 18 senatorial districts. In general, Lagos obtained an average of 5.6% less support among women than among men. Although there remains the need for an account of the apparent conservatism of women, Lagos did fairly well in those senatorial districts where women's turnout was higher than 90%. He won 4 out of 6 districts with high turnout. Lagos also benefited from higher turnout among men in the 18 senatorial districts. In this regard, the 1999 presidential elections resemble pre-1973 elections. The leftist candidate in 1958, 1964 and 1970, Salvador Allende, did significantly better among men than among women. In that sense, more than in any other aspect, the 1999 election reproduced historically observed patterns of electoral behavior among Chileans.

## **Conclusion**

Rather than attempt to identify the causes that explain the electoral behavior of Chileans in 1999 (that should be the result of rigorous studies based on reliable polling and electoral data), here we attempted to put forward three considerations specific to the

1999 process and three general observations. After ten years of *Concertación* government and in the midst of an economic crisis, the 1999 presidential election was distinct because of the arrest of General Pinochet in London (that allowed Lavín to quickly position himself as a centrist candidate), the holding of presidential primaries by the *Concertación* (which led them to underestimate their opponent's chances and overestimate their own) and the move to the left by the *Concertación* (by having a socialist candidate for the first time since democratization). The three general observations are that the predicted effect of the median voter theorem can be observed in Chile in 1999, the two candidates for the run-off election moved to the center and sought the support of the median voter. Second, electoral participation among registered voters increased because the result of the election mattered and because there was much uncertainty about the result; the argument that Chileans are disenchanted with politics seems contrary to the evidence (most of those who are not registered would have voted had they been given the chance). The institutional constraints that exist in the cumbersome registration rules have excluded many Chileans from exercising their citizenship rights. Third, the evidence indicates that there are important continuities in the electoral preferences of Chileans that can be observed in regional and gender based differences. These continuities reflect the endurance of pre-1973 social and political cleavages and certainly the strength of the 1988 plebiscite cleavage.

Yet, there is also evidence that points to some changes taking place in the Chilean electorate. The fact that there was an economic crisis in 1999 makes it difficult to determine whether the fall in support for the *Concertación* responds to economic difficulties or to an underlying societal change. After all, even though elections allow voters to express their preferences, voters can only choose among a limited number of candidates running for office taking into account the constraints and incentives provided by the electoral laws in place. We should not conclude that voters do not behave rationally. Instead we should broaden our definition of rationality beyond economic expectations. Issue voting, social class voting, party identification, coalition identification, personal vote, incomplete information rational voting, prospective and retrospective voting are all elements we ought to consider when analyzing electoral results. In fact, often several of this profiles of voters coexist within individual voters who, if given the chance, can also vote strategically or split their ticket to address specific concerns and preferences, depending on the importance of a particular election. Thus, in the absence of reliable survey and polling data that can tell us more about the reasoning behind the choices made by Chileans in the recent presidential elections, the information available indicates that although there might be a change brewing in the Chilean voter, at the end of the day, the 1999 presidential election did not diverge from all the previous contests since electoral democracy was restored in 1988: The *Concertación* won.

**Table 1. Electoral Participation in Chile 1870-1973 (in thousands)**

Year	Total Population (1)	Voting Age Population (2)	Voters (3)	Voters as % of total population (4)=(3)/(1)	Voters as % of voting age population (5)=(3)/(2)
1870	1,943	919	31	1.6	3.3
1876	2,116	1,026	80	3.8	7.8
1885	2,507	1,180	79	3.1	6.7
1894	2,676	1,304	114	4.3	8.7
1915	3,530	1,738	150	4.2	8.6
1920	3,730	1,839	167	4.5	9.1
1932	4,425	2,287	343	7.8	15.0
1942	5,219	2,666	465	8.9	17.4
1952*	5,933	3,278	954	16.1	29.1
1958	7,851	3,654	1,236	15.7	33.8
1964	8,387	4,088	2,512	30.0	61.6
1970	9,504	5,202	2,923	30.8	56.2
1973	9,850	5,238	3,620	36.8	69.1

\*=Women gained the right to vote in municipal elections in 1935 and national elections in 1948.

Source: Meller (1996: 102) and Cruz Coke (1983)

**Table 2. Electoral Participation in Chile 1988-2000 (in thousands)**

Year	Voting Age Population (1)	Registered Population (2)	Voters (3)	Voters as % of Voting Age Population (4)=(3)/(1)	Voters as % of Registered Population (5)=(3)/(2)
1988	8,062	7,436	7,251	89.9	96.6
1989	8,243	7,558	7,157	86.8	92.3
1992	8,775	7,840	6,420	73.2	81.9
1993	8,951	8,044	7,385	82.5	84.3
1996	9,464	8,073	6,944	73.4	76.6
1997	9,627	8,069	6,912	71.8	71.1
1999*	9,945	8,084	7,272	73.1	90.0
2000*	9,945	8,084	7,316	73.6	90.5

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl> and <http://www.ine.cl/chileci/index.htm> (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas)

**Table 3. Null and Blank Votes in Chile 1988-2000 (en miles)**

Year	Voting Age Population (1)	Valid Votes (2)	Null and Blank Votes (3)	Null and Blank Votes, abstentions and unregistered voters (4)	Valid votes as % of voting age population $5=(2)/(1)$
1988	8,062	7,187	65	824	89.1
1989	8,243	6,974	183	1,163	84.6
1992	8,775	6,420	633	1,722	73.2
1993	8,951	6,784	601	1,540	75.8
1996	9,464	6,183	761	2,306	65.3
1997	9,627	5,733	1,178	2,513	59.6
1999	9,945	7,055	216	2,674	70.1
2000	9,945	7,169	148	2,628	72.1

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl> and <http://www.ine.cl/chileci/index.htm> (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas)

**Table 4. Presidential Election Results in Chile 1989-2000**

Candidate	1989	1993	1999 (first round)
<b>Concertación (Aylwin, Frei, Lagos)</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>48.0</b>
Unión por Chile (RN-UDI) (Büchi, Alessandri, Lavín)	29.4	24.4	47.5
Unión de Centro-Centro (Errazuriz and Frei Bolívar)	15.4	----	0.4
José Piñera	----	6.2	----
<b>Conservative parties/candidates Total</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>47.9</b>
Communist Party (Pizarro and Marín)	----	4.7	3.2
Humanist Party (Reitze and Hirsch)	----	1.2	0.5
Manfred Max Neef	----	5.6	----
Sara Larraín			0.4
<b>Non-Concertación Left Total</b>	<b>----</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>
<b>Total Voters (thousands)</b>	<b>6,980</b>	<b>6,969</b>	<b>7,055</b>

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/>

**Table 5. Parliamentary and Municipal Election Results 1992-1997**

Party/coalition	Municipal 1992	Parliamentary 1993	Municipal 1996	Parliamentary 1997
<i>Concertación</i>	53.3	55.3	56.1	50.6
RN-UDI	29.6	36.6	32.5	36.3
UCC (UCCP)	8.1	--	2.8	2.0
PC (MIDA)	6.6	6.4	5.9	7.5
PH	---	1.4	1.6	2.9
Ind. And others	2.1	0.1	1.1	0.7
Total (thousands)	6,411	6,736	6,301	5,724

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/)



**Table 6. Presidential Election First Round, 1999 by Senatorial Districts (ranked by Lagos performance)**

Circunscripción	FreiBolivar	Larraín	Hirsch	Marín	Lagos	Lavín	Total
IV Región	0.4	0.5	0.5	3.5	56.6	38.5	262,345
III Región	0.3	0.4	0.4	4.5	56.1	38.4	111,010
II Región	0.3	0.3	0.6	4.1	54.2	40.6	198,543
XII Región	0.4	0.3	0.5	2.4	54.2	42.3	74,082
VII Reg. Norte	0.4	0.5	0.5	2.5	52.8	47.3	287,684
VIII Reg. Costa	0.7	0.5	0.6	3.7	52.7	52.4	532,381
Metro Poniente	0.3	0.4	0.5	3.7	49.3	45.8	1,333,843
VI Región	0.4	0.5	0.5	2.7	48.7	45.8	392,299
VIII Reg. Interior	0.5	0.6	0.5	2.7	48.3	41.9	378,936
Metro Oriente	0.3	0.4	0.6	3.4	46.3	49.0	1,437,011
XI Región	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.2	45.9	50.4	40,934
I Región	0.3	0.3	0.6	4.0	45.8	49.0	171,569
V Región Costa	0.3	0.4	0.5	3.1	45.6	50.0	403,540
X Región Norte	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.9	45.0	51.8	254,014
VII Reg. Sur	0.5	0.6	0.4	1.4	44.7	43.4	164,125
X Región Sur	0.6	0.5	0.4	1.7	44.2	52.6	237,478
V Reg. Cordillera	0.4	0.4	0.5	4.2	42.8	51.8	376,171
IX Región Norte	0.6	0.7	0.5	1.7	41.9	47.3	140,010
IX Región Sur	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.6	39.5	57.4	259,153
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.38</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>47.96</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>7,055,128</b>

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/>

**Table 7. Registered Population by Gender, 1999 Presidential Election  
(ranked by highest turnout level)**

Senatorial District	Registered Men thousands [1]	Registered Women thousands [2]	M/W % [3=1/2]	Total registered [4=1+2]	Valid Votes Total [5]	% Turnout [5/4]	Winner
V Región Costa	201	222	90.5	424	404	95.2	Lavín
VI Región	214	220	97.1	435	392	90.3	Lagos
Metro Poniente	705	780	90.4	1,484	1,334	89.9	Lagos
Metro Oriente	722	879	82.1	1,602	1,437	89.7	Lavín
VII Reg. Norte	157	165	95.3	322	288	89.4	Lagos
VIII Reg. Costa	294	318	92.6	612	532	87.1	Lagos
IV Región	146	156	93.7	302	262	86.8	Lagos
VII Reg. Sur	93	97	96.6	190	164	86.4	Lavín
VIII Reg. Interior	215	224	95.9	439	379	86.2	Lagos
X Región Norte	147	153	96.2	300	254	84.7	Lavín
X Región Sur	141	140	100.6	281	237	84.4	Lavín
IX Región Sur	149	158	94.2	308	259	84.2	Lavín
III Región	67	67	100.1	135	111	82.3	Lagos
IX Región Norte	86	86	99.9	171	140	81.8	Lavín
II Región	122	122	100.0	243	199	81.7	Lagos
V Reg. Cordillera	220	247	89.0	467	376	80.5	Lavín
I Región	110	105	104.5	215	172	79.7	Lavín
XI Región	30	24	126.1	54	41	75.5	Lavín
XII Región	55	44	125.4	99	74	74.5	Lagos
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,875</b>	<b>4,208</b>	<b>92.1</b>	<b>8,083</b>	<b>7,055</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>Lagos</b>

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/>

**Table 8. Presidential Election Run-Off by Gender  
(ranked by women's vote for Lavín)**

Senatorial District	Lagos Men	Lagos Women	Lagos Total	Lavín Men	Lavín Women	Lavín Total	Total Men	Total Women	Total Valid Votes
<b>IX Región Sur</b>	44.1	40.3	42.1	55.9	59.7	57.9	128,462	139,410	267,872
<b>IX Región Norte</b>	47.1	42.0	44.5	52.9	58.0	55.5	71,153	74,710	145,863
<b>X Región Sur</b>	48.1	43.0	45.5	51.9	57.0	54.5	121,186	129,393	250,579
<b>VII Reg. Sur</b>	49.3	43.5	46.3	50.7	56.5	53.7	82,142	87,241	169,383
<b>V Región Costa</b>	49.5	44.5	46.8	50.5	55.5	53.2	191,914	219,777	411,691
<b>X Región Norte</b>	50.2	45.5	47.8	49.8	54.5	52.2	126,115	135,481	261,596
<b>V Reg. Cordillera</b>	52.9	45.7	49.1	47.1	54.3	50.9	179,908	202,475	382,383
<b>Metro Oriente</b>	52.7	46.8	49.5	47.3	53.2	50.5	651,722	790,560	1,442,282
<b>XI Región</b>	48.3	46.9	47.7	51.7	53.1	52.3	21,487	19,898	41,385
<b>I Región</b>	51.6	47.3	49.4	48.4	52.7	50.6	84,728	88,830	173,558
<b>VIII Reg. Interior</b>	54.2	48.5	51.3	45.8	51.5	48.7	188,265	201,374	389,639
<b>VI Región</b>	55.7	48.6	52.1	44.3	51.4	47.9	194,929	204,478	399,407
<b>Metro Poniente</b>	56.2	50.1	53.0	43.8	49.9	47.0	636,521	711,871	1,348,392
<b>VII Reg. Norte</b>	59.0	51.9	55.3	41.0	48.1	44.7	141,766	151,738	293,504
<b>VIII Reg. Costa</b>	59.7	54.5	56.9	40.3	45.5	43.1	258,610	286,239	544,849
<b>II Región</b>	60.9	55.3	58.1	39.1	44.7	41.9	97,851	101,988	199,839
<b>III Región</b>	63.6	56.3	59.8	36.4	43.7	40.2	54,996	58,247	113,243
<b>XII Región</b>	55.8	56.3	56.0	44.2	43.7	44.0	38,575	35,076	73,651
<b>IV Región</b>	63.5	56.9	60.0	36.5	43.1	40.0	127,552	141,102	268,654
<b>Total</b>	54.3	48.7	51.3	45.7	51.4	48.7	3,397,882	3,779,888	7,177,770

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/>

**Table 9. Valid Votes and Registered Population for Run-Off (ranked by women turnout rates)**

Senatorial District	Lagos	Men Valid Votes	Women Valid Votes	Votes Total	Registered Men	Registered Women	Total Registered
V Región Costa	46.8	95.4	98.8	97.2	201,232	222,446	423,678
VI Región	52.1	91.1	92.8	91.9	214,060	220,455	434,515
X Región Sur	45.5	85.8	92.2	89.0	141,198	140,299	281,497
VII Reg. Norte	55.3	90.3	92.1	91.2	157,004	164,738	321,742
Metro Poniente	53.0	90.3	91.3	90.9	704,629	779,533	1,484,162
IV Región	60.0	87.2	90.4	88.9	146,231	156,087	302,318
VII Reg. Sur	46.3	88.0	90.3	89.2	93,307	96,584	189,891
VIII Reg. Costa	56.9	88.0	90.1	89.1	293,966	317,602	611,568
Metro Oriente	49.5	90.2	89.9	90.1	722,170	879,420	1,601,590
VIII Reg. Interior	51.3	87.5	89.8	88.7	215,083	224,283	439,366
X Región Norte	47.8	85.7	88.6	87.2	147,089	152,959	300,048
IX Región Sur	42.1	86.1	88.0	87.1	149,208	158,414	307,622
IX Región Norte	44.5	83.2	87.3	85.2	85,563	85,615	171,178
III Región	59.8	81.5	86.4	84.0	67,444	67,409	134,853
I Región	49.4	77.0	84.4	80.6	110,087	105,299	215,386
II Región	58.1	80.5	83.9	82.2	121,555	121,513	243,068
XI Región	47.7	71.1	83.0	76.3	30,233	23,975	54,208
V Reg. Cordillera	49.1	81.8	81.9	81.8	220,033	247,356	467,389
XII Región	56.0	69.8	79.5	74.1	55,298	44,099	99,397
<b>Total</b>	51.2	87.7	89.8	88.8	3,875,390	4,208,086	8,083,476

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>

**Table 10. Support for Lagos and Regional Differences among Registered Voters.  
Run Off Election**

Senatorial District	Support for Lagos among Men %	Support for Lagos among Women %	Women's Turnout Rate	Lagos Total Vote
I Región	51.6	47.3	84.4	49.4
II Región	60.9	55.3	83.9	58.1
III Región	63.6	56.3	86.4	59.8
IV Región	63.5	56.9	90.4	60.0
V Región Costa	49.5	44.5	98.8	46.8
V Reg. Cordillera	52.9	45.7	81.9	49.1
VI Región	55.7	48.6	92.8	52.1
VII Reg. Norte	59.0	51.9	92.1	55.3
VII Reg. Sur	49.3	43.5	90.3	46.3
VIII Reg. Interior	54.2	48.5	90.1	51.3
VIII Reg. Costa	59.7	54.5	89.8	56.9
IX Región Sur	44.1	40.3	87.3	42.1
IX Región Norte	47.1	42.0	88.0	44.5
X Región Norte	50.2	45.5	88.6	47.8
X Región Sur	48.1	43.0	92.2	45.5
XI Región	48.3	46.9	83.0	47.7
XII Región	55.8	56.3	79.5	56.0
Metro Poniente	56.2	50.1	91.3	53.0
Metro Oriente	52.7	46.8	89.9	49.5
Total	54.3	48.7	89.8	51.3

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>

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